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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** IN RE AMELIA W. ET AL.* (AC 20486)
Foti, Spear and Dranginis, Js. Argued January 8--officially released March 27, 2001 Counsel

Mary Ann Barile, with whom was Sandra G. Huggins, for the appellant (respondent father). Mary K. Lenehan, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner). Justino Rosado, for the minor child.
Opinion

SPEAR, J. The respondent father1 appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his two daughters, A and N. He claims that the court improperly found that (1) the department of children and families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent with his children and (2) there was no ongoing parent-child relationship with either child.2 We dismiss the first claim

as moot and affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to the second claim. The relevant facts found by the court are as follows. A was born on June 20, 1989, and N was born on September 20, 1992. The court determined that A and N were neglected after the department found them living in an unsafe dwelling that was infested with roaches and littered with dirty clothes and garbage. Their mother was a substance abuser, and the respondent was incarcerated. Both children were committed to the custody of the petitioner, the commissioner of children and families (commissioner), on July 30, 1996. The respondent has a long psychiatric history that includes paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder and intermittent explosive personality disorder. He also has an extensive criminal history that reveals a pattern of violence. He has been convicted of assault on a peace officer, threatening and carrying a dangerous weapon. Despite his history, the respondent continuously denied that he had any problems and rejected the assistance offered by social services, claiming that he did not need it. On May 14, 1998, the commissioner filed petitions to terminate the respondent's parental rights with respect to his children, alleging that (1) the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the respondent, (2) the children were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for, and the respondent has failed to achieve the necessary degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the children, he could assume a responsible position in the life of the children, and (3) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the respondent that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing, dayto-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the children and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of a parentchild relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the children. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with his children and that the respondent was ``unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts because he repeatedly told the worker that there was nothing wrong with him and that he did not need services.'' The court also found that ``[the respondent] continues to suffer from serious emotional problems that preclude his ability to safely and competently parent his children and understand their individualized needs. [A] is `an emotionally fragile, mildly retarded youngster with many perceptual and language difficulties . . . who also suffers from severe anxiety second-

ary to a severe post-traumatic stress disorder . . . .' [A] is currently on several medications to help stabilize her behavior. [The respondent] has made statements such as the medicine will mix with [A's] Native American blood and have a demonic effect on her. He also told the court ordered evaluator that [A] is brilliant and has the ability to act as an adult. It is clear that [the respondent] has absolutely no awareness of his child's specialized needs. It is in [A's] best interest to terminate her father's parental rights so that she can continue to live in a structured and nurturing environment with people who understand her problems and can help her in her struggle to overcome the many difficulties that she has faced in her short life. ``When [N] had to engage in an interactional evaluation in May of 1999, she subsequently told a social worker that she was scared and nervous being in the same room with [the respondent] and that she was glad that he had left. She has also told her foster mother that she is fearful that she will be taken away from their home. [N] deserves permanency and it is clearly in her best interest to terminate [the respondent's] parental rights in order to allow her to be adopted by her aunt and uncle.'' On January 13, 2000, the court terminated the respondent's parental rights. This appeal followed. I The respondent claims that the court improperly determined that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with his children. We dismiss this claim because, even if we agreed with the respondent, we could accord him no practical relief. We first turn to the governing statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 1997)

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