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rel: 12/21/2012

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the




rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the



rel: 12/21/2012

Southern Reporter
Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1100902

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace

v.

Belleview Properties Corporation et al.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-05-1619)

WISE, Justice.
Dr. Stephen defendant below,

L. Wallace, the plaintiff/counterclaim-appeals from a summary judgment of the




1100902
Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"). We dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center in Fairfield, Alabama, to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years.
On December 22, 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, they

1Wallace also named Kenneth Rosen, an officer or manager of one or more of the defendants, as a defendant. The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of Rosen, and Wallace does not challenge that judgment in this appeal.

2



1100902
Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"). We dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center in Fairfield, Alabama, to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years.
On December 22, 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, they

1Wallace also named Kenneth Rosen, an officer or manager of one or more of the defendants, as a defendant. The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of Rosen, and Wallace does not challenge that judgment in this appeal.

2



1100902
Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"). We dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center in Fairfield, Alabama, to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years.
On December 22, 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, they

1Wallace also named Kenneth Rosen, an officer or manager of one or more of the defendants, as a defendant. The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of Rosen, and Wallace does not challenge that judgment in this appeal.

2



1100902
Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"). We dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center in Fairfield, Alabama, to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years.
On December 22, 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, they

1Wallace also named Kenneth Rosen, an officer or manager of one or more of the defendants, as a defendant. The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of Rosen, and Wallace does not challenge that judgment in this appeal.

2



1100902
Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"). We dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center in Fairfield, Alabama, to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years.
On December 22, 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, they

1Wallace also named Kenneth Rosen, an officer or manager of one or more of the defendants, as a defendant. The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of Rosen, and Wallace does not challenge that judgment in this appeal.

2



1100902
Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"). We dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center in Fairfield, Alabama, to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years.
On December 22, 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, they

1Wallace also named Kenneth Rosen, an officer or manager of one or more of the defendants, as a defendant. The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of Rosen, and Wallace does not challenge that judgment in this appeal.

2



1100902

were not. Wallace asserted that, as a result of reported water leaks that were left unrepaired, the office was infested with toxic mold. Therefore, he asserted, in April 2005, he closed his practice to avoid exposing his employees and his patients to the toxic mold.
The defendants filed answers to the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses. Also, IPF filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, essentially seeking unpaid rent. Wallace answered the counterclaim, alleging that he was constructively evicted from the premises because of the mold infestation and asserting defenses to IPF's counterclaim.
On August 28, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. On September 11, 2009, IPF filed a motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On January 20, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motions for a summary judgment.
On January 27, 2010, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants' motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. The trial court certified the judgment as to all claims filed by Wallace as final pursuant

3



1100902

were not. Wallace asserted that, as a result of reported water leaks that were left unrepaired, the office was infested with toxic mold. Therefore, he asserted, in April 2005, he closed his practice to avoid exposing his employees and his patients to the toxic mold.
The defendants filed answers to the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses. Also, IPF filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, essentially seeking unpaid rent. Wallace answered the counterclaim, alleging that he was constructively evicted from the premises because of the mold infestation and asserting defenses to IPF's counterclaim.
On August 28, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. On September 11, 2009, IPF filed a motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On January 20, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motions for a summary judgment.
On January 27, 2010, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants' motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. The trial court certified the judgment as to all claims filed by Wallace as final pursuant

3



1100902

were not. Wallace asserted that, as a result of reported water leaks that were left unrepaired, the office was infested with toxic mold. Therefore, he asserted, in April 2005, he closed his practice to avoid exposing his employees and his patients to the toxic mold.
The defendants filed answers to the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses. Also, IPF filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, essentially seeking unpaid rent. Wallace answered the counterclaim, alleging that he was constructively evicted from the premises because of the mold infestation and asserting defenses to IPF's counterclaim.
On August 28, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. On September 11, 2009, IPF filed a motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On January 20, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motions for a summary judgment.
On January 27, 2010, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants' motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. The trial court certified the judgment as to all claims filed by Wallace as final pursuant

3



1100902

were not. Wallace asserted that, as a result of reported water leaks that were left unrepaired, the office was infested with toxic mold. Therefore, he asserted, in April 2005, he closed his practice to avoid exposing his employees and his patients to the toxic mold.
The defendants filed answers to the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses. Also, IPF filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, essentially seeking unpaid rent. Wallace answered the counterclaim, alleging that he was constructively evicted from the premises because of the mold infestation and asserting defenses to IPF's counterclaim.
On August 28, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. On September 11, 2009, IPF filed a motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On January 20, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motions for a summary judgment.
On January 27, 2010, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants' motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. The trial court certified the judgment as to all claims filed by Wallace as final pursuant

