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ROBERT B. BARTON v. CITY OF NORWALK (AC 31113)
DiPentima, C. J., and Espinosa and West, Js. Argued April 25--officially released October 4, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Pavia, J. [motion for summary judgment]; Adams, J. [motion to amend].) Linda M. Guliuzza, assistant corporation counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Robert F. Maslan, Jr., corporation counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Elliot B. Pollack, with whom was Megan Youngling Carannante, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

ESPINOSA, J. The defendant, the city of Norwalk, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, Robert B. Barton. The defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff's inverse condemnation action was not precluded by (1) the existence of a judgment in a related eminent domain proceeding, (2) the doctrine of res judicata and (3) the doctrine of collateral estoppel.1 We agree with the trial court that the motion for summary judgment was not supported by any of the theories advanced by the defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts and procedural history of the case can be summarized as follows. The plaintiff owned property at 65 South Main Street and 70 South Main Street in Norwalk. The 65 South Main Street property served as a parking lot for the 70 South Main Street property. On February 26, 2002, the defendant exercised its eminent domain authority over the property at 65 South Main Street. An action to determine the value of the condemned property followed. During the course of the action, the plaintiff twice attempted to amend his pleadings to reflect the loss in value of 70 South Main Street resulting from the taking of 65 South Main Street. In both instances, the defendant objected to the amendments. Ultimately, the court sustained the defendant's objections and did not allow the amendments. After a trial to determine the value of 65 South Main Street, the court, in its memorandum of decision dated January 27, 2009, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the difference between the fair market value that the court calculated and the amount initially paid to the plaintiff, plus interest. In addition to the previously described condemnation proceeding, the plaintiff simultaneously pursued the present inverse condemnation action2 regarding the property at 70 South Main Street. The plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on November 17, 2003, shortly after the court denied his second attempt to amend his pleadings in the eminent domain proceeding. The defendant moved for summary judgment in the inverse condemnation action on March 4, 2009. Because the eminent domain proceeding had concluded and resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had received just compensation for the taking of 65 South Main Street and, therefore, could not pursue an inverse condemnation action. The court denied this motion on May 11, 2009, and the defendant appealed on May 27, 2009.3 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. Practice Book

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Connecticut Law