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REL: 10/29/2010

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



REL: 10/29/2010

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
2090490
Tina Lang v.
Michael Lang
Appeal from Pickens Circuit Court (DR-04-16.01 and DR-04-16.02)
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Tina Lang ("the mother") appeals from a judgment modifying custody of the parties' three children. The mother
had been awarded primary physical custody of the children when she and Michael Lang ("the father") divorced in December 2004.



2090490
In the judgment at issue, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father; it awarded custody of the oldest child to the children's maternal grandparents. The children were 16, nine, and six years old at the time of trial. The youngest child is a boy; the older two children are girls.
The record indicates the following. In August 2006, the father filed a petition seeking to hold the mother in contempt for staying overnight with a member of the opposite sex while the children were present, in contravention of the divorce judgment. The father also requested custody of the parties' three children. The mother then filed a motion seeking to hold the father in contempt for his failure to pay child support and for his failure to exercise visitation with all the children. The mother asserted that the father visited with only one child and took only one child for summer vacation. The mother and the father settled their differences at that time, and the trial court incorporated their agreement into a judgment entered on August 23, 2006. In that judgment, the trial court also held the mother in contempt for her admitted violation of the cohabitation provision of the

2



2090490
In the judgment at issue, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father; it awarded custody of the oldest child to the children's maternal grandparents. The children were 16, nine, and six years old at the time of trial. The youngest child is a boy; the older two children are girls.
The record indicates the following. In August 2006, the father filed a petition seeking to hold the mother in contempt for staying overnight with a member of the opposite sex while the children were present, in contravention of the divorce judgment. The father also requested custody of the parties' three children. The mother then filed a motion seeking to hold the father in contempt for his failure to pay child support and for his failure to exercise visitation with all the children. The mother asserted that the father visited with only one child and took only one child for summer vacation. The mother and the father settled their differences at that time, and the trial court incorporated their agreement into a judgment entered on August 23, 2006. In that judgment, the trial court also held the mother in contempt for her admitted violation of the cohabitation provision of the

2



2090490
In the judgment at issue, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father; it awarded custody of the oldest child to the children's maternal grandparents. The children were 16, nine, and six years old at the time of trial. The youngest child is a boy; the older two children are girls.
The record indicates the following. In August 2006, the father filed a petition seeking to hold the mother in contempt for staying overnight with a member of the opposite sex while the children were present, in contravention of the divorce judgment. The father also requested custody of the parties' three children. The mother then filed a motion seeking to hold the father in contempt for his failure to pay child support and for his failure to exercise visitation with all the children. The mother asserted that the father visited with only one child and took only one child for summer vacation. The mother and the father settled their differences at that time, and the trial court incorporated their agreement into a judgment entered on August 23, 2006. In that judgment, the trial court also held the mother in contempt for her admitted violation of the cohabitation provision of the

2



2090490

divorce judgment. In the August 23, 2006, judgment, the trial court also stated: "The parties have agreed that no future custody petitions shall be filed based on the co-habitation issue which is being resolved by this order."
On March 26, 2007, the father filed another petition for a custody modification, alleging that the mother had violated the August 23, 2006, order enforcing the provision in the divorce judgment forbidding the mother to cohabitate. In his petition, the father sought custody of the parties' middle child and asked that custody of the oldest and youngest children be awarded to the maternal grandparents. The same day--March 26, 2007--the trial court entered an ex parte order awarding pendente lite custody of the middle child to the father and awarding pendente lite custody of the other two children to the maternal grandparents.
During the two years after the entry of the ex parte pendente lite order, the parties filed a number of petitions and motions regarding child support and visitation issues. Four judges have presided over this case. As pointed out by the trial judge who entered the judgment made the basis of this appeal, it appears from the record that the parties

3



2090490

divorce judgment. In the August 23, 2006, judgment, the trial court also stated: "The parties have agreed that no future custody petitions shall be filed based on the co-habitation issue which is being resolved by this order."
On March 26, 2007, the father filed another petition for a custody modification, alleging that the mother had violated the August 23, 2006, order enforcing the provision in the divorce judgment forbidding the mother to cohabitate. In his petition, the father sought custody of the parties' middle child and asked that custody of the oldest and youngest children be awarded to the maternal grandparents. The same day--March 26, 2007--the trial court entered an ex parte order awarding pendente lite custody of the middle child to the father and awarding pendente lite custody of the other two children to the maternal grandparents.
During the two years after the entry of the ex parte pendente lite order, the parties filed a number of petitions and motions regarding child support and visitation issues. Four judges have presided over this case. As pointed out by the trial judge who entered the judgment made the basis of this appeal, it appears from the record that the parties

