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DISTRICT COURT, DENVER, COLORADO 1437 Bannock Street Denver, Colorado 80202

Plaintiffs: DOUGLAS H. BARBER, et al.; v. Defendants: BILL OWENS, as Governor of the State of Colorado, et al.  COURT USE ONLY  Case Number(s): 04CV6602 Courtroom: 8

AMENDED COURT'S ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFFS' CROSS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS MATTER is before the Court on the above referenced motions. The Court, having reviewed all related pleadings, the file, and being fully advised, hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows: The Plaintiffs contend that the transfers aggregating some $442 million from 31 Cash Funds to the General Fund to pay the general expenses of government were in violation of the Colorado Constitution. Further, the Plaintiffs contend that the special taxes, fees, surcharges and assessments, as they are continued, increased or extended to replenish the monies transferred, are also in violation of the Colorado Constitution. STANDING Standing is a threshold issue that must be determined before a court may review the merits of a case. Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004). To establish standing under Colorado law, a plaintiff generally must have: (1) suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) to a legally protected interest. See id. at 855,856; see also Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). The "injury-in-fact" prong of Colorado's standing test is

required by the separation of powers doctrine in article III of the Colorado Constitution; it assures that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is proper one for judicial resolution. See Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982). This prong requires "a concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues that parties argue to the courts." Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)). Standing cannot be conferred by the "remote possibility of a future injury" or an injury that is "overly `indirect and incidental' to the defendant's action." (quoting Brotman v. E. Lake Creek Ranch, L.L.P., 31 P.3d 886, 890-91 (Colo. 2001); see also O'Bryant v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 778 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1989). The "legally protected interest" prong involves an inquiry as to whether the constitution, the common law, or statute, rule or regulation protects the plaintiff's legal interest. Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856. A legally protected interest may be a tangible or economic interest arising out of property or contract, or a statute that confers privilege; on the other hand, it may be intangible, such as an interest in free speech or in having a government that operates in conformity with the constitution. See id.; see also Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968); Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401, 290 P.2d 237 (1955). This Court finds that Plaintiffs', except for HeggemLundquist, claimed injury was to a "legally protected interest." However, this Court will address the "injury-in-fact" prong of the test for standing as it relates to each Plaintiff in this action. 1. Douglas H. Barber: Douglas Barber is a real estate broker licensed by the State of Colorado. Douglas Barber has been a licensed realtor in Colorado since 1975. In the past, he has paid into the Real Estate Recovery Fund. The Real Estate Recovery Fund is a special fund established by

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