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REL: 12/17/10

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



REL: 12/17/10

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090546 and 2090700
David Bittinger v.
Paula Bittinger Byrom
Appeals from Lawrence Circuit Court (DR-97-31.01)
BRYAN, Judge.
David Bittinger ("the former husband") appeals from a judgment entered by the Lawrence Circuit Court ("the trial court") insofar as it modified his child-support obligation to Paula Bittinger Byrom ("the former wife") and determined his



2090546/2090700
child-support arrearage and from an order purporting to amend that judgment.
Procedural History On January 15, 2008, the former husband filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the former wife in contempt for violating certain provisions of the parties' divorce judgment that had been entered by the trial court in 1997. The former husband also requested, among other things, that he be allowed to claim the parties' two minor children ("the children") as dependents for income-tax purposes. The former husband also sought to modify two provisions in the parties' divorce judgment that are not pertinent to this appeal. No further action was taken in the case until the former husband filed a motion for injunctive relief on January 23, 2009. In his motion, the former husband requested, among other things, that the former wife be enjoined from filing her income-tax return until the trial court ruled on his petition filed in
January 2008.
On January 29, 2009, the former wife filed an answer to the former husband's petition for contempt and to modify the divorce judgment. The former wife also filed a counterclaim

2



2090546/2090700
child-support arrearage and from an order purporting to amend that judgment.
Procedural History On January 15, 2008, the former husband filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the former wife in contempt for violating certain provisions of the parties' divorce judgment that had been entered by the trial court in 1997. The former husband also requested, among other things, that he be allowed to claim the parties' two minor children ("the children") as dependents for income-tax purposes. The former husband also sought to modify two provisions in the parties' divorce judgment that are not pertinent to this appeal. No further action was taken in the case until the former husband filed a motion for injunctive relief on January 23, 2009. In his motion, the former husband requested, among other things, that the former wife be enjoined from filing her income-tax return until the trial court ruled on his petition filed in
January 2008.
On January 29, 2009, the former wife filed an answer to the former husband's petition for contempt and to modify the divorce judgment. The former wife also filed a counterclaim

2



2090546/2090700
child-support arrearage and from an order purporting to amend that judgment.
Procedural History On January 15, 2008, the former husband filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the former wife in contempt for violating certain provisions of the parties' divorce judgment that had been entered by the trial court in 1997. The former husband also requested, among other things, that he be allowed to claim the parties' two minor children ("the children") as dependents for income-tax purposes. The former husband also sought to modify two provisions in the parties' divorce judgment that are not pertinent to this appeal. No further action was taken in the case until the former husband filed a motion for injunctive relief on January 23, 2009. In his motion, the former husband requested, among other things, that the former wife be enjoined from filing her income-tax return until the trial court ruled on his petition filed in
January 2008.
On January 29, 2009, the former wife filed an answer to the former husband's petition for contempt and to modify the divorce judgment. The former wife also filed a counterclaim

2



2090546/2090700
child-support arrearage and from an order purporting to amend that judgment.
Procedural History On January 15, 2008, the former husband filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the former wife in contempt for violating certain provisions of the parties' divorce judgment that had been entered by the trial court in 1997. The former husband also requested, among other things, that he be allowed to claim the parties' two minor children ("the children") as dependents for income-tax purposes. The former husband also sought to modify two provisions in the parties' divorce judgment that are not pertinent to this appeal. No further action was taken in the case until the former husband filed a motion for injunctive relief on January 23, 2009. In his motion, the former husband requested, among other things, that the former wife be enjoined from filing her income-tax return until the trial court ruled on his petition filed in
January 2008.
On January 29, 2009, the former wife filed an answer to the former husband's petition for contempt and to modify the divorce judgment. The former wife also filed a counterclaim

2



2090546/2090700
child-support arrearage and from an order purporting to amend that judgment.
Procedural History On January 15, 2008, the former husband filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the former wife in contempt for violating certain provisions of the parties' divorce judgment that had been entered by the trial court in 1997. The former husband also requested, among other things, that he be allowed to claim the parties' two minor children ("the children") as dependents for income-tax purposes. The former husband also sought to modify two provisions in the parties' divorce judgment that are not pertinent to this appeal. No further action was taken in the case until the former husband filed a motion for injunctive relief on January 23, 2009. In his motion, the former husband requested, among other things, that the former wife be enjoined from filing her income-tax return until the trial court ruled on his petition filed in
January 2008.
On January 29, 2009, the former wife filed an answer to the former husband's petition for contempt and to modify the divorce judgment. The former wife also filed a counterclaim

