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MARLENE BALASKA v. RICHARD BALASKA (AC 32241)
Robinson, Bear and Borden, Js. Argued April 25--officially released August 2, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Gordon, J. [judgment]; Abery-Wetstone, J. [modification of visitation].)

William H. Cashman, with whom was Maria Chiarelli, for the appellant (plaintiff). Richard Balaska, pro se, the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

BORDEN, J. The plaintiff, Marlene Balaska, appeals from the postdissolution order of the trial court modifying the visitation of the defendant, Richard Balaska, with respect to their minor child, C. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court: (1) abused its discretion by modifying the visitation order without finding a substantial change in circumstances or finding that modification was in the best interests of the child, and without considering the defendant's present ability to parent; (2) improperly ordered the parties to attend parental counseling; (3) erroneously found that she had engaged in parental alienation; and (4) improperly referred to treatises and articles that were not exhibits at trial.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the plaintiff's appeal. The parties were married on May 29, 1994. They have two minor children of the marriage: a son, C, born in 1994; and a daughter, A, born in 1997. In May, 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking the dissolution of her marriage to the defendant on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. On November 5, 2007, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. The judgment incorporated by reference the terms of a separation agreement that the parties had entered into on the same date. The agreement provided in relevant part that the parties were to have joint legal custody of C and A, with the plaintiff having primary physical custody. During the school year, the defendant had visitation with the children once a week after school until 7:30 p.m., and one additional midweek evening per month from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. During the summer, he had visitation twice a week from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. In addition, the defendant had visitation on alternating weekend days and holidays. The agreement did not provide the defendant with any overnight parental access. The record reflects that the parties subsequently engaged in classic, high conflict postdissolution litigation regarding family matters. See Strobel v. Strobel, 73 Conn. App. 428, 808 A.2d 698, appeal dismissed, 267 Conn. 901, 838 A.2d 209 (2003). In this context, both parties filed, inter alia, motions seeking to modify custody and visitation with respect to both children. The defendant sought sole physical and legal custody of C, along with increased visitation. The plaintiff, in response, moved for sole legal custody of both C and A, along with more restricted visitation for the defendant. Following a fourteen day hearing, the court issued its order increasing the defendant's visitation rights with C but suspending entirely his visitation with A.2 The defendant's increased visitation time with C included overnight visitation.3 In addition, the court ordered that the plaintiff and the defendant engage in the coparent-

ing program ``Focus on Kids'' at a minimum of once per month ``to discuss [their children's] behavioral issues, educational issues, medical issues and planning for their children's futures.'' The court found that the plaintiff's and defendant's participation in parental counseling was in the best interests of both children. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly increased the defendant's visitation with C without finding a substantial change in circumstances or that modification was in the child's best interests, and without considering the defendant's present ability to parent. We disagree. We begin by setting forth the standard of review and legal principles that guide our analysis. ``Our standard of review of a trial court's decision regarding custody, visitation and relocation orders is one of abuse of discretion.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Emrich v. Emrich, 127 Conn. App. 691, 694, 15 A.3d 1104 (2011). ``As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 366, 999 A.2d 721 (2010). ``In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's findings are binding on this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence in the record to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buehler v. Buehler, 117 Conn. App. 304, 317

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