3



2090490

divorce judgment. In the August 23, 2006, judgment, the trial court also stated: "The parties have agreed that no future custody petitions shall be filed based on the co-habitation issue which is being resolved by this order."
On March 26, 2007, the father filed another petition for a custody modification, alleging that the mother had violated the August 23, 2006, order enforcing the provision in the divorce judgment forbidding the mother to cohabitate. In his petition, the father sought custody of the parties' middle child and asked that custody of the oldest and youngest children be awarded to the maternal grandparents. The same day--March 26, 2007--the trial court entered an ex parte order awarding pendente lite custody of the middle child to the father and awarding pendente lite custody of the other two children to the maternal grandparents.
During the two years after the entry of the ex parte pendente lite order, the parties filed a number of petitions and motions regarding child support and visitation issues. Four judges have presided over this case. As pointed out by the trial judge who entered the judgment made the basis of this appeal, it appears from the record that the parties

3



2090490

reached agreements on the issues raised in their various petitions before hearings could be held. Since the entry of the March 26, 2007, ex parte custody order, the custody arrangement set forth in that order remained in place. After providing time for the parents to submit to drug tests and for a psychologist to examine the children and after a number of continuances requested by the attorneys for both parties and by the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the children, a trial was held on the issue of "permanent" custody on July
30, 2009.
The evidence adduced at the July 30, 2009, trial tended to show the following. The father testified that he sought a custody modification because, at the time he filed the petition in 2007, the mother was spending the night with a man who was a user and manufacturer of methamphetamine. The mother acknowledged that she had been in a relationship with the man, and she was aware he used and manufactured methamphetamine, but, she said, she did not use drugs or drink alcohol. The older children were upset over the mother's relationship with the man, who was in jail at the time of the trial. The mother acknowledged that, while she was in that

4



2090490

reached agreements on the issues raised in their various petitions before hearings could be held. Since the entry of the March 26, 2007, ex parte custody order, the custody arrangement set forth in that order remained in place. After providing time for the parents to submit to drug tests and for a psychologist to examine the children and after a number of continuances requested by the attorneys for both parties and by the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the children, a trial was held on the issue of "permanent" custody on July
30, 2009.
The evidence adduced at the July 30, 2009, trial tended to show the following. The father testified that he sought a custody modification because, at the time he filed the petition in 2007, the mother was spending the night with a man who was a user and manufacturer of methamphetamine. The mother acknowledged that she had been in a relationship with the man, and she was aware he used and manufactured methamphetamine, but, she said, she did not use drugs or drink alcohol. The older children were upset over the mother's relationship with the man, who was in jail at the time of the trial. The mother acknowledged that, while she was in that

4



2090490

reached agreements on the issues raised in their various petitions before hearings could be held. Since the entry of the March 26, 2007, ex parte custody order, the custody arrangement set forth in that order remained in place. After providing time for the parents to submit to drug tests and for a psychologist to examine the children and after a number of continuances requested by the attorneys for both parties and by the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the children, a trial was held on the issue of "permanent" custody on July
30, 2009.
The evidence adduced at the July 30, 2009, trial tended to show the following. The father testified that he sought a custody modification because, at the time he filed the petition in 2007, the mother was spending the night with a man who was a user and manufacturer of methamphetamine. The mother acknowledged that she had been in a relationship with the man, and she was aware he used and manufactured methamphetamine, but, she said, she did not use drugs or drink alcohol. The older children were upset over the mother's relationship with the man, who was in jail at the time of the trial. The mother acknowledged that, while she was in that