2



2090546/2090700
for contempt and a petition to modify the former husband's child-support obligation. The former wife subsequently filed an amended counterclaim seeking reimbursement of medical expenses she had incurred on behalf of the children and an award of the child-support arrearage owed by the former husband.
On or about February 3, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment ("the February 2010 judgment") that modified the former husband's child-support obligation, ordering him to pay $1,578 a month until the parties' older child turned 19 (on May 15, 2010) and to pay $1,108 a month for the parties' younger child from that point forward. The trial court also ordered the former husband to pay the former wife $26,623.40 as his child-support arrearage. That arrearage calculation included "applying the modified amount of [child] support back
to the date of filing " The judgment also ordered the
former husband to pay the former wife approximately $681 as reimbursement for certain pharmaceutical bills and health-insurance co-pays that were not covered by health insurance.
On February 12, 2010, the former wife filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., in

3



2090546/2090700
for contempt and a petition to modify the former husband's child-support obligation. The former wife subsequently filed an amended counterclaim seeking reimbursement of medical expenses she had incurred on behalf of the children and an award of the child-support arrearage owed by the former husband.
On or about February 3, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment ("the February 2010 judgment") that modified the former husband's child-support obligation, ordering him to pay $1,578 a month until the parties' older child turned 19 (on May 15, 2010) and to pay $1,108 a month for the parties' younger child from that point forward. The trial court also ordered the former husband to pay the former wife $26,623.40 as his child-support arrearage. That arrearage calculation included "applying the modified amount of [child] support back
to the date of filing " The judgment also ordered the
former husband to pay the former wife approximately $681 as reimbursement for certain pharmaceutical bills and health-insurance co-pays that were not covered by health insurance.
On February 12, 2010, the former wife filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., in

3



2090546/2090700
for contempt and a petition to modify the former husband's child-support obligation. The former wife subsequently filed an amended counterclaim seeking reimbursement of medical expenses she had incurred on behalf of the children and an award of the child-support arrearage owed by the former husband.
On or about February 3, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment ("the February 2010 judgment") that modified the former husband's child-support obligation, ordering him to pay $1,578 a month until the parties' older child turned 19 (on May 15, 2010) and to pay $1,108 a month for the parties' younger child from that point forward. The trial court also ordered the former husband to pay the former wife $26,623.40 as his child-support arrearage. That arrearage calculation included "applying the modified amount of [child] support back
to the date of filing " The judgment also ordered the
former husband to pay the former wife approximately $681 as reimbursement for certain pharmaceutical bills and health-insurance co-pays that were not covered by health insurance.
On February 12, 2010, the former wife filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., in

3



2090546/2090700
for contempt and a petition to modify the former husband's child-support obligation. The former wife subsequently filed an amended counterclaim seeking reimbursement of medical expenses she had incurred on behalf of the children and an award of the child-support arrearage owed by the former husband.
On or about February 3, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment ("the February 2010 judgment") that modified the former husband's child-support obligation, ordering him to pay $1,578 a month until the parties' older child turned 19 (on May 15, 2010) and to pay $1,108 a month for the parties' younger child from that point forward. The trial court also ordered the former husband to pay the former wife $26,623.40 as his child-support arrearage. That arrearage calculation included "applying the modified amount of [child] support back
to the date of filing " The judgment also ordered the
former husband to pay the former wife approximately $681 as reimbursement for certain pharmaceutical bills and health-insurance co-pays that were not covered by health insurance.
On February 12, 2010, the former wife filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., in

3



2090546/2090700
for contempt and a petition to modify the former husband's child-support obligation. The former wife subsequently filed an amended counterclaim seeking reimbursement of medical expenses she had incurred on behalf of the children and an award of the child-support arrearage owed by the former husband.
On or about February 3, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment ("the February 2010 judgment") that modified the former husband's child-support obligation, ordering him to pay $1,578 a month until the parties' older child turned 19 (on May 15, 2010) and to pay $1,108 a month for the parties' younger child from that point forward. The trial court also ordered the former husband to pay the former wife $26,623.40 as his child-support arrearage. That arrearage calculation included "applying the modified amount of [child] support back
to the date of filing " The judgment also ordered the
former husband to pay the former wife approximately $681 as reimbursement for certain pharmaceutical bills and health-insurance co-pays that were not covered by health insurance.
On February 12, 2010, the former wife filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., in

