New v. Kroeger 10/21/08 CA4/1

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State: California

Court: 1st District Court of Appeal 1st District Court of Appeal

Docket No: D051120

Case Date: 01/14/2009

Preview:Filed 10/21/08

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DALE W. NEW et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DONALD L. KROEGER et al., Defendants and Respondents.

D051120

(Super. Ct. No. GIN055854)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jacqueline M. Stern, Judge. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Baker & McKenzie, Charles H. Dick, Jr., Abby B. Silverman, Lauren S. Cartwright and Jason K. Petrek for Plaintiffs and Appellants. GoodwinProcter, David Booth Beers and Jeffrey David Skinner for The Episcopal Church as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. Payne & Fears, Eric C. Sohlgren and Daniel F. Lula for Defendants and Respondents.

Wild, Carter & Tipton and Russell G. VanRozeboom for the Diocese of San Joaquin and the Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

This action arises out of a dispute concerning the governance of St. John's Parish church (St. John's) that is a member of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States (the Episcopal Church), located in Fallbrook, California. The clergy, members of the governing board and a majority group of its members (collectively, the defendants) resigned their membership in the Episcopal Church. When they did so, the Bishop of the Diocese of San Diego (San Diego Diocese) determined that the remaining loyalist members of St. John's Parish (collectively, individual plaintiffs) constituted the true membership of St. John's Parish, the resigned dissident members were no longer qualified to serve as members of St. John's Parish's governing board, and a new governing board should be elected. The individual plaintiffs elected a new board, but the resigned members of the board, who had since voted to become affiliated with an Anglican Church in Africa (Anglican Church), refused to relinquish their seats, or control over the assets of St. John's Parish, which were held by a corporation known as St. John's Parish corporation (Parish corporation). The individual plaintiffs and the San Diego Diocese filed a lawsuit under Corporations Code section 94181 seeking a declaration that they were the true and lawful

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All further statutory references are to the Corporations Code. 2

directors of St. John's Parish. The plaintiffs stipulated that they were only seeking a determination of who were the proper board of directors of the Parish corporation, not who owned the assets of St. John's Parish.2 The court thereafter held a motion hearing, finding in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that, applying "neutral principles of California corporations law," the defendant board members were the lawful directors of the Parish corporation. On appeal plaintiffs assert the court erred in finding in favor of defendants because (1) the court refused to consider and did not defer to the San Diego Diocese's determination of the true membership of St. John's Parish; (2) the Parish corporation was subordinate to the Episcopal Church; (3) the board of the Parish corporation lacked the authority to amend the bylaws and articles of incorporation to disaffiliate from the Episcopal Church; and (4) the court failed to afford plaintiffs the evidentiary hearing to which they were entitled. We conclude that (1) applying neutral principles of law, the defendants lacked the power and authority to amend the bylaws and articles of incorporation of the Parish corporation to make it part of the Anglican Church, and their actions in this regard are a legal nullity; (2) by taking the actions they did, defendants were no longer a part of the Episcopal Church and could not be the lawful directors; (3) we must give deference to the

2 Indeed, there is a separate action pending in the superior court that seeks a determination of who controls the property of St. John's Parish. (The Episcopal Diocese of San Diego v. St. John's Parish (Episcopal), Fallbrook, California (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2007, No. 37-2007-00068521-CU-MC-CTL).)

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Episcopal Church and San Diego Diocese's determination as to who constituted the true members of St. John's Parish, and consequently the election of the individual defendants as board members of the Parish corporation was a legal nullity; and (4) applying neutral principles of law to the actions of the Episcopal Church and San Diego Diocese in determining who were the true members of the church, the result is the same. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter with directions that the court enter judgment for plaintiffs. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Hierarchy of the Episcopal Church The Episcopal Church is a hierarchical church with a three-tiered organizational structure. At the highest level is the Episcopal Church itself, which is an unincorporated association operating on a national level in the United States and multiple other countries. The Episcopal Church is governed by a "General Convention," comprising lay and clerical delegates, which has adopted a constitution and canons that are binding on all subordinate entities in the church. The second level of the Episcopal Church consists of 111 "dioceses," which are separate and distinct ecclesiastical entities that superintend the mission and ministry of the Church within their respective geographic areas. As a condition of its creation, each diocese must accede to the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church and is required to recognize the authority of the church's general convention. Upon being admitted into union with the church, a diocese then convenes its own annual convention, which adopts a diocesan constitution and canons consistent with the constitution and 4

