Maynard v. Brandon 2/25/03 CA4/2

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » California » Court of Appeal » 2003 » Maynard v. Brandon 2/25/03 CA4/2

State: California

Court: 1st District Court of Appeal 1st District Court of Appeal

Docket No: E031430

Case Date: 06/18/2003

Preview:Filed 2/25/03 Maynard v. Brandon CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO JAMES N. MAYNARD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOUISE BRANDON et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gloria Trask, Judge. Reversed. Law Offices of Rodger A. Maynes and Rodger A. Maynes for Defendants and Appellants. Law Offices of James N. Maynard and James N. Maynard for Plaintiff and Respondent. This appeal involves a dispute over legal fees for services rendered by plaintiff James N. Maynard (Maynard) to defendants Louise Brandon (Brandon), Satyananda Apaji Tagra also known as Frederick Saylor (Tagra), Lakoo Kriya Church, successor organization to The Joy Life Church, nonprofit corporations (JLC), and the Institute of 1 E031430 (Super.Ct.No. RIC 331910) OPINION

Spiritual Education and Evolution, a nonprofit corporation (ISEE, collectively Defendants). The dispute was arbitrated pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6200 et seq., resulting in an award in favor of Maynard. Defendants claim that the trial court erred (1) in denying their Code of Civil Procedure section 4731 motion for relief from filing a late rejection of the arbitration award; (2) in confirming, and subsequently entering, judgment based upon the arbitration award; (3) in denying their motion to vacate the judgment; and (4) in denying a postjudgment claim for exemption from levy. We agree that the trial court should have considered Defendants' request for relief under section 473 on its merits and therefore reverse the judgment. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Maynard filed a complaint against Defendants on August 23, 1999, alleging causes of action including breach of a written contract, aiding and abetting and conspiracy to breach a written contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, assault and battery, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In his complaint, Maynard alleged that he and his daughter were members of a religious group headed by Tagra. Under Tagra's direction, Maynard resumed his long-abandoned legal career, providing services for Tagra and members of his group without remuneration. These services included obtaining IRS tax-exempt status for JLC, assisting Tagra in obtaining custody of his son,

1

All further references to section 473 are to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

2

obtaining social security benefits for member Tampoe, and assisting other members with various legal matters. Maynard estimated the value of the services at $25,783. On September 23, 1994, Maynard entered into a written "attorney client retainer agreement" with Brandon to provide her with legal representation in exchange for onethird of any recovery she might obtain. Maynard was able to obtain a settlement of $500,000 for Brandon, paid to her in the form of grants to ISEE, which Tagra guided her to found. Maynard further alleged that Tagra directed Brandon to transfer funds from ISEE to JLC to finance the purchase of real property, thereby draining the ISEE account of the majority of its funds. Additional real property purchased by ISEE was sold and the proceeds used to benefit the JLC community. While the Brandon settlement was fully paid by January 3, 1998, Maynard had not received the $166,667 one-third compensation due him under the retainer agreement. Maynard and his daughter left the community in July 1997. Subsequent to leaving the group, Maynard discovered that it had the characteristics of a cult. Maynard made a formal request to Tagra, Brandon and other JLC members for the compensation that he believed was due him for his legal services. Maynard also alleged that Tagra declined to pay and instructed the group members to do likewise. Defendants' request that the claim for attorney fees be submitted to fee arbitration by a three-person panel of the Riverside County Bar Association was granted, and the action was stayed pending a decision. After a hearing on March 6, 2001, the arbitration panel rendered its decision and served it upon counsel on August 27, 2001. The panel