3



2090546/2090700
for contempt and a petition to modify the former husband's child-support obligation. The former wife subsequently filed an amended counterclaim seeking reimbursement of medical expenses she had incurred on behalf of the children and an award of the child-support arrearage owed by the former husband.
On or about February 3, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment ("the February 2010 judgment") that modified the former husband's child-support obligation, ordering him to pay $1,578 a month until the parties' older child turned 19 (on May 15, 2010) and to pay $1,108 a month for the parties' younger child from that point forward. The trial court also ordered the former husband to pay the former wife $26,623.40 as his child-support arrearage. That arrearage calculation included "applying the modified amount of [child] support back
to the date of filing " The judgment also ordered the
former husband to pay the former wife approximately $681 as reimbursement for certain pharmaceutical bills and health-insurance co-pays that were not covered by health insurance.
On February 12, 2010, the former wife filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., in

3



2090546/2090700

which she sought, among other things, the issuance of an income-withholding order and reimbursement of a portion of the younger child's orthodontic expenses and the cost of eye care for the children. The trial court set the former wife's postjudgment motion for a hearing to be conducted on March 16, 2010. On March 4, 2010, the former husband filed a notice of appeal; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090546.1
On March 17, 2010, the trial court entered an order ("the March 2010 order") amending the February 2010 judgment to provide for an income-withholding order and to require the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if his employer changed. On April 16, 2010, the trial court entered an order ("the April 2010 order") that stated, in pertinent part:
"The Court held a hearing on March 16, 2010, on the [former wife]'s Motion to Alter or Amend. No additional testimony was presented. The attorneys made oral arguments before the Court. The Court had given the attorneys additional time to submit case law for review on several issues discussed at the hearing on the Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate. Specifically, those issues were the award of attorney's fees and orthodontic bills of one of the

1That appeal was held in abeyance until the adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion. See Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P.

4



2090546/2090700

which she sought, among other things, the issuance of an income-withholding order and reimbursement of a portion of the younger child's orthodontic expenses and the cost of eye care for the children. The trial court set the former wife's postjudgment motion for a hearing to be conducted on March 16, 2010. On March 4, 2010, the former husband filed a notice of appeal; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090546.1
On March 17, 2010, the trial court entered an order ("the March 2010 order") amending the February 2010 judgment to provide for an income-withholding order and to require the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if his employer changed. On April 16, 2010, the trial court entered an order ("the April 2010 order") that stated, in pertinent part:
"The Court held a hearing on March 16, 2010, on the [former wife]'s Motion to Alter or Amend. No additional testimony was presented. The attorneys made oral arguments before the Court. The Court had given the attorneys additional time to submit case law for review on several issues discussed at the hearing on the Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate. Specifically, those issues were the award of attorney's fees and orthodontic bills of one of the

1That appeal was held in abeyance until the adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion. See Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P.

4



2090546/2090700

which she sought, among other things, the issuance of an income-withholding order and reimbursement of a portion of the younger child's orthodontic expenses and the cost of eye care for the children. The trial court set the former wife's postjudgment motion for a hearing to be conducted on March 16, 2010. On March 4, 2010, the former husband filed a notice of appeal; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090546.1
On March 17, 2010, the trial court entered an order ("the March 2010 order") amending the February 2010 judgment to provide for an income-withholding order and to require the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if his employer changed. On April 16, 2010, the trial court entered an order ("the April 2010 order") that stated, in pertinent part:
"The Court held a hearing on March 16, 2010, on the [former wife]'s Motion to Alter or Amend. No additional testimony was presented. The attorneys made oral arguments before the Court. The Court had given the attorneys additional time to submit case law for review on several issues discussed at the hearing on the Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate. Specifically, those issues were the award of attorney's fees and orthodontic bills of one of the

1That appeal was held in abeyance until the adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion. See Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P.

