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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** IN RE DAVID W.* (SC 16113)
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Ronan, Js. Argued May 30--officially released October 10, 2000 Counsel

Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, with whom were Susan T. Pearlman and Bette L. Paul, assistant attorneys general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (petitioner). Bradford J. Chaucer, for the appellee (respondent mother). William R. Kinloch, for the appellee (respondent father). Mary S. Chromik, for the minor child. Keely Magyar and Martha Stone filed a brief for the Center for Children's Advocacy, Inc., as amicus curiae.
Opinion

NORCOTT, J. The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether ex parte contact between a court-

appointed expert witness and the party on whose behalf that witness testifies requires the per se exclusion of the expert witness' testimony. We conclude that it does not and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. The petitioner, the commissioner of the department of children and families (department), appeals from the decision of the Appellate Court, reversing the judgment of the trial court. The respondents, the mother and father of David W., claim that the trial court improperly denied the respondent father's motion to strike the testimony of David Mantell, a clinical psychologist, who had been appointed by the court to evaluate the rehabilitation progress of the parents, but who also had ex parte contacts with the department and testified as an expert for the department. The trial court, Foley, J., determined that the appropriate remedy for a party who claims that an ex parte communication has compromised a court-appointed witness' neutrality is to impeach the witness in order to affect the weight given to the witness' testimony. Accordingly, the trial court declined to strike Mantell's testimony. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court, holding that ``the court should have granted the motion to strike the testimony of its appointed expert because of the conflict created by his agreement to testify on behalf of the department and also because of the ex parte contacts with counsel for the department.'' In re David W., 52 Conn. App. 576, 590, 727 A.2d 264 (1999). We granted the department's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issues: (1) ``Under the circumstances of this case, was the trial court required as a matter of law to strike all of the testimony of David Mantell, the courtappointed expert witness?''; and (2) ``If the answer to question one is yes, was the error harmful?'' In re David W., 249 Conn. 907, 733 A.2d 225 (1999). The following facts are properly set forth by the Appellate Court. ``The child was born to the respondents on July 12, 1993. He was born three months premature, weighing only three pounds nine ounces and remained in the hospital for eighteen days. He was discharged on August 1, 1993, and lived with his parents until September 5, 1993. On that date, he was brought to the hospital after having sustained multiple life threatening injuries: four fractures of the left ribs; a fracture showing interval healing of the right femur; a spiral fracture of the left femur; a distal fracture of the left femur, which appeared to have healed; two recent fractures of the right tibia and fibula; a collapsed lung and multiple bruises and petechiae on the face, neck and chest, probably caused by the child screaming in pain according to the testimony of a physician. The parents had exclusive control and custody of the child immediately preceding his injuries. They offered no reasonable explanation for the injuries sustained by their child.

``On September 8, 1993, the child was discharged from the hospital and placed in the care of the department, which obtained an order of temporary custody on the same date. After a study by the department foster care unit, he was placed with a couple known to the respondents. The child has resided with the couple since December 24, 1993, but the respondents have visited him, as permitted by the department, since that time, either at their home or at the home of the foster parents. On January 11, 1994, the respondents pleaded nolo contendere to the neglect petition that the department had filed. The court, Barnett, J., adjudicated the child to be a neglected child pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1993)

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