canons of the Episcopal Church. The San Diego Diocese is a diocese of the Episcopal Church and was created in this manner. The "ecclesiastical authority" of each diocese is the bishop, who is a member of the ordained clergy elected to that position by a convention of the diocese. The Right Reverend James R. Mathes is the Bishop of the San Diego Diocese. The third level of the church comprises individual congregations of Episcopalians, where persons faithful to the doctrine and discipline of the Episcopal Church gather for worship. Each congregation is governed by an elected board known as a "vestry." A start-up congregation that is dependent on the larger church for nurture and support is known as a "mission," and once a mission becomes self-supporting, its vestry may ask that the congregation formally be admitted into union with the diocese responsible for that locale. As a condition of that admission, the mission congregation also must accede to the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church and the diocese. In recognition of the congregation's pledge of subservience, a diocesan convention may elect to accept the application and create a new ecclesiastical entity known as a "parish" for use by the local congregants in their mission and ministry. St. John's Parish is a parish of the San Diego Diocese and the Episcopal Church; it was created in the manner described above. Once a parish has been created and admitted into union with a diocese, its elected vestry, with the concurrence of the bishop, formally "calls" an ordained priest of the Episcopal Church to be its primary pastor. Such person is called the "rector" of the parish, and, by canon law, the rector is a member of the parish vestry. The defendant

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Reverend Donald Kroeger was an ordained member of the Episcopal clergy and was elected as the rector of St. John's Parish. A vestry of a parish may, but is not required to, form a nonprofit religious corporation for the purpose of holding the parish's assets. If it chooses to form a corporation, then the vestry also serves as the board of directors for that parish corporation. B. Subordinate Ecclesiastical Entities in the Episcopal Church Since its inception in 1789, the Episcopal Church has required that every diocese accede to the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church as a condition of being admitted into union with the church. When the San Diego Diocese was created in 1973, it included the following provision in its constitution: "The Church in the Episcopal Diocese of San Diego accedes to the Constitution and Canons of that branch of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, known in law as The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, also known as The Episcopal Church, and recognizes the authority of the General Convention of the same." The San Diocese also included a provision in its constitution that permitted a local mission congregation to apply for admission as a parish of the San Diego Diocese and the Episcopal Church. That provision requires that in its application for parish status, a local congregation must promise to be bound by the authority of the diocesan and Episcopal constitutions and canons, and it must adopt bylaws "in which such Parish expressly accedes to the Constitution, Canons, doctrine, discipline and worship of The Episcopal Church and to the Constitution and Canons of the Episcopal Diocese of San Diego." The

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diocesan canons further require that the parish's bylaws incorporate the Episcopal and diocesan constitution and canons, which must prevail when there is a conflict with the bylaws: "[T]he Constitution and Canons of The Episcopal Church and the Constitution and Canons of The Episcopal Diocese of San Diego . . . shall be incorporated in said Bylaws; and that in the case of any conflict between said Constitutions and Canons and said Bylaws, the former shall prevail over and in all respects supersede and to that extent effect the repeal of the said Bylaws." (Italics added.) Once formed as an ecclesiastical entity, a parish may not unilaterally "disaffiliate" from the Episcopal Church or the diocese by a vote of its current membership or any other means. Pursuant to the San Diego Diocese's canons, any parish seeking to change its status, revert to being a mission congregation or cease its existence as part of the Episcopal Church, must follow specific procedures for dissolution, which include consent of the Bishop. In the event of such change, title to parish assets reverts to the diocese. This is in keeping with the Episcopal Church's 1979 "Dennis Canon," also known as Canon 1.7(4), which states that "'[a]ll real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is located.'" (Hassler, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal Resolution of Church Property Disputes In A Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife (2008) 35 Pepperdine L.Rev. 399, 414.) The diocesan canons require vestry members to be "qualified electors" of the Episcopal Church. In order to serve as a "warden" of a vestry (one of a vestry's lay officers), one must be a "communicant in good standing." Further, the canons of the 7