4



2090546/2090700

which she sought, among other things, the issuance of an income-withholding order and reimbursement of a portion of the younger child's orthodontic expenses and the cost of eye care for the children. The trial court set the former wife's postjudgment motion for a hearing to be conducted on March 16, 2010. On March 4, 2010, the former husband filed a notice of appeal; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090546.1
On March 17, 2010, the trial court entered an order ("the March 2010 order") amending the February 2010 judgment to provide for an income-withholding order and to require the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if his employer changed. On April 16, 2010, the trial court entered an order ("the April 2010 order") that stated, in pertinent part:
"The Court held a hearing on March 16, 2010, on the [former wife]'s Motion to Alter or Amend. No additional testimony was presented. The attorneys made oral arguments before the Court. The Court had given the attorneys additional time to submit case law for review on several issues discussed at the hearing on the Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate. Specifically, those issues were the award of attorney's fees and orthodontic bills of one of the

1That appeal was held in abeyance until the adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion. See Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P.

4



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

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2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700
minor children. The ... March ... 2010 [order] was in error and the Motion to Alter or Amend is GRANTED and the ... [February] ... 2010 [judgment] is AMENDED as follows
The trial court then ordered the former husband to pay a portion of the orthodontic expenses incurred by the former wife, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, ordered the entry of an income-withholding order, and ordered the former husband to contact the trial court clerk if he changed employers. The former husband filed a second notice of appeal from the April 2010 order; this court assigned that appeal case no. 2090700. This court consolidated the former husband's appeals ex mero  motu.
Issues
The former husband raises several issues for this court's
review, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the
April 2010 order is void and (2) whether the trial court erred
in its determination of his child-support obligation and his
child-support arrearage.
Standard of Review
"Under the ore tenus rule, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless these findings are

5



2090546/2090700

'plainly or palpably wrong or against the preponderance of the evidence.' Ex parte Cater, 772 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Ala. 2000). However, '[t]he ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge's conclusions of law ... with a presumption of correctness.' Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala. 1999). Thus, the court's legal conclusions are subject to de novo review."
Shealy v. Golden, 897 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala. 2004).
Discussion I. Appeal No. 2090700 On appeal, the former husband argues that the April 2010 order is void because the March 2010 order amending the February 2010 judgment to include a provision for an income-withholding order effectively denied all other relief requested by the former wife. Thus, he argues, the trial court lost jurisdiction to make any further orders after it adjudicated the former wife's postjudgment motion. See Ex parte Dowling, 477 So. 2d 400, 404 (Ala. 1985) ("In the usual case, after a post-judgment motion has been denied, the only review of that denial is by appeal; a judge has no jurisdiction to 'reconsider' the denial."). Accordingly, this court must decide whether the March 2010 order amending the February 2010 judgment to include a provision for an income-withholding order constituted a final adjudication of the

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2090546/2090700

'plainly or palpably wrong or against the preponderance of the evidence.' Ex parte Cater, 772 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Ala. 2000). However, '[t]he ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge's conclusions of law ... with a presumption of correctness.' Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala. 1999). Thus, the court's legal conclusions are subject to de novo review."
Shealy v. Golden, 897 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala. 2004).
Discussion I. Appeal No. 2090700 On appeal, the former husband argues that the April 2010 order is void because the March 2010 order amending the February 2010 judgment to include a provision for an income-withholding order effectively denied all other relief requested by the former wife. Thus, he argues, the trial court lost jurisdiction to make any further orders after it adjudicated the former wife's postjudgment motion. See Ex parte Dowling, 477 So. 2d 400, 404 (Ala. 1985) ("In the usual case, after a post-judgment motion has been denied, the only review of that denial is by appeal; a judge has no jurisdiction to 'reconsider' the denial."). Accordingly, this court must decide whether the March 2010 order amending the February 2010 judgment to include a provision for an income-withholding order constituted a final adjudication of the

6



2090546/2090700

'plainly or palpably wrong or against the preponderance of the evidence.' Ex parte Cater, 772 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Ala. 2000). However, '[t]he ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge's conclusions of law ... with a presumption of correctness.' Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala. 1999). Thus, the court's legal conclusions are subject to de novo review."
Shealy v. Golden, 897 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala. 2004).
Discussion I. Appeal No. 2090700 On appeal, the former husband argues that the April 2010 order is void because the March 2010 order amending the February 2010 judgment to include a provision for an income-withholding order effectively denied all other relief requested by the former wife. Thus, he argues, the trial court lost jurisdiction to make any further orders after it adjudicated the former wife's postjudgment motion. See Ex parte Dowling, 477 So. 2d 400, 404 (Ala. 1985) ("In the usual case, after a post-judgment motion has been denied, the only review of that denial is by appeal; a judge has no jurisdiction to 'reconsider' the denial."). Accordingly, this court must decide whether the March 2010 order amending the February 2010 judgment to include a provision for an income-withholding order constituted a final adjudication of the

