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NATHAN LITWIN, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF P. EDWARD LIZAUSKAS) v. MARK RYAN ET AL. (AC 32834)
Bishop, Lavine and Beach, Js. Argued May 17--officially released September 20, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Matasavage, J.) Iris W. Lord, pro se, the appellant (proposed intervenor). Craig S. Taschner, for the appellee (named defendant). Jonathan J. Meter, for the appellee (defendant Lizbro, Inc.).

Opinion

BEACH, J. The putative intervenor, Iris W. Lord, appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion to intervene as a party plaintiff in this action in which the plaintiff, Nathan Litwin, administrator of the estate of P. Edward Lizauskas, is seeking to void the assignment of certain shares of common stock to the defendant Mark Ryan.1 On appeal, Lord claims that the court erred by denying her motion to intervene. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to entertain Lord's claim and, thus, we dismiss her appeal. The record reveals the following relevant factual and procedural history. On July 6, 2010, the plaintiff filed the amended complaint underlying the present action.2 It alleged the following facts. Following P. Edward Lizauskas' retirement in 1994, the defendant3 began providing care to him. Such care consisted of assisting P. Edward Lizauskas with his medical care, legal affairs, business affairs and management of daily living. During this time, P. Edward Lizauskas' health and mental condition had deteriorated and, as such, he granted to the defendant a power of attorney. In 1997, the defendant, ``knowing of [P. Edward Lizauskas'] infirm mental and physical state, and being in a position of trust, control and influence over [him], procured [his] signature on a document entitled `Assignment,' '' which purported to assign to the defendant P. Edward Lizauskas' 1160 shares of common stock in Lizbro, Inc. (Lizbro),4 a Connecticut corporation that conducts business as a farm. The plaintiff further contends that P. Edward Lizauskas had ``never demonstrated an intent to make a conveyance of his Lizbro stock . . . when he was healthy and in control of his affairs.'' As a result, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the assignment of the stock should be voided because the defendant procured the assignment by exercising undue influence over P. Edward Lizauskas.5 Lord filed a motion to intervene and to be added as a party plaintiff in this action on June 26, 2008. She alleged that she ``is a necessary party . . . in this matter . . . [because she] has an interest in the subject matter in this case . . . .'' More specifically, she alleged that she is ``the sole remaining potential derivative beneficiary through the [e]state of Grayce Lizauskas, deceased wife of . . . P. Edward Lizauskas.'' In other words, P. Edward Lizauskas' will named his wife, Grayce Lizauskas, as the sole beneficiary of his estate. Thereafter, Grayce Lizauskas executed a will in which Lord was named as the executrix and was one of only two beneficiaries.6 As such, Lord pleaded that she was ``the sole remaining potential derivative beneficiary through the [e]state of Grayce Lizauskas'' because if the assignment of stock to the defendant is voided, it would pass to P. Edward Lizauskas' estate and then would pass to her as the sole beneficiary of Grayce

Lizauskas' estate. Lord further averred that her interest in this action is not adequately being represented by any party and that neither the plaintiff, nor his counsel, Thomas P. Willcutts, ``will . . . communicate with [her] regarding the case.'' The court held a hearing on Lord's motion to intervene on September 29, 2010. Neither the parties nor Lord presented evidence or requested to present evidence. Counsel for Lord maintained that her interests in this case were not adequately being represented by either the plaintiff or Willcutts. The court disagreed, however, reasoning that the plaintiff ``is representing the estate [of P. Edward Lizauskas],'' and ``the interest of . . . Lord as a beneficiary of the estate [of Grayce Lizauskas] is the same interest as the estate [of P. Edward Lizauskas]'' because ``[a]nything . . . [Lord] gets out of this case, she gets through the estate [of P. Edward Lizauskas].'' The court concluded, therefore, that Lord's interests ``are protected by the [plaintiff]'' and denied the motion to intervene.7 This appeal followed. On appeal, Lord claims that the court erred by denying her motion to intervene. We conclude that Lord does not have the party status necessary to invoke our appellate jurisdiction and, thus, we dismiss her appeal. ``A threshold inquiry of this court upon every appeal presented to it is the question of appellate jurisdiction. . . . It is well established that the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appellate Court . . . is governed by [General Statutes]

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Connecticut Law