3



1100902
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.2 Finally, it stated that it
was taking IPF's motion for a summary judgment as to its counterclaim under advisement.
On February 11, 2010, Wallace filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider or vacate its January 27, 2010, order and to set the matter for a hearing. The defendants filed a motion in opposition to Wallace's motion. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on April 27, 2010. On December 15, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on IPF's motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On December 27, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for a summary judgment on the counterclaim, explaining as follows: "The Court is of the opinion that this case should be tried and heard because the Court notes that there is a serious question of constructive eviction and

2Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."

4



1100902
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.2 Finally, it stated that it
was taking IPF's motion for a summary judgment as to its counterclaim under advisement.
On February 11, 2010, Wallace filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider or vacate its January 27, 2010, order and to set the matter for a hearing. The defendants filed a motion in opposition to Wallace's motion. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on April 27, 2010. On December 15, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on IPF's motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On December 27, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for a summary judgment on the counterclaim, explaining as follows: "The Court is of the opinion that this case should be tried and heard because the Court notes that there is a serious question of constructive eviction and

2Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."

4



1100902
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.2 Finally, it stated that it
was taking IPF's motion for a summary judgment as to its counterclaim under advisement.
On February 11, 2010, Wallace filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider or vacate its January 27, 2010, order and to set the matter for a hearing. The defendants filed a motion in opposition to Wallace's motion. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on April 27, 2010. On December 15, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on IPF's motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On December 27, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for a summary judgment on the counterclaim, explaining as follows: "The Court is of the opinion that this case should be tried and heard because the Court notes that there is a serious question of constructive eviction and

2Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."

4



1100902
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.2 Finally, it stated that it
was taking IPF's motion for a summary judgment as to its counterclaim under advisement.
On February 11, 2010, Wallace filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider or vacate its January 27, 2010, order and to set the matter for a hearing. The defendants filed a motion in opposition to Wallace's motion. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on April 27, 2010. On December 15, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on IPF's motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On December 27, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for a summary judgment on the counterclaim, explaining as follows: "The Court is of the opinion that this case should be tried and heard because the Court notes that there is a serious question of constructive eviction and

2Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."

4



1100902
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.2 Finally, it stated that it
was taking IPF's motion for a summary judgment as to its counterclaim under advisement.
On February 11, 2010, Wallace filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider or vacate its January 27, 2010, order and to set the matter for a hearing. The defendants filed a motion in opposition to Wallace's motion. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on April 27, 2010. On December 15, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on IPF's motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On December 27, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for a summary judgment on the counterclaim, explaining as follows: "The Court is of the opinion that this case should be tried and heard because the Court notes that there is a serious question of constructive eviction and

2Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."

4



1100902
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.2 Finally, it stated that it
was taking IPF's motion for a summary judgment as to its counterclaim under advisement.
On February 11, 2010, Wallace filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider or vacate its January 27, 2010, order and to set the matter for a hearing. The defendants filed a motion in opposition to Wallace's motion. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on April 27, 2010. On December 15, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on IPF's motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim against Wallace. On December 27, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for a summary judgment on the counterclaim, explaining as follows: "The Court is of the opinion that this case should be tried and heard because the Court notes that there is a serious question of constructive eviction and

2Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."

4



1100902

promissory estoppel as a defense of the plaintiff to said counterclaim." In that order, the trial court also stated: "Any other motions are hereby overruled and denied." On February 14, 2011, Wallace filed a request for clarification of the December 27, 2010, order.
During a hearing on March 21, 2011, counsel for IPF specifically asked that the counterclaim be dismissed. As a result, on March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a final order of dismissal in the case. Wallace filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on May 2, 2011.
Discussion
In his notice of appeal and in the statement of jurisdiction in his brief to this Court, Wallace purports to appeal from the trial court's March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal. However, he categorizes his arguments as follows in his brief to this Court:
1. "The trial court's order granting partial summary judgment was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist."
2. "The trial court's December 27, 2010, order denying relief under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion."
3. "The Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective or, in the alternative, the rule