4



2090490
relationship, she had put her relationship with her boyfriend before the needs of her children. She said that, at the time, she did not believe that the relationship might cause her to lose custody of her children because, she said, she believed that the father was "trying to get back" at her. She also testified that, although she had continued the relationship after the trial court entered the ex parte pendente lite custody order on March 26, 2007, she never "stayed" with the man again. The mother testified that the relationship had ended more than a year before the 2009 trial.
At the time of the trial, the mother was engaged to a man she had known all of her life. She said that they had been dating for seven months. Her fiance has a four-bedroom, two-bath house, large enough to accommodate all three children; she said that she did not want the children separated. At the time of the trial, the mother was living with the maternal grandparents. She said that she had moved in with them to be with her children, two of whom had been living with the maternal grandparents as a result of the 2007 ex parte order. The mother testified that she had a full-time job and could

5



2090490
relationship, she had put her relationship with her boyfriend before the needs of her children. She said that, at the time, she did not believe that the relationship might cause her to lose custody of her children because, she said, she believed that the father was "trying to get back" at her. She also testified that, although she had continued the relationship after the trial court entered the ex parte pendente lite custody order on March 26, 2007, she never "stayed" with the man again. The mother testified that the relationship had ended more than a year before the 2009 trial.
At the time of the trial, the mother was engaged to a man she had known all of her life. She said that they had been dating for seven months. Her fiance has a four-bedroom, two-bath house, large enough to accommodate all three children; she said that she did not want the children separated. At the time of the trial, the mother was living with the maternal grandparents. She said that she had moved in with them to be with her children, two of whom had been living with the maternal grandparents as a result of the 2007 ex parte order. The mother testified that she had a full-time job and could

5



2090490
relationship, she had put her relationship with her boyfriend before the needs of her children. She said that, at the time, she did not believe that the relationship might cause her to lose custody of her children because, she said, she believed that the father was "trying to get back" at her. She also testified that, although she had continued the relationship after the trial court entered the ex parte pendente lite custody order on March 26, 2007, she never "stayed" with the man again. The mother testified that the relationship had ended more than a year before the 2009 trial.
At the time of the trial, the mother was engaged to a man she had known all of her life. She said that they had been dating for seven months. Her fiance has a four-bedroom, two-bath house, large enough to accommodate all three children; she said that she did not want the children separated. At the time of the trial, the mother was living with the maternal grandparents. She said that she had moved in with them to be with her children, two of whom had been living with the maternal grandparents as a result of the 2007 ex parte order. The mother testified that she had a full-time job and could

5



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



2090490

support all three children. She also said that she was back in school studying to earn a degree as a registered nurse.
The mother submitted to a drug test, the results of which were negative, but she did not submit to the hair-follicle test that the trial court requested. The mother testified that she could not afford the latter test but that she did submit to a urine drug test. The results of that test, included in the record, indicated that the mother was not using drugs of any kind.
The mother also did not take part in the psychologist's
examination of the children. She testified that she thought
she was to make the children available for the psychologist,
but she did not think that she was to be there. The order
requiring the children to submit to the examinations states:
"[T]he court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that they be examined by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in order to determine their current emotional state; any underlying causes of distress; and to make recommendations to the court and the guardian ad litem concerning future handling of the children's emotional needs."
The father was ordered to pay the cost of the children's
sessions with the psychologist.

6



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Similarly, the mother testified that she did not contact the guardian ad litem appointed on behalf of the children because, she said, she believed that the guardian ad litem was to contact the children. The mother said that she had not paid the guardian ad litem because, she said, she never received a bill.
The father was living with his father in the children's paternal grandparents' house at the time of trial. The father's mother had died a month before the trial. The paternal grandparents' house has three bedrooms: the paternal grandfather has one room, the father has one room, and the middle child has the last room. When the youngest child had visited with the father, he had slept with the father in his room or with the paternal grandparents in their room. The father testified that if he received custody of all three children, he would have to "work out" sleeping arrangements. He speculated that they would make use of "air mattresses, couches, whatever."
The father testified that he had requested custody of only one of the children because it was too difficult for him to drive the oldest and youngest children to school. The

7



2090490

Similarly, the mother testified that she did not contact the guardian ad litem appointed on behalf of the children because, she said, she believed that the guardian ad litem was to contact the children. The mother said that she had not paid the guardian ad litem because, she said, she never received a bill.
The father was living with his father in the children's paternal grandparents' house at the time of trial. The father's mother had died a month before the trial. The paternal grandparents' house has three bedrooms: the paternal grandfather has one room, the father has one room, and the middle child has the last room. When the youngest child had visited with the father, he had slept with the father in his room or with the paternal grandparents in their room. The father testified that if he received custody of all three children, he would have to "work out" sleeping arrangements. He speculated that they would make use of "air mattresses, couches, whatever."
The father testified that he had requested custody of only one of the children because it was too difficult for him to drive the oldest and youngest children to school. The