Episcopal Church mandate that the vestry members "well and faithfully perform the duties of that office in accordance with the Constitution and Canons of [the Episcopal] Church and of the Diocese in which the office is being exercised." C. Ecclesiastical Authority in Episcopal Dioceses The bishop of an Episcopal diocese is vested with both the authority and responsibility for the program and ministry of the Episcopal Church within the territory of the diocese. As stated in the diocesan constitution, "[t]he Bishop is the Ecclesiastical Authority of this Diocese." As bishop of the San Diego Diocese, Bishop Mathes is charged with attending to the spiritual needs of Episcopalians within San Diego, Imperial, and a part of Riverside Counties. He is the presiding officer over all organizations of the Episcopal Church in the San Diego Diocese, and he "has appellate jurisdiction over their proceedings," consistent with California law. The bishop is the final authority for determining intracongregational disputes, specifically including disputes between persons adversely claiming to be members of the vestry: "Controversies. Irreconcilable controversies . . . between a congregation or its Vestry and its Minister, or between persons adversely claiming to be Members of the Vestry of a congregation, shall be referred to the Ecclesiastical Authority for determination." As the ecclesiastical authority, the bishop may determine who are members of the Episcopal Church and who is qualified to serve on a vestry. Conversely, the bishop is the person empowered to determine whether an individual is no longer eligible to be a vestry member as a result of violating the constitutions and canons of the Episcopal Church. Further, the bishop is empowered to resolve whether a person is a qualified "elector"

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within the diocese. When there are vacancies in elected offices of the church, such as a vestry, the bishop may intervene and facilitate the parish electing replacement vestry members. D. Establishment of St. John's as a Parish In 1973 the mission congregation at St. John's sought permission from the San Diego Diocese to become a parish. As required by the diocesan constitution and canons, in its application the mission congregation promised that, if created by the diocese, St. John's would be bound by and conform to the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church and the San Diego Diocese in perpetuity. The San Diego Diocese formally recognized St. John's Parish as a parish of the Episcopal Church at the primary convention of the San Diego Diocese on December 7, 1973. The vestry of St. John's Parish eventually formed a California nonprofit religious corporation to serve the parish, which was incorporated on November 12, 1974. The articles of incorporation for the Parish corporation provided: "The specific and primary purpose for which this corporation is formed is: To incorporate . . . the existing unincorporated religious association and church known as St. John's Parish (Episcopal), Fallbrook . . . (a subordinate body and integral unit of the Episcopal Diocese of San Diego and of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America), as a subordinate body of 'The Episcopal Diocese of San Diego,' a non-profit religious corporation, within the meaning of Sections 9202, 9203, and 9802 of the Corporations Code of California; and to further establish, develop, maintain, and operate a parish church which is, and which shall continue perpetually to be, a constituent unit or part of . . . [The Episcopal Church] pursuant to and in accordance with the Constitutions and Canons, rules, regulations, and disciplines of said Church . . . ." (Italics added.)

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The bylaws of the Parish corporation stated: "The Constitution, Canons, Rules, Regulations, and discipline of the Episcopal Church . . . and the Constitution and Canons of the said Church in the Episcopal Diocese of San Diego shall, unless they be contrary to the laws of this State, always form part of the by-laws, ordinances, constitutions, and discipline of this parish; and prevail against any resolutions, by-laws, or other enactments by this parish that may appear to be repugnant to such Constitutions, Canons, Rules, Regulations, or Discipline." (Italics added.) Those bylaws expressly provide that the vestry members shall constitute the board of directors for the Parish corporation. Once incorporated with appropriate language of accession in its articles and bylaws, the San Diego Diocese conveyed title to the St. John's Parish's real estate to the Parish corporation. E. Defendants Resign from the Episcopal Church In July 2006 defendants and a majority of the congregants of St. John's Parish resigned their membership in the Episcopal Church and affiliated with a member church of the Anglican Church in Uganda. Acting as the directors of the Parish corporation, the defendant vestry members changed the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the corporation, eliminating language of accession to the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church and the San Diego Diocese. They also changed the name of the Parish corporation to "St. John's Anglican Church, Fallbrook, California." Informed of defendants' action, Bishop Mathes "inhibited" Father Kroeger from further service as the rector of St. John's Parish.3 Bishop Mathes also determined that the

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An inhibition has the effect of prohibiting a priest from officiating in the diocese.