5



1100902

promissory estoppel as a defense of the plaintiff to said counterclaim." In that order, the trial court also stated: "Any other motions are hereby overruled and denied." On February 14, 2011, Wallace filed a request for clarification of the December 27, 2010, order.
During a hearing on March 21, 2011, counsel for IPF specifically asked that the counterclaim be dismissed. As a result, on March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a final order of dismissal in the case. Wallace filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on May 2, 2011.
Discussion
In his notice of appeal and in the statement of jurisdiction in his brief to this Court, Wallace purports to appeal from the trial court's March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal. However, he categorizes his arguments as follows in his brief to this Court:
1. "The trial court's order granting partial summary judgment was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist."
2. "The trial court's December 27, 2010, order denying relief under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion."
3. "The Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective or, in the alternative, the rule

5



1100902

promissory estoppel as a defense of the plaintiff to said counterclaim." In that order, the trial court also stated: "Any other motions are hereby overruled and denied." On February 14, 2011, Wallace filed a request for clarification of the December 27, 2010, order.
During a hearing on March 21, 2011, counsel for IPF specifically asked that the counterclaim be dismissed. As a result, on March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a final order of dismissal in the case. Wallace filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on May 2, 2011.
Discussion
In his notice of appeal and in the statement of jurisdiction in his brief to this Court, Wallace purports to appeal from the trial court's March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal. However, he categorizes his arguments as follows in his brief to this Court:
1. "The trial court's order granting partial summary judgment was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist."
2. "The trial court's December 27, 2010, order denying relief under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion."
3. "The Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective or, in the alternative, the rule

5



1100902

promissory estoppel as a defense of the plaintiff to said counterclaim." In that order, the trial court also stated: "Any other motions are hereby overruled and denied." On February 14, 2011, Wallace filed a request for clarification of the December 27, 2010, order.
During a hearing on March 21, 2011, counsel for IPF specifically asked that the counterclaim be dismissed. As a result, on March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a final order of dismissal in the case. Wallace filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on May 2, 2011.
Discussion
In his notice of appeal and in the statement of jurisdiction in his brief to this Court, Wallace purports to appeal from the trial court's March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal. However, he categorizes his arguments as follows in his brief to this Court:
1. "The trial court's order granting partial summary judgment was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist."
2. "The trial court's December 27, 2010, order denying relief under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion."
3. "The Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective or, in the alternative, the rule

5



1100902

promissory estoppel as a defense of the plaintiff to said counterclaim." In that order, the trial court also stated: "Any other motions are hereby overruled and denied." On February 14, 2011, Wallace filed a request for clarification of the December 27, 2010, order.
During a hearing on March 21, 2011, counsel for IPF specifically asked that the counterclaim be dismissed. As a result, on March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a final order of dismissal in the case. Wallace filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on May 2, 2011.
Discussion
In his notice of appeal and in the statement of jurisdiction in his brief to this Court, Wallace purports to appeal from the trial court's March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal. However, he categorizes his arguments as follows in his brief to this Court:
1. "The trial court's order granting partial summary judgment was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist."
2. "The trial court's December 27, 2010, order denying relief under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion."
3. "The Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective or, in the alternative, the rule

5



1100902

promissory estoppel as a defense of the plaintiff to said counterclaim." In that order, the trial court also stated: "Any other motions are hereby overruled and denied." On February 14, 2011, Wallace filed a request for clarification of the December 27, 2010, order.
During a hearing on March 21, 2011, counsel for IPF specifically asked that the counterclaim be dismissed. As a result, on March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a final order of dismissal in the case. Wallace filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on May 2, 2011.
Discussion
In his notice of appeal and in the statement of jurisdiction in his brief to this Court, Wallace purports to appeal from the trial court's March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal. However, he categorizes his arguments as follows in his brief to this Court:
1. "The trial court's order granting partial summary judgment was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist."
2. "The trial court's December 27, 2010, order denying relief under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion."
3. "The Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective or, in the alternative, the rule

5



1100902

promissory estoppel as a defense of the plaintiff to said counterclaim." In that order, the trial court also stated: "Any other motions are hereby overruled and denied." On February 14, 2011, Wallace filed a request for clarification of the December 27, 2010, order.
During a hearing on March 21, 2011, counsel for IPF specifically asked that the counterclaim be dismissed. As a result, on March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a final order of dismissal in the case. Wallace filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on May 2, 2011.
Discussion
In his notice of appeal and in the statement of jurisdiction in his brief to this Court, Wallace purports to appeal from the trial court's March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal. However, he categorizes his arguments as follows in his brief to this Court:
1. "The trial court's order granting partial summary judgment was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist."
2. "The trial court's December 27, 2010, order denying relief under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion."
3. "The Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective or, in the alternative, the rule