7



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Similarly, the mother testified that she did not contact the guardian ad litem appointed on behalf of the children because, she said, she believed that the guardian ad litem was to contact the children. The mother said that she had not paid the guardian ad litem because, she said, she never received a bill.
The father was living with his father in the children's paternal grandparents' house at the time of trial. The father's mother had died a month before the trial. The paternal grandparents' house has three bedrooms: the paternal grandfather has one room, the father has one room, and the middle child has the last room. When the youngest child had visited with the father, he had slept with the father in his room or with the paternal grandparents in their room. The father testified that if he received custody of all three children, he would have to "work out" sleeping arrangements. He speculated that they would make use of "air mattresses, couches, whatever."
The father testified that he had requested custody of only one of the children because it was too difficult for him to drive the oldest and youngest children to school. The

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oldest child was in high school in Gordo, and, at the time the father filed his petition, the youngest child was in school in Reform. The father lived in Greene County, more than 30 miles away from the children's schools. At the time of the trial, however, the middle child and the youngest child attended the same school. The father said that, in addition to seeing the youngest child every other weekend, he also sees the youngest child when he takes the middle child to school or picks her up from school. The father testified that he and the oldest child, a daughter, had a strained relationship. He seldom saw the oldest child, although he did speak with her on the telephone approximately once every two weeks.
The middle child was in the fourth grade at the time of the trial. By all accounts, she was a good student while in the father's custody. When the middle child was in the first grade, she lived with the mother. The father called the middle child's first-grade teacher to testify that, while in the first grade, that child had been inattentive, had frequently daydreamed, and had "seemed to be just in her own little world." Both the mother and the father met with the teacher and were involved in helping to work with the child.

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oldest child was in high school in Gordo, and, at the time the father filed his petition, the youngest child was in school in Reform. The father lived in Greene County, more than 30 miles away from the children's schools. At the time of the trial, however, the middle child and the youngest child attended the same school. The father said that, in addition to seeing the youngest child every other weekend, he also sees the youngest child when he takes the middle child to school or picks her up from school. The father testified that he and the oldest child, a daughter, had a strained relationship. He seldom saw the oldest child, although he did speak with her on the telephone approximately once every two weeks.
The middle child was in the fourth grade at the time of the trial. By all accounts, she was a good student while in the father's custody. When the middle child was in the first grade, she lived with the mother. The father called the middle child's first-grade teacher to testify that, while in the first grade, that child had been inattentive, had frequently daydreamed, and had "seemed to be just in her own little world." Both the mother and the father met with the teacher and were involved in helping to work with the child.

8



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The teacher also testified that she recalled "something about maybe the power was cut off" when the middle child was living with the mother; however, the teacher could not remember specifically where the power had been turned off, saying: "I don't know that it was [the middle child's] mother's apartment or house. It may have been someone else's." The teacher noted that three years had passed since the incident.
The father conceded that he had not made any child-support payments in the eight months preceding the trial. The father testified that he was self-employed and that his income fluctuated between $16,000 and $30,000 annually. Evidence introduced at trial indicated that the father's monthly income was $1,500 and that the mother's monthly income was $2,393.60.
A psychologist who had met with the two oldest children in 2008 testified that, at that time, both were emotionally healthy, well adjusted children. The psychologist said that the oldest child appeared to be angry with the mother for being in a relationship with a man. At the time the psychologist met with the children, the mother would still have been in the relationship with the man who allegedly used and manufactured methamphetamine, whom she was no longer

9



2090490

The teacher also testified that she recalled "something about maybe the power was cut off" when the middle child was living with the mother; however, the teacher could not remember specifically where the power had been turned off, saying: "I don't know that it was [the middle child's] mother's apartment or house. It may have been someone else's." The teacher noted that three years had passed since the incident.
The father conceded that he had not made any child-support payments in the eight months preceding the trial. The father testified that he was self-employed and that his income fluctuated between $16,000 and $30,000 annually. Evidence introduced at trial indicated that the father's monthly income was $1,500 and that the mother's monthly income was $2,393.60.
A psychologist who had met with the two oldest children in 2008 testified that, at that time, both were emotionally healthy, well adjusted children. The psychologist said that the oldest child appeared to be angry with the mother for being in a relationship with a man. At the time the psychologist met with the children, the mother would still have been in the relationship with the man who allegedly used and manufactured methamphetamine, whom she was no longer

