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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** CAS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. DAINTY RUBBISH SERVICE, INC. (AC 17943)
Hennessy, Pellegrino and Dupont, Js. Argued May 30--officially released October 10, 2000 Counsel

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Cynthia C. Bott and Mark A. Balaban, for the appellant (defendant). Brendan T. Flynn, with whom, on the brief, was Lawrence G. Rosenthal, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

DUPONT, J. This is an appeal by the defendant, Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc., from the judgment for the plaintiff, CAS Construction Company, Inc., in the amount of $31,643.87 plus costs, and from the denial of its motion to open the judgment. The issue is whether the defendant's motion to open the judgment should have been granted.1 We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court. The plaintiff commenced this action against the

defendant by writ, summons and complaint on June 18, 1997, seeking damages arising from an alleged breach of an oral contract involving the storage of topsoil. The complaint was returnable on July 8, 1997. On August 7, 1997, the trial court, Stanley, J., issued a notice that the case had been placed on the fast track and that counsel had 180 days from the return date to close the pleadings.2 On August 12, 1997, the plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure to plead that was acted on by the court clerk and granted that same day.3 The notice of the default issued on August 15, 1997. On August 22, 1997, the plaintiff filed a claim for a hearing in damages.4 Thereafter, the defendant filed a request to revise on September 2, 1997, which was dated August 25, 1997. The plaintiff's objection to that request was dated August 29, 1997, and also was filed on September 2, 1997. The plaintiff argued in its objection that the defendant was limited to filing an answer.5 On September 25, 1997, the defendant moved to open the default. The plaintiff filed an objection to this motion on October 6, 1997. The motion to open the default was never decided and, at the time judgment was rendered, it remained pending.6 According to the plaintiff, the motion to open the default, although scheduled on the short calendar for October 20, 1997, was never marked ``ready'' by the defendant, and therefore the court marked it ``off.'' Thereafter, on October 27, 1997, the court clerk placed the plaintiff's objection to the motion to open the default on the short calendar, but it also was marked ``off'' because the plaintiff's counsel was out of state. The trial court, Hodgson, J., was unaware of the defendant's motion to open the default that had been filed on September 25, 1997, when it sustained the plaintiff's objection to the request to revise on October 14, 1997. In sustaining the objection to the request to revise, the court stated that because ``the defendant has not moved to set aside the default but is apparently depending on the automatic reopening feature of [Practice Book]

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Connecticut Law