Preview:

****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** MCDONALD, C. J., dissenting. I dissent from the majority's decision that the writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the proceedings to terminate the petitioner's parental rights. In this case, the petitioner claimed that his two courtappointed attorneys in the termination proceeding in 1998 gave him ineffective assistance that led to his abortive pro se appeal. In 2000, the trial court dismissed the petition for the writ filed in 1999. The majority assumes that the petitioner did have the right to effective counsel. That assumption is unnecessary. In Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 32, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981), the United States Supreme Court decided that the decision whether to appoint counsel in termination proceedings is ``to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review.'' In this case, the trial court did determine that the appointment of counsel was required. As to the question of whether the appointed counsel must be effective, in State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 160, 425 A.2d 939 (1979), this court stated that

``[b]ecause of the substantial interests involved, a parent in a termination of parental rights hearing has the right not only to counsel but to the effective assistance of counsel.'' In Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 838, 613 A.2d 818 (1992), we also concluded that appointed counsel must be effective counsel. ``It would be absurd to have the right to appointed counsel who is not required to be competent.'' Id. The majority's sweeping conclusion that the writ may not be used to vindicate that right to effective counsel is based upon the interest of the child in the finality of the termination and the availability of other remedies. Those other remedies, however, are subject to time limits between four months; General Statutes

Download In re Jonathan M..pdf

Connecticut Law