6



2090546/2090700

former wife's postjudgment motion. If the March 2010 order disposed of the former wife's postjudgment motion, the former husband's notice of appeal from the February 2010 judgment, which had been held in abeyance until the adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion, became effective on the date the March 2010 order was entered, see Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the trial court lost jurisdiction to further amend the February 2010 judgment. See Horton v. Horton, 822 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (quoting Ward v. Ullery,
412 So. 2d 796, 797 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)) ("'Once an appeal is taken, the trial court loses jurisdiction to act except in matters entirely collateral to the appeal.'").
In BancTrust Co. v. Griffin, 963 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), this court was faced with a similar question. In that case, the appellant ("BancTrust") filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59 challenging, "among other things, ... the trial court's finding that it had stipulated to the admissibility of all the evidence Id. at 107 (emphasis
added). The trial court subsequently entered an order amending the final judgment that "noted that BancTrust had objected to the admissibility of some of the evidence upon

7



2090546/2090700

former wife's postjudgment motion. If the March 2010 order disposed of the former wife's postjudgment motion, the former husband's notice of appeal from the February 2010 judgment, which had been held in abeyance until the adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion, became effective on the date the March 2010 order was entered, see Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the trial court lost jurisdiction to further amend the February 2010 judgment. See Horton v. Horton, 822 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (quoting Ward v. Ullery,
412 So. 2d 796, 797 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)) ("'Once an appeal is taken, the trial court loses jurisdiction to act except in matters entirely collateral to the appeal.'").
In BancTrust Co. v. Griffin, 963 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), this court was faced with a similar question. In that case, the appellant ("BancTrust") filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59 challenging, "among other things, ... the trial court's finding that it had stipulated to the admissibility of all the evidence Id. at 107 (emphasis
added). The trial court subsequently entered an order amending the final judgment that "noted that BancTrust had objected to the admissibility of some of the evidence upon

7



2090546/2090700

former wife's postjudgment motion. If the March 2010 order disposed of the former wife's postjudgment motion, the former husband's notice of appeal from the February 2010 judgment, which had been held in abeyance until the adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion, became effective on the date the March 2010 order was entered, see Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the trial court lost jurisdiction to further amend the February 2010 judgment. See Horton v. Horton, 822 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (quoting Ward v. Ullery,
412 So. 2d 796, 797 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)) ("'Once an appeal is taken, the trial court loses jurisdiction to act except in matters entirely collateral to the appeal.'").
In BancTrust Co. v. Griffin, 963 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), this court was faced with a similar question. In that case, the appellant ("BancTrust") filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59 challenging, "among other things, ... the trial court's finding that it had stipulated to the admissibility of all the evidence Id. at 107 (emphasis
added). The trial court subsequently entered an order amending the final judgment that "noted that BancTrust had objected to the admissibility of some of the evidence upon

7



2090546/2090700

former wife's postjudgment motion. If the March 2010 order disposed of the former wife's postjudgment motion, the former husband's notice of appeal from the February 2010 judgment, which had been held in abeyance until the adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion, became effective on the date the March 2010 order was entered, see Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the trial court lost jurisdiction to further amend the February 2010 judgment. See Horton v. Horton, 822 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (quoting Ward v. Ullery,
412 So. 2d 796, 797 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)) ("'Once an appeal is taken, the trial court loses jurisdiction to act except in matters entirely collateral to the appeal.'").
In BancTrust Co. v. Griffin, 963 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), this court was faced with a similar question. In that case, the appellant ("BancTrust") filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59 challenging, "among other things, ... the trial court's finding that it had stipulated to the admissibility of all the evidence Id. at 107 (emphasis
added). The trial court subsequently entered an order amending the final judgment that "noted that BancTrust had objected to the admissibility of some of the evidence upon

7



2090546/2090700

which [the court] had relied." Id. BancTrust subsequently purported to file a second postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, adopting the same arguments it had asserted in its first postjudgment motion. Id. at 108. The trial court purported to deny that motion, and BancTrust appealed. Id. On appeal, this court held that, despite the fact that the trial court's order amending the judgment "did not explicitly address the pending postjudgment motion and did not specifically rule on that motion," the "order did change the [original] judgment in a manner requested by BancTrust in its [first] postjudgment motion." Id. at 109. We concluded that the order amending the original judgment was entered in response to BancTrust's postjudgment motion and that the time for filing a notice of appeal began running on the date the trial court entered the amended order in response to BancTrust's postjudgment motion. Id. at 109-10.
Using the reasoning from BancTrust, we conclude that the March 2010 order was an adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion, despite the fact that the trial court did not explicitly address the former wife's postjudgment motion or state that it was ruling on the postjudgment motion,