9



2090490

The teacher also testified that she recalled "something about maybe the power was cut off" when the middle child was living with the mother; however, the teacher could not remember specifically where the power had been turned off, saying: "I don't know that it was [the middle child's] mother's apartment or house. It may have been someone else's." The teacher noted that three years had passed since the incident.
The father conceded that he had not made any child-support payments in the eight months preceding the trial. The father testified that he was self-employed and that his income fluctuated between $16,000 and $30,000 annually. Evidence introduced at trial indicated that the father's monthly income was $1,500 and that the mother's monthly income was $2,393.60.
A psychologist who had met with the two oldest children in 2008 testified that, at that time, both were emotionally healthy, well adjusted children. The psychologist said that the oldest child appeared to be angry with the mother for being in a relationship with a man. At the time the psychologist met with the children, the mother would still have been in the relationship with the man who allegedly used and manufactured methamphetamine, whom she was no longer

9



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seeing at the time of the trial. Likewise, the psychologist said, he thought the oldest child had distanced herself from the father. The psychologist's report indicated that the oldest child thought that the father's affair with a "close friend of the family" had caused her parents' divorce.
On January 21, 2010, the trial court entered an order finding that the father was a fit parent and that the mother was "unfit" for a number of reasons, including that the man with whom the mother had previously been cohabitating was a methamphetamine user and manufacturer who was in prison at the time of the trial. The mother had admitted that she had continued to cohabitate with the man even after the August 2006 contempt order was entered, saying that, at the time, she put that relationship before the needs of her children. The trial court further noted that, at the time of the trial, the mother was not "ready to acknowledge that the relationship with [the man had] threatened her custody of the children."
As further grounds that the mother was "unfit," the trial court stated that the mother had failed to participate when the psychologist had examined the children; that she had not

10



2090490

seeing at the time of the trial. Likewise, the psychologist said, he thought the oldest child had distanced herself from the father. The psychologist's report indicated that the oldest child thought that the father's affair with a "close friend of the family" had caused her parents' divorce.
On January 21, 2010, the trial court entered an order finding that the father was a fit parent and that the mother was "unfit" for a number of reasons, including that the man with whom the mother had previously been cohabitating was a methamphetamine user and manufacturer who was in prison at the time of the trial. The mother had admitted that she had continued to cohabitate with the man even after the August 2006 contempt order was entered, saying that, at the time, she put that relationship before the needs of her children. The trial court further noted that, at the time of the trial, the mother was not "ready to acknowledge that the relationship with [the man had] threatened her custody of the children."
As further grounds that the mother was "unfit," the trial court stated that the mother had failed to participate when the psychologist had examined the children; that she had not

10



2090490

seeing at the time of the trial. Likewise, the psychologist said, he thought the oldest child had distanced herself from the father. The psychologist's report indicated that the oldest child thought that the father's affair with a "close friend of the family" had caused her parents' divorce.
On January 21, 2010, the trial court entered an order finding that the father was a fit parent and that the mother was "unfit" for a number of reasons, including that the man with whom the mother had previously been cohabitating was a methamphetamine user and manufacturer who was in prison at the time of the trial. The mother had admitted that she had continued to cohabitate with the man even after the August 2006 contempt order was entered, saying that, at the time, she put that relationship before the needs of her children. The trial court further noted that, at the time of the trial, the mother was not "ready to acknowledge that the relationship with [the man had] threatened her custody of the children."
As further grounds that the mother was "unfit," the trial court stated that the mother had failed to participate when the psychologist had examined the children; that she had not

10



2090490
submitted to a hair-follicle drug test;1 and that she had not contacted the children's guardian ad litem although the guardian ad litem had sought her input.
Based upon its findings, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father and awarded custody of the oldest child to the maternal grandparents. The mother was awarded supervised visitation with the middle child and the youngest child and unsupervised visitation with the oldest child.
In addition to modifying custody, the trial court's judgment also established child-support obligations, determined the father's child-support arrearage, ordered the mother and the father to each pay half of the guardian ad litem's fee, and denied all other relief the parties had requested. The mother appeals.
The mother contends that the trial court violated her right to due process when it entered the March 2007 ex parte custody order and an order extending the terms of that order,
1The record includes the results of urine drug tests administered to the mother and the father. The results of both tests were negative for the presence of illegal drugs. There is no evidence in the record indicating that either the mother or the father submitted to a hair-follicle drug test.

