Campise v. Valley Children's Hospital 12/31/01 CA5

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State: California

Court: 1st District Court of Appeal 1st District Court of Appeal

Docket No: F034603

Case Date: 03/14/2002

Preview:Filed 12/31/01

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT KARI CAMPISE, F034603 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 616761-2) v. VALLEY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Lawrence Jones, Judge. Doyle, Penner, Bradley & Seymour; Doyle, Penner, Bradley & Armstrong, David Douglas Doyle and Peter Sean Bradley, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Foley & Lardner, Howard W. Cohen and Heather D. McNeill, for Defendant and Respondent. -ooOoo-

This case is the companion case to F034128, Campise v. Morrison Health Care, Inc. On August 13, 1998, Kari Campise filed a complaint against Morrison Health Care, Inc. (Morrison) and Valley Children's Hospital (VCH) pursuant to Government Code1 section 12900 et seq., the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). VCH filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted in part. A second motion for summary judgment was then filed by VCH, which also was granted and judgment entered in favor of VCH. We will reverse. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY The procedural summary of the case set forth in F034128 is adopted here. Set forth below are additional facts and case history pertinent to this appeal. Campise's complaint asserted a cause of action against VCH and Morrison, pursuant to section 12940, for sexual harassment and retaliation. VCH filed an answer to the complaint on October 5, 1998, generally denying the allegations and asserting numerous affirmative defenses. On June 4, 1999, VCH filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. In addition to the motion, VCH filed a statement of undisputed facts; memorandum of points and authorities; several supporting declarations and copies of portions of two transcripts of depositions. Campise filed a response to the statement of undisputed facts filed by VCH, her declaration in opposition, a statement of disputed material facts, and points and authorities in opposition to VCH's motion. VCH filed a reply, objections to Campise's declaration, and a consolidated separate statement of undisputed facts. With limited exceptions, the facts set forth as disputed material facts by Campise were undisputed by

1

References to code sections are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.

2.

VCH. VCH maintained that the facts alleged by Campise were simply immaterial, and that the conduct complained of did not constitute sexual harassment or retaliation. VCH did not dispute that Campise was an employee of VCH, worked in the kitchen at VCH, and reported to kitchen supervisors who in turn reported to Rafael Negroe and Rod Miranda, employees of Morrison. Nor did VCH dispute that Leslie Herzog, a VCH employee, was one of Campise's supervisors. It also was undisputed that Negroe assigned and adjusted daily work schedules and duties, and had the authority to discipline VCH employees. Virtually all of the conduct engaged in by Negroe, which Campise asserted constituted sexual harassment, was labeled by VCH as "undisputed and immaterial." VCH maintained that the conduct simply amounted to "isolated and trivial" remarks and incidents. With respect to the undisputed facts alleged by Campise to be retaliatory actions, VCH variously responded that these facts were disputed, undisputed, or immaterial. On July 15, 1999, after argument, the trial court granted the motion in part. Summary adjudication was granted as to the sexual harassment claim. In addition, the trial court found that VCH had an affirmative defense under Faragher v. Boca Raton (1998) 524 U.S. 775 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) 524 U.S. 772. Summary adjudication of the retaliation claim and the claim for punitive damages was denied. On August 6, 1999, VCH filed a second motion for summary judgment with respect to the retaliation and punitive damage claims asserted by Campise against VCH. Campise opposed the motion, asserting in part that it was barred by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(2). On September 3, 1999, the trial court granted the second motion for summary judgment. DISCUSSION Many of the issues raised in the instant appeal are raised and addressed by this court in the companion case, Campise v. Morrison Health Care, Inc., F034128. We 3.

hereby adopt the analysis and reasoning set forth in that case. Among the issues addressed in F034128 are whether: (1) Negroe is a supervisor; (2) an employer is strictly liability for harassment by a supervisor; (3) a triable issue of material fact exists regarding hostile environment and quid pro quo harassment; and (4) whether Campise has established a triable issue of material fact with respect to her claim of retaliation. We address here those issues which are not raised and determined in the companion case. First Motion To the extent Morrison is the agent of VCH, VCH is strictly liable for the actions of Morrison employees. VCH acknowledged in its first summary judgment motion that it had contracted with Morrison to provide food management services for the kitchen. Although VCH's answer to the complaint was a general denial, in its first summary judgment motion VCH did not challenge the allegation of an agency relationship between Morrison and VCH. Instead, VCH took the position that Negroe was not a supervisor; there was no strict liability on the part of VCH; and Negroe's conduct did not rise to the level of sexual harassment. Section 12940, subdivision (j)(1), provides in part that harassment of an "employee ... by an employee other than an agent or supervisor shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate appropriate action...." This section has been interpreted to mean that an employer is strictly liable for the actions of its supervisors and agents. (Carrisales v. Department of Corrections (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1132, 1136-1137; Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1046.) The term agent is not defined in the FEHA, nor in the FEHC regulations, but is defined in the Civil Code as "one who represents another, called the principal, in dealings with third persons." (Civ. Code,

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