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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** LAVERY, C. J., dissenting. On the basis of the procedural history of this case, I respectfully dissent from part I of the majority's opinion. Contrary to the majority's view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, Michael Culmo, on rebuttal, and Culmo's testimony was not prejudicial to the defendants. The transcript of the trial demonstrates that both counsel for the parties failed to comply timely with the requirements of our rules of practice with respect to amended pleadings and the disclosure of expert witnesses. Apparently, the plaintiffs timely disclosed Timothy Foreman, a builder and an inspector, as an expert witness who testified during the plaintiffs' case-in-chief. Approximately five weeks before trial, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to allege the defects to the structural frame of the house at issue in this appeal. The defendants did not object to the amendment in a timely fashion.1 During trial, the defendants disclosed that Barry Steinberg, a structural engineer, would testify as an expert witness. Thereafter, the plaintiffs disclosed Culmo, a structural engineer, to rebut Steinberg's testimony. Although the defendants objected strenuously, the court permitted Culmo to tes-

tify.2 The court also permitted the defendants to introduce additional testimony from Steinberg in surrebuttal.3 ``It is a well established principle of law that the trial court may exercise its discretion with regard to evidentiary rulings, and the trial court's rulings will not be disturbed on appellate review absent abuse of that discretion. . . . Sound discretion, by definition, means a discretion that is not exercised arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law . . . . And [it] requires a knowledge and understanding of the material circumstances surrounding the matter . . . . In our review of these discretionary determinations, we make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling. . . . State v. Orhan, 52 Conn. App. 231, 237, 726 A.2d 629 (1999). Evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the [appellant] of substantial prejudice or injustice. State v. Hernandez, 204 Conn. 377, 390, 528 A.2d 794 (1987).'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baughman v. Collins, 56 Conn. App. 34, 35

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