11



2090490
submitted to a hair-follicle drug test;1 and that she had not contacted the children's guardian ad litem although the guardian ad litem had sought her input.
Based upon its findings, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father and awarded custody of the oldest child to the maternal grandparents. The mother was awarded supervised visitation with the middle child and the youngest child and unsupervised visitation with the oldest child.
In addition to modifying custody, the trial court's judgment also established child-support obligations, determined the father's child-support arrearage, ordered the mother and the father to each pay half of the guardian ad litem's fee, and denied all other relief the parties had requested. The mother appeals.
The mother contends that the trial court violated her right to due process when it entered the March 2007 ex parte custody order and an order extending the terms of that order,
1The record includes the results of urine drug tests administered to the mother and the father. The results of both tests were negative for the presence of illegal drugs. There is no evidence in the record indicating that either the mother or the father submitted to a hair-follicle drug test.

11



2090490
submitted to a hair-follicle drug test;1 and that she had not contacted the children's guardian ad litem although the guardian ad litem had sought her input.
Based upon its findings, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father and awarded custody of the oldest child to the maternal grandparents. The mother was awarded supervised visitation with the middle child and the youngest child and unsupervised visitation with the oldest child.
In addition to modifying custody, the trial court's judgment also established child-support obligations, determined the father's child-support arrearage, ordered the mother and the father to each pay half of the guardian ad litem's fee, and denied all other relief the parties had requested. The mother appeals.
The mother contends that the trial court violated her right to due process when it entered the March 2007 ex parte custody order and an order extending the terms of that order,
1The record includes the results of urine drug tests administered to the mother and the father. The results of both tests were negative for the presence of illegal drugs. There is no evidence in the record indicating that either the mother or the father submitted to a hair-follicle drug test.

11



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submitted to a hair-follicle drug test;1 and that she had not contacted the children's guardian ad litem although the guardian ad litem had sought her input.
Based upon its findings, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father and awarded custody of the oldest child to the maternal grandparents. The mother was awarded supervised visitation with the middle child and the youngest child and unsupervised visitation with the oldest child.
In addition to modifying custody, the trial court's judgment also established child-support obligations, determined the father's child-support arrearage, ordered the mother and the father to each pay half of the guardian ad litem's fee, and denied all other relief the parties had requested. The mother appeals.
The mother contends that the trial court violated her right to due process when it entered the March 2007 ex parte custody order and an order extending the terms of that order,
1The record includes the results of urine drug tests administered to the mother and the father. The results of both tests were negative for the presence of illegal drugs. There is no evidence in the record indicating that either the mother or the father submitted to a hair-follicle drug test.

11



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submitted to a hair-follicle drug test;1 and that she had not contacted the children's guardian ad litem although the guardian ad litem had sought her input.
Based upon its findings, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father and awarded custody of the oldest child to the maternal grandparents. The mother was awarded supervised visitation with the middle child and the youngest child and unsupervised visitation with the oldest child.
In addition to modifying custody, the trial court's judgment also established child-support obligations, determined the father's child-support arrearage, ordered the mother and the father to each pay half of the guardian ad litem's fee, and denied all other relief the parties had requested. The mother appeals.
The mother contends that the trial court violated her right to due process when it entered the March 2007 ex parte custody order and an order extending the terms of that order,
1The record includes the results of urine drug tests administered to the mother and the father. The results of both tests were negative for the presence of illegal drugs. There is no evidence in the record indicating that either the mother or the father submitted to a hair-follicle drug test.

