P. v. Super. Ct. 4/20/09 CA3

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State: California

Court: 1st District Court of Appeal 1st District Court of Appeal

Docket No: C060522

Case Date: 08/13/2009

Preview:Filed 4/20/09

P. v. Superior Court CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Yuba) ----

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF YUBA COUNTY, Respondent; ANGELIC LOUISE RAMPONE, Real Party in Interest.

C060522 (Super. Ct. No. CRF050000699)

After a jury acquitted Michael Huggins of felony murder but found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter for killing two men, real party in interest Angelic Rampone argued that collateral estoppel barred the People from prosecuting her for felony murder for the same killings. The superior court ultimately

agreed and ordered that Rampone could not be prosecuted for felony murder on the theory that the killings occurred during the commission or attempted commission of robbery or burglary.

1

On the People's writ petition, we conclude the superior court erred in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we will issue a

writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order precluding the prosecution of Rampone for felony murder. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We take the relevant facts from the People's petition, the trial court documents submitted in support of that petition, and the appellate record in a related case of which we have taken judicial notice.1 Before we do so, however, we pause to address

two procedural matters. The first matter relates to the allegations in the People's petition. The respondent superior court did not file a return

to the alternative writ this court issued, and Rampone, as real party in interest, filed only an "opposition," asserting she was "not legally obligated to answer the specific allegations of the Petition" because she is not the respondent. Rampone is

partially correct -- she was not "obligated to answer" the allegations of the petition, but then neither was the respondent court. The pertinent rule provides that "[i]f the court issues

an alternative writ . . . , the respondent or any real party in interest, separately or jointly, may serve and file a return by demurrer, verified answer, or both." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

1

At the People's request, we have taken judicial notice of the record in Huggins's appeal from his convictions for voluntary manslaughter (case No. C056765). 2

8.487(b)(1), italics added.)

Technically, an "opposition" is

permissible only "[i]f the court notifies the parties that it is considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance" (ibid.), which did not happen here. Thus, while Rampone was not

obligated to answer the petition, her only other option was to file a return by way of demurrer. Because no one filed an answer denying any of the allegations in the People's petition, we must accept the facts alleged in the petition as true. (Titmas v. Superior Court

(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 738, 741; Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 996, fn. 2.) Thus, in effect, Rampone's

"opposition" is actually a return by demurrer, because a demurrer admits the facts pleaded in a writ petition. (See

Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 141, 143.) petition as true.2 The second procedural matter relates to the superior court documents the People submitted in support of their petition. petition for a writ of mandate must be verified. (Code Civ. In A Thus, we treat the facts alleged in the

Proc.,

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