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vestry members who changed the parish articles of incorporation and bylaws had breached their duties as directors, violated the constitutions and canons of the Episcopal Church and San Diego Diocese, and were no longer qualified to serve. Based on these determinations, the Bishop removed the defendants from the vestry. At a meeting of St. John's Parish on July 17, 2006, the defendants informed the congregation that they had resigned their membership in the Episcopal Church and had affiliated with the Anglican Church. They called for a congregational vote on whether the membership should disaffiliate. A majority of those present chose to leave the Episcopal Church. On July 27, 2007, after defendants' resignation from the Episcopal Church and their removal from the vestry, Bishop Mathes sent written notice of a special members' meeting of St. John's Parish. He appointed The Reverend Wayne F. Sanders as the priest-in-charge to replace the inhibited Reverend Kroeger. On August 7, 2006, Bishop Mathes convened the special parish meeting. The parishioners present at the meeting were recognized as being the "true members" of the church. Bishop Mathes and the San Diego Diocese recognized them as the lawful vestry of St. John's. However, defendants continued to exercise control over the Parish corporation, and the parish's buildings, funds, records, and personal property. They have continued to use these assets for their own purposes in association with the Anglican Church. F. Procedural Background In September 2006 plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory relief under section 9418, seeking a determination that "[t]he individual Plaintiffs [and] their fellow Vestry 11

Members are the lawfully elected board of directors of St. John's Parish" and sought a hearing on the merits within five days. They further sought a declaration that they "are the persons lawfully entitled to exercise dominion and control over the property of St. John's Parish." They sought a declaration that the defendants' attempt to exercise dominion and control over the property was "unlawful" and their attempt to amend the articles and bylaws of the Parish corporation was a "legal nullity." Finally, they sought a declaration that the action of Bishop Mathes in determining the true membership of St. John's Parish "is a right that ecclesiastical authorities of hierarchical churches have with respect to matters of internal self-governance under both the first Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of California." The parties subsequently appeared at an ex parte hearing and the court set the matter for a noticed hearing. At the ex parte hearing, the minutes reflect that plaintiffs' counsel "states that this case only involves applic[ation] of [section] 9418 [and a] determ[ination] of Board directorship." Plaintiffs thereafter filed moving papers, which stated that "[t]he central dispute in this lawsuit is a narrow, but important question: Who are the duly elected directors of the nonprofit religious corporation known as St. John's Parish (Episcopal), Fallbrook, California." In their moving papers plaintiffs argued (1) because the Episcopal church was a hierarchical church, the court must defer to its determination of ecclesiastical matters; (2) defendants could not serve on the vestry after they renounced their church membership and breached their fiduciary duties to the church; (3) the attempted corporate actions by defendants were ultra vires; and (4) the board of directors elected on August 7, 12

2006, was the true vestry of St. John's Parish. In support of the motion, plaintiffs submitted declarations from Bishop Mathes, Father Fenton, and Dr. Robert Bruce Mullin, a religious historian and teacher at an Episcopal seminary, concerning the hierarchical structure of the Episcopal Church, as detailed ante. Defendants filed opposition, asserting (1) the defendant directors did not resign or forfeit their directorships; (2) the San Diego Diocese was a "corporate outsider" that could not determine that the board of directors of the Parish corporation was vacant; and (3) the "disgruntled members[']" election of a new board was invalid under the corporation's bylaws. The matter came on for hearing in November 2006. The court ruled "the board of Directors of St. John's Corporation consists of the individual Defendants named in the instant action; that there was no valid basis for Bishop Mathes' removal and replacement of the board of directors of the corporation; the purported election on Aug. 7, 2006 of a new board was invalid." In so doing, the court ruled that it need not defer to the Episcopal Church or San Diego Diocese's determination in this case because here the court was "not being asked to determine the 'true members' of St. John's Parish. The issue here is solely the validity of an election of directors of a California corporation." The court also distinguished one California Court of Appeal decision, Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of the Pacific (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 480 (Korean Philadelphia), overruled on another point in Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743, footnote 11, on the basis the "decision to disaffiliate in that case was made after the national church had decided that the pastor's group of 13

worshipers were not the 'true church members'" and in this case "the disaffiliation . . . took place before the Bishop purported to remove and replace the directors." The court found that, applying "neutral principles of California corporations law," plaintiffs could not show that the directors "ceased at some point to be the corporate directors." The court further found that defendants' evidence showed (1) the corporate bylaws were amended on July 11, 2006; (2) a number of resolutions were passed at a July 14, 2006 board meeting; and (3) "a properly noticed special meeting took place on July 17, 2006, at which time the members voted to disassociate the corporation from the Episcopal Church and amend its articles of incorporation." Finally, the court stated: "[T]he Court will not adjudicate whether, under the Constitution or Canons of the [San Diego] Diocese or the Episcopal Church, Bishop Mathes had the authority to remove and replace the board members. What is significant is that plaintiffs cite to no such authority under California corporations law." (Italics added.) DISCUSSION I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Because this is an issue of law on undisputed facts, and we are determining questions of constitutional law, we review the trial court's decision de novo. (Concord Christian Center v. Open Bible Standard Churches (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1408 (Concord); Singh v. Singh (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1294.)

