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GARY BROWN v. KAREN BROWN (AC 31801)
Gruendel, Lavine and Bear, Js. Argued May 26--officially released August 2, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Hon. Howard T. Owens, judge trial referee.) Michael S. Taylor, with whom was Kenneth J. Bartschi, for the appellant (plaintiff). David R. Schaefer, with whom was Sean M. Fisher, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. In this marital dissolution action, the plaintiff, Gary Brown, appeals from the judgment of the trial court with respect to the court's financial orders. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion by (1) awarding the defendant, Karen Brown, $20,000 in monthly alimony payments without sufficient evidence of his income and (2) excluding evidence regarding the state of his financial condition at the time of trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The parties married on November 28, 1982, in Woodbridge. On November 5, 2009, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage and entered related financial orders.1 By the time of the parties' divorce, the plaintiff had enjoyed a successful career as a prodigious and highly competent entrepreneur, particularly within the real estate development market.2 As documented by his financial affidavit, the total value of the plaintiff's assets equaled approximately $3.1 million as of May, 2009, and it was undisputed that for the four year period immediately preceding their divorce, the parties lived on between $600,000 and $1 million of annual, tax free cash withdrawals from the plaintiff's businesses and investments, which the court, in its memorandum of decision, explicitly deemed as ``income.''3 The plaintiff also testified that from September, 2007, through December, 2008, he provided the defendant with at least $40,000 per month for her personal expenses.4 During the underlying dissolution trial before the court in May and June, 2009, the plaintiff claimed that he had limited income and that his business ventures left him little in terms of overall asset value. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that, beginning in September, 2008, his extensive business investments, which previously had been of substantial value, now had limited worth and he was considering bankruptcy. Thus, the plaintiff maintained that he had no ability to provide the defendant with financial support in the form of alimony or otherwise. Nonetheless, in its November 5, 2009 memorandum of decision, the court explicitly determined that ``much of the plaintiff's testimony as to the current status of his businesses as well as the future status of same can be considered self-serving.''5 As the court described, not only was the plaintiff's business debt ``grossly exaggerated,'' but, ``[s]ince the [parties'] separation [in early 2008, the plaintiff] has had an incomparable lifestyle, [including] expensive and extensive travel and lavish living expenses.'' Accordingly, having ``considered . . . the criteria set forth in [General Statutes

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Connecticut Law