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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** SUSAN BARESE v. JAMES G. CLARK (AC 20036)
Lavery, C. J., and Landau and Mihalakos, Js. Argued November 1, 2000--officially released February 27, 2001 Counsel

Norman A. Pattis, for the appellant (plaintiff). Terrence M. O'Neill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

LAVERY, C. J. The plaintiff, Susan Barese, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, James G. Clark. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant, an assistant state's attorney, was immune from a civil action that was based on his dealings with the plaintiff, who was a victim of a crime. Because we conclude that state's attorneys are immune from tort liability for acts committed in the performance of their duties as state's attorneys, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our consideration of the issue raised in this appeal.1 In August, 1994, the plaintiff was the victim of an assault, robbery and burglary in her home. During the course of those crimes, the intruder bit the plaintiff, breaking her skin. The defendant successfully prosecuted the assailant2 for those and other crimes, resulting in a lengthy prison sentence. The day before the assailant's scheduled sentencing, the plaintiff and the defendant spoke by telephone. In that conversation, the defendant asked the plaintiff to meet him at his office the next morning prior to the sentencing hearing, and the plaintiff agreed to do so. When the plaintiff arrived the next morning, the defendant informed her that the presentence investigation (PSI)3 report contained a statement by the assailant that he was HIV positive at the time of the incident. The defendant, however, informed the plaintiff that he did not believe the assailant's claim, but rather believed that the assailant said this only in an effort to obtain leniency in sentencing. The defendant also assured the plaintiff that he would not disclose this information. At the sentencing hearing, however, the defendant revealed to the sentencing court the assailant's claim that he was HIV positive. The defendant stated in deposition testimony for this case that he did so partly to reveal to the court that ``there were two sides to [the assailant's] claim of having an illness.'' Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a four count complaint against the defendant alleging breach of the plaintiff's privacy, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that because the conduct giving rise to this action was performed by him in his capacity as an assistant state's attorney, he was immune from civil liability for those actions. The court granted the defendant's motion as to all counts of the plaintiff's complaint. This appeal followed. We first state our standard of review in summary judgment matters. ``The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book

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