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II. ANALYSIS A. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Disputes Involving Religious Institutions The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." That provision is binding on the states under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow (2004) 542 U.S. 1, 8, fn. 4; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 303.) The United States Supreme Court has held that the applicable federal constitutional restrictions, in the context of litigation involving religious institutions, dictate that the role of the civil courts is " 'severely circumscribe[d].' " (Jones v. Wolf (1979) 443 U.S. 595, 602 (Jones); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 709 (Serbian Eastern); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church (1969) 393 U.S. 440, 449 (Hull).) The prohibition against civil court participation in sectarian disputes extends to issues involving membership, clergy credentials and discipline, as well as religious entity governance and administration. (Jones, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 602, 603-604; Concord, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1411.) Civil courts cannot interfere in disputes relating to religious doctrine, practice, faith, ecclesiastical rule, discipline, custom, law, or polity. (Serbian Eastern, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 708-709, 713; Hull, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 449; Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Nonsectarian Church (1952) 39 Cal.2d 121, 131-132 (Rosicrucian Fellowship).) The term "polity" has been described by one Court of Appeal as follows: " 'Polity refers to 15

the general governmental structure of a church, the organs of authority and the allocation and locus of its judicatory powers as defined by its own organic law.' [Citations.]" (Barr v. United Methodist Church (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 259, 267, fn. 6.) 1. Deference to ecclesiastical matters in hierarchical churches The restriction on civil courts interfering with internal matters of religious institutions is most severe in what are known as "hierarchical" churches, such as the Episcopal Church. "By definition, a hierarchical church is one in which individual churches are 'organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine[, and] with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head' vested with ultimate ecclesiastical authority over the individual congregations and members of the entire organized church. [Citations.] It has long been established that in such a hierarchical church, an individual local congregation that affiliates with the national church body becomes 'a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, . . . under its government and control, and . . . bound by its orders and judgments.' [Citations.] In contrast, a congregational church is defined as one 'strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and [one that] so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.' [Citation.]" (Concord, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1409.) The United States Supreme Court has held that in the case of hierarchical religious entities, as here, the civil courts must accept as binding and defer to decisions by religious tribunals with respect to religious doctrine, practice, faith, ecclesiastical rule, discipline, custom, law, and religious entity governance and administration. (Jones, 16

supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602; Serbian Eastern, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 708-709, 713; Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679, 728-729 (Watson); accord, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 527, 541-542; Committee of Missions v. Pacific Synod (1909) 157 Cal. 105, 128; Horsman v. Allen (1900) 129 Cal. 131, 138-139.) As early as Watson, supra, 80 U.S. at page 727, the United States Supreme Court held: "In this class of cases [involving hierarchical religious tribunals] we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them." As the high court in Watson, supra, 80 U.S. at pages 728-729 further explained: "In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers 17

within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for." More recently, in Serbian Eastern, supra, 426 U.S. at page 709, the court explained the jurisdiction of civil courts over disputes within religious organizations in this manner: "[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them." 2. Property disputes However, the United States Supreme Court has also recognized a state has a legitimate interest in resolving property disputes in its civil courts and may do so even when incidental ecclesiastical matters are present, so long as the matter can be resolved without the court becoming entangled in religious disputes. (Jones, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602; Serbian Eastern, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 709; Hull, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 441-449; 18

Providence Baptist Church v. Superior Court (1952) 40 Cal.2d 55, 60-61 (Providence); Rosicrucian Fellowship, supra, 39 Cal.2d at pp. 131-132.) Conversely, if resolution of a religious dispute determines the control or possession of the property at issue, the sectarian authority's decision is not subject to judicial review. (Serbian Eastern, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 709.) "[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice." (Jones, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602; see California-Nevada Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. St. Luke's United Methodist Church (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763 (CaliforniaNevada).) The high court in Jones noted this tension between allowing courts to apply neutral principles of law and at the same time deferring to ecclesiastical determinations: "The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively. [Citation.] [

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