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GATEWAY, KELSO AND COMPANY, INC. v. WEST HARTFORD NO. 1, LLC (AC 31374)
Lavine, Robinson and Lavery, Js. Argued November 18, 2010--officially released February 15, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Elgo, J.) Kerry M. Wisser, with whom was Nathan A. Schatz, for the appellant (defendant). Daniel J. Klau, with whom, on the brief, was James G. Green, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

ROBINSON, J. The defendant, West Hartford No. 1, LLC, appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment, which asserted that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the action brought by the plaintiff, Gateway, Kelso & Company, Inc. The issue presented in this appeal is whether a factual finding made in a prejudgment remedy proceeding may be accorded collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent proceeding on the merits. Because we conclude that it may not, we affirm the decision of the trial court.1 The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review of the defendant's claim on appeal. As alleged in the underlying complaint, the plaintiff was engaged in the business of developing commercial real estate. During September and October, 2006, the plaintiff was looking for commercial real estate to purchase, to develop and subsequently to lease to its client, Wakefern Food Corporation (Wakefern), a supermarket retail company. In October, 2006, the plaintiff's vice president, Joseph Penner, contacted the defendant's real estate broker, Reno Properties, so that Penner could inspect one of the defendant's properties for purchase. Reno Properties advised Penner that the defendant had a parcel located at 983 New Britain Avenue in West Hartford available for purchase. In a letter to Penner on behalf of the defendant, Reno Properties stated that the parcel was available for $7 million. Wakefern indicated to Penner that it was interested in leasing property in West Hartford. After some negotiation, Penner sent a letter of intent to purchase the parcel for $7 million. Shortly thereafter, the defendant learned that the plaintiff's client was Wakefern. After learning the client's identity, the defendant contacted Wakefern directly with an offer to lease the parcel, effectively removing the plaintiff from the transaction. Wakefern informed the defendant that it could not enter into a lease with the defendant because of its agreement with the plaintiff. The defendant then contacted the plaintiff and negotiated a contract under which the plaintiff would release Wakefern from its agreement in exchange for a $500,000 fee from the defendant, payable upon successful consummation of an agreement between the defendant and Wakefern. The defendant successfully negotiated a lease with Wakefern but failed to uphold its agreement with the plaintiff to pay the $500,000 fee. On March 11, 2009, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant alleging fraud, breach of contract and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes

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Connecticut Law