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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** SIGMUND FEUERMAN v. HARRIETTE FEUERMAN (AC 18850)
Lavery, C. J., and Schaller and Mihalakos, Js. Submitted on briefs March 2, 2000--officially released March 20, 2001 Counsel

Daniel J. Mahaney filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff). Sandra P. Lax filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J. The plaintiff, Sigmund Feuerman, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's four count complaint1 against her. The plaintiff2 in this civil action seeks to enforce the provisions of a separation agreement that the court had incorporated by reference into the judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. The trial court found the following facts. The plaintiff and the defendant were married on November 3, 1957. A dissolution proceeding was commenced in 1991, and on November 7, 1994, the parties signed a separation

agreement,3 which the court accepted and incorporated by reference into the judgment dissolving the marriage. On March 5, 1995, the court, by agreement of the parties, extended the time for payment under paragraph 5.1 (a), from March 7, 1995, to March 31, 1995. The parties agreed to a further extension on March 13, 1995. The defendant again appeared before the court and asked for a further extension, which the court refused. The court cited as its reason that it could not open a judgment beyond the four month time limitation since it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court then signed an order transferring the certain stock to the defendant in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5.1 (e) of the separation agreement. An appeal to the Appellate Court followed. We affirmed the judgment.4 This civil action followed on February 19, 1998, in which the plaintiff is claiming an interest in a portion of the assets that the trial court transferred to the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the defendant was to receive a specific sum of lump sum alimony, that is, $575,000, and that the defendant has been unjustly enriched because she has received substantially more than that amount by virtue of the transfer due to an increase in the value of the stocks that were transferred. The present civil action seeks to enjoin the defendant from liquidating those assets she received pursuant to the separation agreement as well as an order requiring the defendant to transfer back to the plaintiff any assets or cash that would be in excess of the $575,000 contractual settlement. On March 16, 1998, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on August 18, 1998, finding that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal followed. In this action, the plaintiff first claims that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, which motion claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We agree. We conclude, however, that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment based on res judicata. In Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727

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Connecticut Law