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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** CARLIN POZZI ARCHITECTS, P.C. v. TOWN OF BETHEL ET AL. (AC 19633)
Spear, Mihalakos and Shea, Js. Argued December 7, 2000--officially released March 27, 2001 Counsel

Stewart A. McMillan, with whom, on the brief, was Michael J. Byrne, for the appellant (plaintiff). Sheila A. Denton, with whom, on the brief, were Edward P. McCreery, III, and Aimee J. Wood, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion

SHEA, J. The plaintiff, Carlin Pozzi Architects, P.C., a firm of architects, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant town of Bethel.1 The plaintiff sought to enjoin the arbitration demanded by the defendant pursuant to an arbitration clause of a contract between the parties for architectural services to be furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment was clearly erroneous because a court and not arbitra-

tion is the appropriate forum for resolving the issue of whether the demand for arbitration was timely filed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On October 28, 1988, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract in which the plaintiff was to provide architectural services for the defendant in the construction of a school. The contract contained an arbitration clause. The pertinent portions of the arbitration clause, Article 9, provide in relevant part: ``9.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this Agreement arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association [AAA] then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree otherwise''; and ``9.2 Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed in writing with the other party to this Agreement and with the American Arbitration Association. The demand shall be made within a reasonable time after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen. In no event shall the demand for arbitration be made after the date when institution of legal or equitable proceedings based on such claim, dispute or other matter in question would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.'' The plaintiff began construction of the school in 1990, and, by the fall of 1991, the defendant occupied and utilized the building. At some point, however, the roof and HVAC systems2 of the building intermittently malfunctioned, causing damage. As a result of the problems with the roof and HVAC systems, on June 3, 1998, the defendant filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA, alleging breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and negligence. The plaintiff filed a verified complaint on December 30, 1998, seeking an injunction to enjoin the defendant and the AAA from proceeding with the arbitration. In seeking an injunction, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's demand for arbitration was time barred by the statute of limitations for claims against design professionals and by the doctrine of laches,3 and, further, that the court and not arbitration was the appropriate forum to determine this issue because defenses such as the statute of limitations were not included in the arbitration agreement. On January 20, 1999, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the demand for arbitration was timely. In its memorandum of decision dated February 25, 1999, the trial court concluded that the court and not arbitration was the proper forum to determine whether the plaintiff's defenses were arbitrable. The court held that the arbitration clause encompassed the issue of

whether the defendant had filed a timely demand for arbitration and that, therefore, the issue should be decided by an arbitrator. The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to enjoin the arbitration, but then stated that unless the parties objected, it would treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment because a motion to dismiss is inappropriate for deciding questions of arbitrability. When the plaintiff objected, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment raising claims identical to those in its motion to dismiss. On May 13, 1999, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and held that the complaint raised no genuine issue of material fact and that the issues are arbitrable. This appeal followed. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment was clearly erroneous because the arbitration agreement fails to include issues involving the timeliness of a demand for arbitration, and, therefore, the court and not an arbitrator should determine whether the defendant filed a demand for arbitration within the proper statutory time period. We are not persuaded. Our standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Pursuant to Practice Book

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