P. v. Lawrence 1/2/08 CA2/7

State: California

Court: 1st District Court of Appeal 1st District Court of Appeal

Docket No: B193831

Case Date: 04/09/2008

Preview:Filed 1/2/08

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RINGO LAWRENCE, Defendant and Appellant.

B193831 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA284590)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark V. Mooney, Judge. Reversed. Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________

Rather than agree to a two-week trial continuance requested by his defense counsel due to a scheduling conflict, Ringo Lawrence, charged with two serious drug offenses, asserted his Sixth Amendment right under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta) to represent himself. After a half-day of jury selection, Lawrence thought better of his decision and asked that counsel be appointed to represent him at trial. The trial court denied the request and also denied a second request made by Lawrence at the conclusion of jury selection. Did the trial court err in refusing to permit Lawrence to withdraw his Faretta waiver? If so, is the erroneous denial of a request to withdraw a Faretta waiver state law error only or is it federal constitutional error? If federal constitutional error, is that error structural or subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705] (Chapman)? Under the circumstances of this case the trial court abused its discretion in denying Lawrence's request for counsel at the end of the first day of trial. Because deprivation of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal trial is federal constitutional error that affects the framework within which the trial proceeds, "with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate," the error is structural and reversal is required without analysis of prejudicial effect. (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 282 [113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182]; see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. ___, ___ [126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409].) FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. The Charges Lawrence, apprehended in connection with an undercover drug investigation, was charged by information with one count of selling, transporting or offering to sell a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,

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