3

found that Maynard had agreed to restructure his fee agreement with respect to Brandon's claim, in order to facilitate the settlement. That restructuring worked as a novation between all parties, which replaced the original fee agreement between Maynard and Brandon. According to the new agreement, Maynard was entitled to total fees in the amount of $120,000. That amount was reduced by $19,000 for payments already received, resulting in a total due to Maynard under the new agreement of $101,000. The panel also concluded that Maynard was not entitled to an additional $45,286.46 in fees claimed for other services rendered as they were either included in the $120,000 owed under the renegotiated agreement or were provided without any fee agreement in place. On September 24, 2001, Defendants' attorney executed and served a notice of rejection of the arbitration award. However, it was not filed with the trial court until October 2, 2001. A petition to vacate the arbitration award was filed simultaneously, as was an opposition to Maynard's petition to confirm the arbitration award. The petition to confirm the award was rejected by the trial court as Maynard was advised by the court that he needed to file a noticed motion, which he did on November 2, 2001. Maynard opposed Defendants' papers on the ground that they failed to file a timely rejection of the arbitration award, and that they failed to set forth grounds for relief as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1285.8. Defendants then filed a section 473 motion for relief from their late filing of their rejection of the arbitration award, on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect. They asserted that while the rejection had been prepared and served in a timely

4

fashion on September 24, 2001, it had not been filed due to their attorney's mistaken assumption that his secretary had filed it prior to a two-week absence due to a death in her family. On December 4, 2001, the trial court refused to consider Defendants' motion for relief as improperly noticed and confirmed the arbitration award since no timely rejection was filed. On December 10, 2001, Defendants filed a motion for relief from the order confirming the arbitration award pursuant to section 473, based on the same grounds previously asserted. Defendants also filed a demurrer to and motion to strike the complaint. In response Maynard filed opposition and a request for leave to file a first amended complaint. The trial court sustained both the demurrer and the motion to strike with 20 days leave to amend. It also found that the Business and Professions Code section 6203 time limit for rejecting an arbitration award was jurisdictional and therefore concluded that no relief was available under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. At the time of the hearing, the trial court filed Maynard's first amended complaint. On January 31, 2002, at an ex parte hearing seeking dismissal of all but the first cause of action in his first amended complaint, Maynard submitted, and the trial court executed, a judgment in conformity with the arbitration award that it had previously confirmed. It awarded Maynard the sum of $101,000 from Defendants on the first amended complaint. Shortly thereafter Defendants filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663 on the ground that the arbitrators had no jurisdiction

5

to enter judgment against Tagra, JLC and ISEE on the Brandon contract. Maynard opposed the motion. On March 19, 2002, the trial court denied Defendants' motion to vacate the judgment because it was not based upon proper grounds and Defendants did not meet their burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2. In the meantime, on March 1, 2002, Tagra filed a claim of exemption on enforcement of the judgment on a bank account that Maynard attempted to levy against, on the ground that none of the funds in the account belonged to him, but constituted Social Security payments and gifts to Katay Kali (Kali). Kali also filed a third party claim of exemption. Maynard opposed the claim of exemption on the ground that Tagra had complete control over all funds in the account, regardless whether Kali's name also appeared on it, and filed an undertaking. On March 11, 2002, the trial court denied the claim of exemption because the account was maintained in Tagra's name and on his Social Security number, and ordered the levying officer to release funds in the account for payment on the judgment. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION The first question with which we must concern ourselves is whether the trial court erred when it determined that section 473 could not be invoked to relieve Defendants from their untimely rejection of the arbitration award because Business and Professions Code section 6203 acts as a statute of limitations, and therefore constitutes a jurisdictional limitation on the trial court's powers. Code of Civil Procedure section 473 provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a

6

party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." (Id., subd. (b).) However, section 473 does not provide relief from errors that result in the running of the applicable statute of limitations. (Carlson v. Department of Fish & Game (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1279; Castro v. Sacramento County Fire Protection Dist. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 927, 929, 934.) Business and Professions Code section 6203 provides that "[e]ven if the parties to the arbitration have not agreed in writing to be bound, the arbitration award shall become binding upon the passage of 30 days after mailing of notice of the award, unless a party has, within the 30 days, sought a trial after arbitration pursuant to Section 6204. . . ." (Id., subd. (b).) "If there is an action pending, the trial after arbitration shall be initiated by filing a rejection of arbitration award and request for trial after arbitration in that action within 30 days after mailing of notice of the award. . . ." (Bus. & Prof. Code,

Download Maynard v. Brandon 2/25/03 CA4/2.pdf