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2090546/2090700

which [the court] had relied." Id. BancTrust subsequently purported to file a second postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59, adopting the same arguments it had asserted in its first postjudgment motion. Id. at 108. The trial court purported to deny that motion, and BancTrust appealed. Id. On appeal, this court held that, despite the fact that the trial court's order amending the judgment "did not explicitly address the pending postjudgment motion and did not specifically rule on that motion," the "order did change the [original] judgment in a manner requested by BancTrust in its [first] postjudgment motion." Id. at 109. We concluded that the order amending the original judgment was entered in response to BancTrust's postjudgment motion and that the time for filing a notice of appeal began running on the date the trial court entered the amended order in response to BancTrust's postjudgment motion. Id. at 109-10.
Using the reasoning from BancTrust, we conclude that the March 2010 order was an adjudication of the former wife's postjudgment motion, despite the fact that the trial court did not explicitly address the former wife's postjudgment motion or state that it was ruling on the postjudgment motion,

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2090546/2090700

because the trial court amended the February 2010 judgment in a manner requested by the former wife in her postjudgment motion. Thus, the former husband's notice of appeal from the February 2010 judgment, which was filed on March 4, 2010, became effective on March 17, 2010, after the trial court entered that March 2010 order. See Rule 4(a)(5). Because the former husband's notice of appeal became effective on March 17, 2010, the trial court lost jurisdiction on that date and, thus, did not have jurisdiction to enter the April 2010 order further amending the February 2010 judgment. See Horton v.  Horton, supra. Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the April 2010 order, the April 2010 order is void and will not support an appeal. See T.B. v.  T.H., 30 So. 3d 429, 433 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (quoting K.R.  v. D.H., 988 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)) ("'[A] judgment entered without subject-matter jurisdiction is void, ... and ... a void judgment will not support an appeal.'"). Accordingly, the former husband's appeal taken from the April 2010 order is dismissed, and we instruct the trial court to set aside the April 2010 order. See T.B. v. T.H., 30 So. 3d at

9



2090546/2090700 433-34.2

II. Appeal No. 2090546
In appeal no. 2090546, the former husband challenges the trial court's determination of his modified child-support obligation and its determination of his child-support arrearage, and he presents this court with several arguments to support his claim that the judgment should be reversed.
First, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by utilizing the child-support guidelines appended to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., as amended. By order dated

2In her brief on appeal, the former wife argues that the April 2010 order constituted the final judgment in the case because the trial court, in the February 2010 judgment, failed to specifically rule on the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses for the children. We disagree. In her counterclaim, the former wife sought reimbursement for "medical expenses" she had incurred on behalf of the children. At the final hearing, the former wife claimed that the former husband was required to reimburse her for pharmaceutical bills, health-insurance co-pays, orthodontic expenses, and eye-care expenses. In the February 2010 judgment, the trial court ordered the former husband to reimburse the former wife only for the pharmaceutical bills and the health-insurance co-pays. Although the trial court did not specifically deny the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses, the trial court's failure to do so did not render the judgment nonfinal because it was clear that the trial court's award of part of the requested relief for reimbursement of medical expenses constituted a denial of the relief that was not granted.

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2090546/2090700 433-34.2

II. Appeal No. 2090546
In appeal no. 2090546, the former husband challenges the trial court's determination of his modified child-support obligation and its determination of his child-support arrearage, and he presents this court with several arguments to support his claim that the judgment should be reversed.
First, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by utilizing the child-support guidelines appended to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., as amended. By order dated

2In her brief on appeal, the former wife argues that the April 2010 order constituted the final judgment in the case because the trial court, in the February 2010 judgment, failed to specifically rule on the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses for the children. We disagree. In her counterclaim, the former wife sought reimbursement for "medical expenses" she had incurred on behalf of the children. At the final hearing, the former wife claimed that the former husband was required to reimburse her for pharmaceutical bills, health-insurance co-pays, orthodontic expenses, and eye-care expenses. In the February 2010 judgment, the trial court ordered the former husband to reimburse the former wife only for the pharmaceutical bills and the health-insurance co-pays. Although the trial court did not specifically deny the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses, the trial court's failure to do so did not render the judgment nonfinal because it was clear that the trial court's award of part of the requested relief for reimbursement of medical expenses constituted a denial of the relief that was not granted.

