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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** MARIBEL COLON ET AL. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL. (AC 18738)
Landau, Hennessy and Mihalakos, Js. Argued February 29--officially released October 3, 2000 Counsel

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Kurt D. Koehler and Tara Knight, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Tracey C. Kammerer, with whom, on the brief, were Thomas W. Ude, Jr., James S. DelVisco, Audrey C. Kramer and Michael A. Wolak III, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

HENNESSY, J. The plaintiffs, Maribel Colon and Maria Garcia,1 appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant board of education of the city of New Haven2 on the ground that the defendant was immune from liability under the doctrine of governmental immunity. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined

that (1) the defendant was immune from liability and (2) that an exception to governmental immunity did not apply in this case. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. The following facts are necessary for our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiffs brought this action for personal injuries sustained by Colon while she attended school in New Haven. The plaintiffs alleged that Colon was in the hallway of the school when she was struck in the head and facial area by a door that was swung open by Geneva Pollack, a teacher at the school. The first count of the complaint alleged that the defendant was liable for the negligence of its agent, servant or employee, Pollack. The defendant denied the allegations of the complaint and raised special defenses asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity and the plaintiffs' failure to bring an action against the teacher. The trial court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs' failure to bring an action against the teacher barred their recovery. The court granted the motion for summary judgment, however, finding that the action of the teacher was discretionary and thus that the defendant was immune from liability under the doctrine of governmental immunity unless the action fell within an exception to the rule that a government agency may not be held liable for its discretionary acts. The court then determined that the only exception relevant to this case, the identifiable person-imminent harm exception, did not apply. The plaintiffs appealed from that decision. ``While `[a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law; Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 593, 479 A.2d 793 (1984) . . . its employees faced the same personal tort liability as private individuals.' Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, [208 Conn. 161, 165, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988)]. `[A] municipal employee [however,] has a qualified immunity in the performance of a governmental duty, but he may be liable if he misperforms a ministerial act, as opposed to a discretionary act. . . . Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 471, 356 A.2d 176 [1975].' Fraser v. Henninger, 173 Conn. 52, 60, 376 A.2d 406 (1977). ``The immunity from liability for the performance of discretionary acts by a municipal employee is subject to three exceptions or circumstances under which liability may attach even though the act was discretionary: first, where the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm . . . second, where a statute specifically provides for a cause of action against a municipality or municipal official for failure to enforce certain laws . . . and third, where

the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness or intent to injure, rather than negligence.'' (Citations omitted.) Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501, 505, 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). ``[T]he ultimate determination of whether qualified immunity applies is ordinarily a question of law for the court . . . [unless] there are unresolved factual issues material to the applicability of the defense . . . [where the] resolution of those factual issues is properly left to the jury.'' Mulligan v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 716, 736, 643 A.2d 1226 (1994), on appeal after remand, 38 Conn. App. 546, 662 A.2d 15 (1995). I The plaintiff claims first that the court improperly determined that Pollack's action in opening the door was discretionary rather than ministerial. We disagree. ``The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment. On the other hand, ministerial acts are performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion as to the propriety of the action. . . . Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, [supra, 208 Conn. 167

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