11



2090490
submitted to a hair-follicle drug test;1 and that she had not contacted the children's guardian ad litem although the guardian ad litem had sought her input.
Based upon its findings, the trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the father and awarded custody of the oldest child to the maternal grandparents. The mother was awarded supervised visitation with the middle child and the youngest child and unsupervised visitation with the oldest child.
In addition to modifying custody, the trial court's judgment also established child-support obligations, determined the father's child-support arrearage, ordered the mother and the father to each pay half of the guardian ad litem's fee, and denied all other relief the parties had requested. The mother appeals.
The mother contends that the trial court violated her right to due process when it entered the March 2007 ex parte custody order and an order extending the terms of that order,
1The record includes the results of urine drug tests administered to the mother and the father. The results of both tests were negative for the presence of illegal drugs. There is no evidence in the record indicating that either the mother or the father submitted to a hair-follicle drug test.

11



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which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pendente lite
custody and further ordering the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the father's motion for pendente lite
custody). The litigation proceeded and, on July 30, 2009, a
trial was held on the issue of custody modification. The
mother fully participated in that trial, after which the trial
court entered the judgment modifying custody. That judgment
effectively replaced the ex parte custody orders.
"'"The general rule is, if pending an  appeal, an event occurs which renders it

12



2090490

which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pendente lite
custody and further ordering the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the father's motion for pendente lite
custody). The litigation proceeded and, on July 30, 2009, a
trial was held on the issue of custody modification. The
mother fully participated in that trial, after which the trial
court entered the judgment modifying custody. That judgment
effectively replaced the ex parte custody orders.
"'"The general rule is, if pending an  appeal, an event occurs which renders it

12



2090490

which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pendente lite
custody and further ordering the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the father's motion for pendente lite
custody). The litigation proceeded and, on July 30, 2009, a
trial was held on the issue of custody modification. The
mother fully participated in that trial, after which the trial
court entered the judgment modifying custody. That judgment
effectively replaced the ex parte custody orders.
"'"The general rule is, if pending an  appeal, an event occurs which renders it

12



2090490

which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pendente lite
custody and further ordering the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the father's motion for pendente lite
custody). The litigation proceeded and, on July 30, 2009, a
trial was held on the issue of custody modification. The
mother fully participated in that trial, after which the trial
court entered the judgment modifying custody. That judgment
effectively replaced the ex parte custody orders.
"'"The general rule is, if pending an  appeal, an event occurs which renders it

12



2090490

which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pendente lite
custody and further ordering the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the father's motion for pendente lite
custody). The litigation proceeded and, on July 30, 2009, a
trial was held on the issue of custody modification. The
mother fully participated in that trial, after which the trial
court entered the judgment modifying custody. That judgment
effectively replaced the ex parte custody orders.
"'"The general rule is, if pending an  appeal, an event occurs which renders it

12



2090490

which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pendente lite
custody and further ordering the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the father's motion for pendente lite
custody). The litigation proceeded and, on July 30, 2009, a
trial was held on the issue of custody modification. The
mother fully participated in that trial, after which the trial
court entered the judgment modifying custody. That judgment
effectively replaced the ex parte custody orders.
"'"The general rule is, if pending an  appeal, an event occurs which renders it

12



2090490

which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pendente lite
custody and further ordering the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the father's motion for pendente lite
custody). The litigation proceeded and, on July 30, 2009, a
trial was held on the issue of custody modification. The
mother fully participated in that trial, after which the trial
court entered the judgment modifying custody. That judgment
effectively replaced the ex parte custody orders.
"'"The general rule is, if pending an  appeal, an event occurs which renders it

12



2090490

which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pendente lite
custody and further ordering the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the father's motion for pendente lite
custody). The litigation proceeded and, on July 30, 2009, a
trial was held on the issue of custody modification. The
mother fully participated in that trial, after which the trial
court entered the judgment modifying custody. That judgment
effectively replaced the ex parte custody orders.
"'"The general rule is, if pending an  appeal, an event occurs which renders it

12



2090490

which was entered in April 2007. Both orders purported to
make "temporary" custody awards. The ex parte "temporary"
custody orders entered in this case were in the nature of
pendente lite orders because they were "'effective only during
the pendency of the litigation ... and [were] ... replaced by
the entry of a final judgment'" at the end of the litigation.
Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)
(quoting T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006)). The mother did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the ex parte orders. See, e.g., Ex
parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (this
court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate ex parte orders granting the father pen

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