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TOWN OF MARLBOROUGH v. AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 818-052 (AC 31468)
Gruendel, Beach and Robinson, Js. Argued January 7--officially released August 9, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Hon. Jerry Wagner, judge trial referee.) Proloy K. Das, with whom was Andrew L. Houlding, for the appellant (plaintiff). J. William Gagne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Kimberly A. Cuneo, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

ROBINSON, J. The plaintiff, town of Marlborough, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to vacate an arbitration award (application) in which an arbitration panel found in favor of the defendant, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052, and concluded that the plaintiff had violated a collective bargaining agreement when it terminated the grievant, Emily Chaponis, from the position of assessor without just cause. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied its application because the award (1) violates the clearly defined public policy that ``elected executive leaders have the responsibility and the right to appoint public officers'' and (2) constitutes a manifest disregard of the law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The charter for the plaintiff (charter) provides that the board of selectmen (board) shall appoint various officers, including an assessor, ``to serve at the direction of the [s]electmen . . . and whose powers and duties shall be as prescribed by [o]rdniance or in the [General Statutes].''1 Pursuant to the charter, the board appointed the grievant to the office of assessor, effective January 7, 2002. In November, 2003, the term of the board that had appointed the grievant ended. The incoming board elected to accept the appointments made by the previous board, and the grievant continued to occupy the office of assessor. During the grievant's tenure as assessor, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) that became effective on July 1, 2007. The agreement provided that the defendant was the exclusive representative for a bargaining unit that included the office of assessor.2 The agreement further provided that ``[a]ny disciplinary action shall be applied for just cause'' and that ``[a]ll disciplinary action may be appealed through the . . . grievance procedure'' set forth in the agreement. In November, 2007, a newly elected board met to make the appointments provided for by the charter. The first selectman asked for a motion to reappoint the grievant to the office of assessor but no motion was made, and the grievant was not reappointed. On November 14, 2007, because of the board's failure to reappoint the grievant, the plaintiff discharged her. The grievant filed a grievance through the defendant, alleging that the plaintiff had violated the agreement because her discharge was not based on just cause. After the grievance advanced without resolution through the grievance procedure set forth in the agreement, the dispute was referred to the state board of mediation and arbitration.3 The issue submitted to the arbitration panel was as follows: ``Did the [plaintiff]

violate the collective bargaining agreement when it discharged the grievant on November 14, 2007 without just cause? If so, what shall the remedy be?'' At the arbitration hearing, the plaintiff first argued that discharging an appointed officer because the board did not reappoint her after the expiration of her term in office did not constitute a disciplinary action. Therefore, because such a discharge was not a disciplinary action, the plaintiff claimed that it did not have to comply with the just cause provision of the agreement. The plaintiff also argued that interpreting the agreement in a manner that would require it to demonstrate just cause before it could discharge an appointed officer after the expiration of her term in office would result in a conflict between the agreement and General Statutes

Download Marlborough v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052.pdf

Connecticut Law