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2090546/2090700 433-34.2

II. Appeal No. 2090546
In appeal no. 2090546, the former husband challenges the trial court's determination of his modified child-support obligation and its determination of his child-support arrearage, and he presents this court with several arguments to support his claim that the judgment should be reversed.
First, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by utilizing the child-support guidelines appended to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., as amended. By order dated

2In her brief on appeal, the former wife argues that the April 2010 order constituted the final judgment in the case because the trial court, in the February 2010 judgment, failed to specifically rule on the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses for the children. We disagree. In her counterclaim, the former wife sought reimbursement for "medical expenses" she had incurred on behalf of the children. At the final hearing, the former wife claimed that the former husband was required to reimburse her for pharmaceutical bills, health-insurance co-pays, orthodontic expenses, and eye-care expenses. In the February 2010 judgment, the trial court ordered the former husband to reimburse the former wife only for the pharmaceutical bills and the health-insurance co-pays. Although the trial court did not specifically deny the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses, the trial court's failure to do so did not render the judgment nonfinal because it was clear that the trial court's award of part of the requested relief for reimbursement of medical expenses constituted a denial of the relief that was not granted.

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2090546/2090700 433-34.2

II. Appeal No. 2090546
In appeal no. 2090546, the former husband challenges the trial court's determination of his modified child-support obligation and its determination of his child-support arrearage, and he presents this court with several arguments to support his claim that the judgment should be reversed.
First, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by utilizing the child-support guidelines appended to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., as amended. By order dated

2In her brief on appeal, the former wife argues that the April 2010 order constituted the final judgment in the case because the trial court, in the February 2010 judgment, failed to specifically rule on the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses for the children. We disagree. In her counterclaim, the former wife sought reimbursement for "medical expenses" she had incurred on behalf of the children. At the final hearing, the former wife claimed that the former husband was required to reimburse her for pharmaceutical bills, health-insurance co-pays, orthodontic expenses, and eye-care expenses. In the February 2010 judgment, the trial court ordered the former husband to reimburse the former wife only for the pharmaceutical bills and the health-insurance co-pays. Although the trial court did not specifically deny the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses, the trial court's failure to do so did not render the judgment nonfinal because it was clear that the trial court's award of part of the requested relief for reimbursement of medical expenses constituted a denial of the relief that was not granted.

10



2090546/2090700 433-34.2

II. Appeal No. 2090546
In appeal no. 2090546, the former husband challenges the trial court's determination of his modified child-support obligation and its determination of his child-support arrearage, and he presents this court with several arguments to support his claim that the judgment should be reversed.
First, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by utilizing the child-support guidelines appended to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., as amended. By order dated

2In her brief on appeal, the former wife argues that the April 2010 order constituted the final judgment in the case because the trial court, in the February 2010 judgment, failed to specifically rule on the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses for the children. We disagree. In her counterclaim, the former wife sought reimbursement for "medical expenses" she had incurred on behalf of the children. At the final hearing, the former wife claimed that the former husband was required to reimburse her for pharmaceutical bills, health-insurance co-pays, orthodontic expenses, and eye-care expenses. In the February 2010 judgment, the trial court ordered the former husband to reimburse the former wife only for the pharmaceutical bills and the health-insurance co-pays. Although the trial court did not specifically deny the former wife's request for reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and eye-care expenses, the trial court's failure to do so did not render the judgment nonfinal because it was clear that the trial court's award of part of the requested relief for reimbursement of medical expenses constituted a denial of the relief that was not granted.

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November 19, 2008, the Alabama Supreme Court amended Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., including the child-support guidelines, effective January 1, 2009. The schedule of basic child-support obligations found in the appendix to Rule 32 was revised and updated to reflect "the latest extensive economic research on the cost of supporting children at various income levels." Comment to Amendments to Rule 32, Effective January 1, 2009. The former husband argues that, because this action was filed in January 2008, the child-support guidelines as they existed at that time should have been used to calculate his child-support obligation. However, our review of the record reveals that the former husband failed to present this argument to the trial court for its consideration. "[An appellate c]ourt cannot consider arguments advanced for the purpose of reversing the judgment of a trial court when those arguments were never presented to the trial court for consideration or were raised for the first time on appeal." State Farm Mut.  Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 821 (Ala. 2005). Accordingly, we will not consider the former husband's argument that the trial court erred by applying Rule 32, as amended, effective January 1, 2009.