5



1100902

promissory estoppel as a defense of the plaintiff to said counterclaim." In that order, the trial court also stated: "Any other motions are hereby overruled and denied." On February 14, 2011, Wallace filed a request for clarification of the December 27, 2010, order.
During a hearing on March 21, 2011, counsel for IPF specifically asked that the counterclaim be dismissed. As a result, on March 21, 2011, the trial court entered a final order of dismissal in the case. Wallace filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on May 2, 2011.
Discussion
In his notice of appeal and in the statement of jurisdiction in his brief to this Court, Wallace purports to appeal from the trial court's March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal. However, he categorizes his arguments as follows in his brief to this Court:
1. "The trial court's order granting partial summary judgment was in error because genuine issues of material fact exist."
2. "The trial court's December 27, 2010, order denying relief under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion."
3. "The Trial Court's Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective or, in the alternative, the rule

5



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

adopted in Allen v. Briggs, 60 So. 3d 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), should be overturned or modified based on the facts of this case."
Also, in the summary of the argument portion of his brief to
this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to
challenge an erroneous grant of summary judgment, denial of a
Rule 60 motion, and an improper and ineffective Rule 54(b)
certification." Therefore, it is clear that Wallace is
challenging the summary judgment the trial court entered in
favor of the defendants on January 27, 2010, and the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, rather than the trial court's
March 21, 2011, final order of dismissal.
The defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
appeal as untimely. Specifically, they contend that the
notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days after the trial
court certified the summary judgment on Wallace's claims
against them as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The defendants
also assert that, if Wallace's motion to reconsider was filed
pursuant to Rule 59, it was denied by operation of law after
90 days, and the notice of appeal was not filed within 42 days
after that denial. Finally, they allege that, if Wallace's
motion to reconsider was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), it was

6



1100902

denied on December 27, 2010, and the notice of appeal was not
filed within 42 days after that date. We agree with the
defendants that Wallace's appeal is untimely.
With regard to when an appeal should be taken, Rule
4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"Except as otherwise provided herein, in all cases in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right to the supreme court or to a court of appeals, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3[, Ala. R. App. P.,] shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from "
With regard to tolling the time for filing a notice of appeal,
Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"The filing of a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55 or 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure ([Ala. R. Civ. P.]) shall suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. In cases where post-judgment motions are filed, the full time fixed for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of the entry in the civil docket of an order granting or denying such motion. If such post-judgment motion is deemed denied under the provisions of Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, then the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of denial of such motion by operation of law, as provided for in Rule 59.1."
With regard to postjudgment motions in civil cases, Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:

7



1100902

denied on December 27, 2010, and the notice of appeal was not
filed within 42 days after that date. We agree with the
defendants that Wallace's appeal is untimely.
With regard to when an appeal should be taken, Rule
4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"Except as otherwise provided herein, in all cases in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right to the supreme court or to a court of appeals, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3[, Ala. R. App. P.,] shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from "
With regard to tolling the time for filing a notice of appeal,
Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"The filing of a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55 or 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure ([Ala. R. Civ. P.]) shall suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. In cases where post-judgment motions are filed, the full time fixed for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of the entry in the civil docket of an order granting or denying such motion. If such post-judgment motion is deemed denied under the provisions of Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, then the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of denial of such motion by operation of law, as provided for in Rule 59.1."
With regard to postjudgment motions in civil cases, Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:

7



1100902

denied on December 27, 2010, and the notice of appeal was not
filed within 42 days after that date. We agree with the
defendants that Wallace's appeal is untimely.
With regard to when an appeal should be taken, Rule
4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"Except as otherwise provided herein, in all cases in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right to the supreme court or to a court of appeals, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3[, Ala. R. App. P.,] shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from "
With regard to tolling the time for filing a notice of appeal,
Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"The filing of a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55 or 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure ([Ala. R. Civ. P.]) shall suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. In cases where post-judgment motions are filed, the full time fixed for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of the entry in the civil docket of an order granting or denying such motion. If such post-judgment motion is deemed denied under the provisions of Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, then the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of denial of such motion by operation of law, as provided for in Rule 59.1."
With regard to postjudgment motions in civil cases, Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:

7



1100902

denied on December 27, 2010, and the notice of appeal was not
filed within 42 days after that date. We agree with the
defendants that Wallace's appeal is untimely.
With regard to when an appeal should be taken, Rule
4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P

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