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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** LOOMIS AMSDEN v. RICHARD FISCHER (AC 19452)
Schaller, Zarella and Peters, Js. Argued June 6, 2000--officially released March 20, 2001 Counsel

Karen K. Clark, with whom, on the brief, was Maria S. Spalding, for the appellant (defendant). Neil Johnson, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SCHALLER, J. The defendant, Richard Fischer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Loomis Amsden, rendered after a jury trial in this medical malpractice action. The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) excluded the testimony of his expert witness on the issue of causation, (2) refused to instruct the jury on intervening cause and (3) failed to direct a verdict in his favor or to set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. This action arose

out of a surgical procedure that the defendant performed on the plaintiff to alleviate carpal tunnel entrapment on March 2, 1993. The plaintiff claimed that as a result of the procedure, he suffered median nerve damage in his right hand, resulting in permanent disability. After postoperative treatment with the defendant, the plaintiff consulted Duffield Ashmead on November 23, 1993. Ashmead is a physician who specializes in reconstructive surgery and microsurgery. His examination of the plaintiff's symptoms, which included diminished sensation in the fingers and virtually no sensation in the thumb, led him to conclude that the plaintiff's median nerve had been damaged during his earlier carpal tunnel release surgery. Ashmead performed two separate reconstructive surgeries on the plaintiff's median nerve, which involved use of the plaintiff's healthy nerve to bridge a gap in the damaged median nerve. Ashmead rated the plaintiff's condition as 44 percent permanently impaired. At trial, the plaintiff offered the testimony of his expert witness, Gerald Sava, a surgeon who performed no more than six carpal tunnel surgeries per year. Sava had difficulty discerning from the defendant's surgical notes what the defendant had done. He testified that the numbness in the plaintiff's fingers and thumb indicated median nerve damage, and was not a risk associated with carpal tunnel release surgery. Sava further testified that the defendant breached the standard of care because an ``injury with consequent significant deficit is an unacceptable consequence of surgery.'' The defendant offered the testimony of his expert witness, Richard Eaton, a physician who testified that the nerves appeared to be regenerating and showing signs of improvement following the defendant's surgical procedure. Eaton stated that nerve damage is a risk of the surgery and that the defendant complied with good medical standards in caring for the plaintiff. Eaton concluded that the plaintiff's condition was not the result of the defendant's surgery and agreed with the defendant's approach. On January 22, 1999, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude a portion of Eaton's testimony in which he stated that the plaintiff's injuries were the result of Ashmead's subsequent surgical procedures. The plaintiff asserted that the testimony was inadmissible because the defendant had not filed a special defense alleging a superseding cause of the injuries and that under the defendant's general denial, the admission of the testimony would serve only to confuse the jury. The court granted the motion. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The defendant claims first that the court improperly excluded the testimony of his expert witness on the

issue of causation. We disagree. ``The decision to preclude a party from introducing expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial court. Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, [2 Conn. App. 103, 107, 476 A.2d 1074 (1984)]. On appeal, that decision is subject only to the test of abuse of discretion. Kemp v. Ellington Purchasing Corporation, 9 Conn. App. 400, 405, 519 A.2d 95 (1986). The salient inquiry is whether the court could have reasonably concluded as it did. Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 108.'' Yale University School of Medicine v. McCarthy, 26 Conn. App. 497, 500

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