P. v. Branner 12/17/09 CA3

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State: California

Court: 1st District Court of Appeal 1st District Court of Appeal

Docket No: C059288A

Case Date: 03/11/2010

Preview:Filed 12/17/09

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ----

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JASPER DWIGHT BRANNER, OPINION ON REHEARING Defendant and Appellant. C059288 (Super.Ct.No. 04F11213)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Troy L. Nunley, Judge. Affirmed. Michele A. Douglass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, David A. Rhodes and Brian G. Smiley, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Almost a century ago, when it created the exclusionary rule to deter improper conduct by law enforcement officers, the United States Supreme Court held the guilty must go free when evidence essential

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for their convictions was obtained by an officer in violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure enshrined in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Weeks v. United States

(1914) 232 U.S. 383 [58 L.Ed. 652]; see also United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 687]; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081].) A question posed in this case is whether the guilty must go free when (1) at the time such evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer, a decision of the United States Supreme Court instructed the officer that the manner in which he searched for and seized the evidence was lawful, but (2) thereafter, the Supreme Court changed its mind. As we will explain, the answer is "No."

Although it may be that a "criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered" (People v. Defore (1926) 242 N.Y. 13, 21), the guilty should not go free when the constable did precisely what the United States Supreme Court told him he could do, but the court later decides it is the one who blundered. Evidence seized

during a search that was lawful pursuant to Supreme Court precedent existing at the time, but later overruled by the court, should not be excluded for two reasons: (1) "the exclusionary rule is designed to

deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates" (United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 916 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 694]) and, therefore, if a search by an officer complies with a court ruling that allows the officer to so act, "[p]enalizing the officer for the [courts] error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations" (id. at pp. 918, 921 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 696, 2

697); and (2) applying the exclusionary rule in such a circumstance would have "substantial social costs" due to the "objectionable collateral consequence of [the rules] interference with the criminal justice systems truth-finding function [by allowing] some guilty defendants [to] go free or receive reduced sentences" (id. at p. 907 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 688]). This principle, known as the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, applies to the search and seizure in this case. Defendant Jasper Dwight Branner, who was required to register as a convicted drug offender (Health & Saf. Code,

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