P. v. Legion Ins. Co. 7/22/02 CA2/2

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State: California

Court: 1st District Court of Appeal 1st District Court of Appeal

Docket No: B149841

Case Date: 10/03/2002

Preview:Filed 7/22/02 P. v. Legion Ins. Co. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEGION INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. B149841 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 202908)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Michael T. Sauer, Judge. Affirmed. Nunez & Bernstein, E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant. Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Brent Riggs and William Woods, Deputy District Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent. ___________________________________________________

Alfonso Ponce pled guilty to one count of the sale of cocaine base. He failed to appear for sentencing, and the court ordered his bail forfeited. Appellant Legion Insurance Company appeals from the subsequent order denying its motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail. Appellant contends that the order of forfeiture should have been set aside and the bond exonerated because the court failed to make findings on whether to allow the defendant to remain at liberty on bail after his conviction, pursuant to Penal Code section 1166.1 Appellant also urges that since the notice of forfeiture sent to the surety and the bail agent reflected the incorrect amount of the bond forfeited ($15,000, instead of $30,000), the court was deprived of jurisdiction and the bond was exonerated by operation of law. The contentions are without merit. DISCUSSION I. Section 1166 applies to verdicts, not to pleas. According to appellant, the failure of the trial court to comply with the requirements of section 1166 exonerated the bond. Section 1166 provides as follows: "If a general verdict is rendered against the defendant, or a special verdict is given, he or she must be remanded, if in custody, or if on bail he or she shall be committed to the proper officer of the county to await the judgment of the court upon the verdict, unless, upon considering [(1)] the protection of the public, [(2)] the seriousness of the offense charged and proven, [(3)] the previous criminal record of the defendant, ([4)] the probability of the defendant failing to appear for the judgment of the court upon the verdict, and [(5)]) public safety, the court concludes the evidence supports its decision to allow the defendant to remain out on bail. When committed, his or her bail is exonerated, or if money is deposited instead of bail it must be refunded to the defendant or to the

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Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2

person or persons found by the court to have deposited said money on behalf of said defendant." (Italics added.) Appellant reads section 1166 to require that a court must commit a defendant upon conviction, whether after a verdict or upon a plea, unless the court considers evidence on the factors enumerated in the statute and concludes that the evidence supports its decision to allow the defendant to remain free on bail until sentencing. The issue of whether this statute applies only to cases involving a jury verdict or also applies to cases resolved by plea is presently pending before our Supreme Court. (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1286, review granted Mar. 13, 2002, S103451 [holding section 1166 does not apply to cases resolved by plea]; People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1358, review granted Mar. 13, 2002, S104487 [finding the language in section 1166 ambiguous because a guilty plea is for most purposes the legal equivalent of a guilty verdict, and construing legislative history to conclude the Legislature intended the statute to apply also upon a plea of guilty].) On the face of the statute, it appears that the Legislature determined that one who is out on bail and voluntarily pleads guilty is somewhat less of a flight risk prior to sentencing than one who protests his innocence and proceeds to a jury trial but is then convicted. The difference in treating the two situations is not unreasonable, though the Legislature also could decide to deal identically with both situations. Not all statutory language, even if flawed, is subject to judicial interpretation of legislative intent. Only if there is an ambiguity may we go behind the plain language of a statute. (See Wells Fargo Bank v. Bank of America (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 424, 433.) "If no ambiguity, uncertainty, or doubt about the meaning of the statute appear, the provision is to be applied according to its terms without further judicial construction." (Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149, 156.) It is of no consequence that legislative history reveals the Legislature possibly intended to do something other than what is

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indicated by the statute's clear and unambiguous language.2 Barring ambiguous language in the statute that invites statutory construction to determine legislative intent, a drafting error must be corrected by the Legislature, not by the courts rewriting statutory language. Here, we decline the invitation to divine an ambiguity where none legitimately exists. The Legislature has defined the terms "general verdict" (

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