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CAROLINE HIRSCHFELD v. ROBERT B. MACHINIST (AC 31500) (AC 31562)
Bishop, Bear and Pellegrino, Js. Argued June 2--officially released September 13, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Shay, J.) Joseph T. O'Connor, for the appellant in AC 31500 and the cross appellant and appellee in AC 31562 (plaintiff). Kenneth J. Bartschi and Dana M. Hrelic, with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Rutkin and Melissa Needle, for the appellee in AC 31500 (defendant). Kenneth J. Bartschi and Dana M. Hrelic, with whom, on the brief, was Arnold Rutkin, for the appellant and cross appellee in AC 31562 (defendant).

Opinion

BISHOP, J. These two appeals arise out of various postjudgment proceedings stemming from the parties' dissolution of marriage.1 In AC 31500, the plaintiff, Caroline Hirschfeld, claims that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that swimming pool expenses were ``shelter expenses'' in accordance with the parties' separation agreement, (2) entered a postjudgment order dividing assets when it attributed to her expenses associated with a certain automobile, (3) denied her motion for an order regarding the division of assets without affording her a full evidentiary hearing and (4) denied her request for counsel fees without allowing her to inquire as to the defendant's financial circumstances.2 In AC 31562, the defendant, Robert Machinist, claims that the trial court abused its discretion in reversing its previous order imposing a sanction on the plaintiff through which she had been precluded from testifying as to housekeeping expenses incurred since the marriage was dissolved. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment in AC 31500, and we affirm the judgment in AC 31562. The marriage of the parties was dissolved on February 2, 2007. The parties had entered into a separation agreement, the terms of which were incorporated as part of the dissolution judgment. Since the date of the judgment, litigation between the parties has been incessant, with more than one hundred court filings. Because the claims on appeal have differing factual and procedural bases, we address each in turn. I AC 31500 A The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly held her liable for expenses associated with the swimming pool at the marital property on the basis of its conclusion that those costs were ``shelter expenses'' within the meaning of the parties' separation agreement. We disagree. ``It is well established that a separation agreement, incorporated by reference into a judgment of dissolution, is to be regarded and construed as a contract. . . . Accordingly, our review of a trial court's interpretation of a separation agreement is guided by the general principles governing the construction of contracts. . . . A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. . . . If a contract is unambiguous within its four corners, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law. . . . When the language of a contract is ambiguous,

[however] the determination of the parties' intent is a question of fact, and the trial court's interpretation is subject to reversal on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. . . . ``Contract language is unambiguous when it has a definite and precise meaning . . . concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion . . . . In contrast, an agreement is ambiguous when its language is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345, 354

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