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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008 _________________________ 1060897 _________________________ Ex parte Manu C. Patel PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Manu C. Patel v. Management Enterprise Development and Services, Inc., et al.) (Madison Circuit Court, CV-04-1776; Court of Civil Appeals, 2050839) LYONS, Justice.

1060897 Manu C. Patel sued Management Enterprise Development and Services, Inc. (hereinafter "MEDS"); Stanley McCall, the chief executive officer of MEDS; and Willow Run Nursing Center, Inc. (hereinafter "Willow Run"), a facility developed by MEDS

(hereinafter collectively "the MEDS parties"), alleging breach of contract. The trial court entered a summary judgment in Patel then appealed to the Court

favor of the MEDS parties. of Civil Appeals.

The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Patel v. Management

summary judgment, without an opinion.

Enter. Dev. & Servs., Inc. (No. 2050839, January 12, 2007), __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (table). Patel then

petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, and we granted certiorari Appeals' conflict to consider of only the whether trial the Court of Civil is on in a

affirmance with our

court's

judgment that,

settled

authority

requiring

motion for summary judgment, the evidence is to be viewed most favorably to the nonmovant. We reverse and remand.

I. Facts and Procedural History Patel alleged that the MEDS parties breached a contract to compensate him for his work in assisting MEDS in obtaining a loan from Colonial Bank. Patel, who describes himself as a

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1060897 financial consultant, had previously assisted Willow Run in obtaining financing. Patel contends that after McCall told

him that he was experiencing difficulty obtaining financing from Colonial Bank for the development of Willow Run, Patel told McCall that he could help MEDS obtain the financing. According to Patel, "[w]ithin a month or so" of this

conversation, Patel and McCall entered into an oral contract pursuant to which MEDS would pay Patel a fee of 1% of the financed amount in exchange for Patel's assistance in

obtaining a loan from Colonial Bank. to Patel, called for MEDS to

The agreement, according the fee in monthly

pay

installments of $10,000, to begin once the financing had been obtained and to continue until the fee was paid in full. Patel also alleges that after the loan was obtained in the amount of $4,700,000, he and McCall entered into an oral

agreement specifying that the fee was $47,000 or 1% of the amount of the loan. After the loan had been finalized, Patel sent McCall an e-mail referring to "your commitment" to pay Patel $10,000 per month until the fee of $47,000 was paid. $10,000 payments in consecutive months. MEDS then made two

After a hiatus of two

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1060897 months, during which MEDS made no payment to Patel, MEDS emailed Patel stating, "WE DO NOT HAVE THE MONEY YET .... WE HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED THE MONEY TO PAY YOU AS OF YET." A month

later, McCall sent Patel an e-mail stating, in pertinent part: "Whatever I do for Willow Run Nursing Center will be because I personally choose and not because of any legal obligations." MEDS made no further payments to Patel. MEDS denies that it

entered into any contract with Patel, and it disputes Patel's involvement in procuring the loan from Colonial Bank. II. Standard of Review Because we are reviewing the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of a summary judgment, our review is de novo. certiorari correctness appellate review, to the this legal Court accords no of presumption "On of

conclusions we must

the

intermediate de novo the

court.

Therefore,

apply

standard of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil Appeals." Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135 The law is well established that a de novo to appellate review of a trial court's

(Ala. 1996). standard

applies

summary judgment.

Ex parte Fort James Operating Co., 895 So.

2d 294 (Ala. 2004).

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1060897 III. Analysis Patel argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the summary judgment in favor of the MEDS parties because, he argues, the Court of Civil Appeals (1) did not review the evidence in the light most favorable to him as the nonmovant, and (2) did not resolve all reasonable doubts

regarding the evidence in his favor.

The MEDS parties argue

that the Court of Civil Appeals properly affirmed the summary judgment because, they argue, there is no basis from which to reasonably infer the existence of a valid contract between Patel and the MEDS parties. The MEDS parties specifically

argue that without making impermissible inferences in favor of Patel, the fact-finder could not conclude that the

consideration required for a valid contract existed because, they argue, the alleged promise to pay Patel occurred after Patel contends that he performed the alleged contract. A summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Civ. P. See Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R.

To determine whether the evidence creates a genuine

issue of material fact, "[the appellate court] must review the

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1060897 record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant." Ex

parte Steadman, 812 So. 2d 290, 293 (Ala. 2001) (citing Pryor v. Brown & Root USA, Inc., 674 So. 2d 45, 47 (Ala. 1995)). In

a breach-of-contract action, no genuine issue of material facts exists "where the contract is unambiguous and the facts undisputed." P & S Bus., Inc. v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.,

466 So. 2d 928, 931-32 (Ala. 1985). The MEDS parties contend that Patel's deposition

testimony, to the effect that "once the loan was confirmed, Mr. McCall agreed to pay me $47,000," establishes that, as a matter of law, the promise by McCall took place after the loan had been obtained and that, therefore, no consideration for payment for the rendition of previous services existed. The

MEDS parties, as did the Court of Civil Appeals, rely upon Gregory v. Hardy, 53 Ala. App. 705, 304 So. 2d 209 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974), which provides that for mutual promises to be enforceable the promises "'must be concurrent, that is, they must become obligatiory [sic] at the same time; otherwise each is a nudum pactum at the time it is made, and neither will support the other. Promises made at different times on the

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1060897 same day are not sufficient.'" 53 Ala. App. at 712, 304 So.

2d at 215 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts

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