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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** ALISTAIR GEMMELL ET AL. v. DENNIS LEE ET AL. (AC 19616)
Landau, Spear and Freedman, Js. Submitted on briefs April 24--officially released August 29, 2000 Counsel

David A. Leff and William F. Dow III filed a brief for the appellants (named defendant et al.). Michele R. Celentano and Morton J. Dimenstein filed a brief for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

FREEDMAN, J. The defendants1 appeal from the judgment of the trial court quieting title in the plaintiffs2 to a right-of-way over property known as Glen Road in Orange, and enjoining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' right-of-way. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to an easement over a proposed road or private right-of-way known as Glen Road. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were interfering with their right to make use of the proposed road and encroaching on their

property.3 The trial court found for the plaintiffs, reciting the following findings of fact. ``All of the properties owned by the parties descend from a common owner, one Mary Gracy. The various deeds from Mary Gracy to the parties herein form the basis for this dispute. ``The deed from Mary Gracy to the plaintiffs' predecessor in title contains a description of the property conveyed setting forth its various boundaries, some of which are described as bordering on a certain `right of way.' . . . There is no specific reference in the deed to any right of passage or use over said right-of-way. The deed does, however, contain a referral to a map, alleged to be of record, for a further description of the property. The reference reads as follows: `The above parcel is fully described and reference is here had to a map entitled ``Gracy, Orange, Conn., scale 1 [inch] 40 [feet], July, 1929, Wynne & Hahn, Civil Engineers and Surveyors'' on file in the Orange Town Clerk's Office.' All of the deeds but one in the plaintiffs' chain of title contain this reference to the map of July, 1929. ``Subsequently, the deeds to the defendants or their predecessors in title refer not only to the map but also refer to the right through over and upon said right of way. An example of such grant is found in the deed to the defendant Joan Somers:4 `[T]ogether with a right of way for all purposes whatsoever, in common with Mary Gracy, her heirs and assigns, and in common with all others to whom a similar right may have been heretofore granted, or may hereafter be granted in, through, over and upon that portion of said right of way 25 feet in width, as herein mentioned, and as the same is shown on a Map entitled ``Gracy, Orange, Conn., Scale 1 inch equals 40 feet, July, 1929, Wynne & Hahn, Civil Engineers,'' on file in the Orange Town Clerk's Office. . . .' ``Over the years, the `Proposed road' or `right-of-way' has become known as Glen Road, and several of the deeds refer to the right in common with others to the use of Glen Road.'' The court framed the issue as ``whether a reference, in a deed, to a map alleged to be on file in the Orange Town Clerk's Office, by itself and without any specific grant conveys an interest in a proposed road depicted thereon, said road being bounded on the property being conveyed.'' The court answered that question in the affirmative and concluded that the plaintiffs have an easement over Glen Road that gives them access to the rear of their property. ``[T]he law is well settled that where an owner of land causes a map to be made of it upon which are delineated separate lots and streets and highways by which access may be had to them, and then sells the lots, referring in his conveyances to the map, the lot owners acquire the right to have the streets and high-

ways thereafter kept open for use in connection with their lands.'' Whitton v. Clark, 112 Conn. 28, 32, 151 A. 305 (1930). ``If a grantor promulgates a general plan for the development of a tract and the plan designates streets by which the lots on the plan may be reached, the lot owners have an enforceable right to use the street to reach their lots. Id., 35. The Whitton court states, `[h]ere the test must be the intention of the owner in creating the restrictions upon any lot to make the benefit of them available not to himself but to the owners of the other lots in the tract.' Id., 36.'' Perkins v. Fasig, 57 Conn. App. 71, 77, 747 A.2d 54, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 925, A.2d (2000). Because the plaintiffs were not given an express easement over Glen Road, we must consider whether they have an easement by implication. ``There are two principal factors to be examined in determining whether an easement by implication has arisen: (1) the intention of the parties; and (2) whether the easement is reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the dominant estate.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 78. We determine whether the grantor intended to establish an easement ``by an examination of the deeds, maps and recorded instruments introduced as evidence. Intent as expressed in deeds and other recorded documents is a matter of law.'' Id., 76. ``We must also examine the facts found by the court as relevant to the establishment of the particular dimensions of the easement.'' Mandes v. Godiksen, 57 Conn. App. 79, 83, 747 A.2d 47, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 915, A.2d (2000); see also Perkins v. Fasig, supra, 57 Conn. App. 78

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