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Similarly, the former husband argues that the child-support guidelines, as they existed in January 2008, did not apply because the combined adjusted gross incomes of the parties exceeded $10,000. This argument was not presented to the trial court, and we will not consider it on appeal. See  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra.
Next, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by failing to calculate his child-support obligation based on the evidence of his monthly income and health-insurance expense that were presented at trial. The record indicates that, at the time of the hearing, the former wife was unemployed, but she received $1,257 a month in unemployment benefits. The former husband testified that he
had earned $210,070 in 2004, $253,487 in 2006, $216,294 in 2007, and approximately $151,000 in 2008.
The former husband testified that he had worked at Inspec Group from early 2009 through the first week of September 2009. He testified that his yearly salary while he was employed at Inspec Group was $105,200 plus bonuses. The former husband stated that he had voluntarily quit his job with Inspec Group because it required extensive travel. After

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Similarly, the former husband argues that the child-support guidelines, as they existed in January 2008, did not apply because the combined adjusted gross incomes of the parties exceeded $10,000. This argument was not presented to the trial court, and we will not consider it on appeal. See  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra.
Next, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by failing to calculate his child-support obligation based on the evidence of his monthly income and health-insurance expense that were presented at trial. The record indicates that, at the time of the hearing, the former wife was unemployed, but she received $1,257 a month in unemployment benefits. The former husband testified that he
had earned $210,070 in 2004, $253,487 in 2006, $216,294 in 2007, and approximately $151,000 in 2008.
The former husband testified that he had worked at Inspec Group from early 2009 through the first week of September 2009. He testified that his yearly salary while he was employed at Inspec Group was $105,200 plus bonuses. The former husband stated that he had voluntarily quit his job with Inspec Group because it required extensive travel. After

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2090546/2090700

Similarly, the former husband argues that the child-support guidelines, as they existed in January 2008, did not apply because the combined adjusted gross incomes of the parties exceeded $10,000. This argument was not presented to the trial court, and we will not consider it on appeal. See  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra.
Next, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by failing to calculate his child-support obligation based on the evidence of his monthly income and health-insurance expense that were presented at trial. The record indicates that, at the time of the hearing, the former wife was unemployed, but she received $1,257 a month in unemployment benefits. The former husband testified that he
had earned $210,070 in 2004, $253,487 in 2006, $216,294 in 2007, and approximately $151,000 in 2008.
The former husband testified that he had worked at Inspec Group from early 2009 through the first week of September 2009. He testified that his yearly salary while he was employed at Inspec Group was $105,200 plus bonuses. The former husband stated that he had voluntarily quit his job with Inspec Group because it required extensive travel. After

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Similarly, the former husband argues that the child-support guidelines, as they existed in January 2008, did not apply because the combined adjusted gross incomes of the parties exceeded $10,000. This argument was not presented to the trial court, and we will not consider it on appeal. See  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra.
Next, the former husband argues that the trial court erred by failing to calculate his child-support obligation based on the evidence of his monthly income and health-insurance expense that were presented at trial. The record indicates that, at the time of the hearing, the former wife was unemployed, but she received $1,257 a month in unemployment benefits. The former husband testified that he
had earned $210,070 in 2004, $253,487 in 2006, $216,294 in 2007, and approximately $151,000 in 2008.
The former husband testified that he had worked at Inspec Group from early 2009 through the first week of September 2009. He testified that his yearly salary while he was employed at Inspec Group was $105,200 plus bonuses. The former husband stated that he had voluntarily quit his job with Inspec Group because it required extensive travel. After

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he left Inspec Group, he began working for a company called Parsons in Aiken, South Carolina. While he was employed by Parsons, the former husband earned the same wages that he had earned while employed by Inspec Group, but he did not receive a bonus while working for Parsons. The former husband testified that he had voluntarily quit his job with Parsons after two months because it required too much time away from his home, which was in or near Decatur. He denied that he had quit his job at Parsons to avoid a higher child-support obligation. Shortly before the ore tenus hearing, the former husband began working at H & M Company in Mobile. He stated that he earne

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