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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** THOMAS MCNEFF ET AL. v. VINCO, INC., ET AL. (AC 19256)
Spear, Pellegrino and Peters, Js. Argued June 9--officially released September 5, 2000 Counsel

Ruth Beardsley, for the appellant (named defendantthird party plaintiff). Kenneth J. Mulvey, Jr., for the appellee (third party defendant).
Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J. The third party plaintiff, Vinco, Inc. (Vinco), appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the third party defendant, Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (Hilton), in a claim arising from a work-related injury. Vinco claims that the trial court improperly (1) sustained objections to certain exhibits, (2) directed a verdict in favor of Hilton and (3) denied its motion to set aside the verdict in favor of Hilton. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In December,

1991, Thomas McNeff, an employee of Hilton, suffered personal injuries when he fell at a construction site known as the Norwalk Community College project (project). Vinco was the project's general contractor and Hilton was a mechanical subcontractor. The accident occurred as McNeff exited a mechanical platform located at the project. Hilton had installed some equipment on the platform, which McNeff was working on prior to the accident, but Hilton did not design or construct the platform itself, nor did it construct walls on the platform. The plaintiffs, McNeff and his wife, subsequently filed an action against the defendants, Vinco, Ames and Whitaker, P.C. (Ames), the architect of the project, and Turner Construction Company (Turner), the project's construction manager, claiming that their negligence proximately caused the accident. Hilton filed an intervening complaint, seeking to recover workers' compensation payments made to its employee, McNeff. Vinco filed a third party complaint against Hilton claiming that Hilton did not properly supervise the work done and the equipment used by its employees and that, under its subcontract, Hilton was responsible for indemnifying Vinco. Ames filed a counterclaim against Hilton for indemnification.1 On December 2, 1998, the trial court granted Hilton's motion for a directed verdict on Vinco's claim for indemnification. The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against Vinco following a jury trial. Vinco filed a motion to set aside the verdict against it, which was denied by the trial court. The present appeal concerns only the directed verdict in favor of Hilton on Vinco's third party complaint. Additional facts will be discussed where relevant to the issues on appeal. I Vinco claims first that the trial court improperly sustained objections, on relevancy grounds, by Hilton and the plaintiffs to certain of Vinco's business records. We disagree. The following additional facts are relevant to these claims. Prior to the accident, McNeff complained orally to Hilton that the working conditions on the platform were unsafe, and Hilton agreed that the ingress to and egress from the platform were dangerous. The exhibits Vinco sought to introduce concerned written complaints made by a subcontractor, C & H Electric, Inc. (C & H), to Vinco, concerning unsafe conditions at the construction project. C & H was not a party to this litigation, and none of the conditions complained of concerned the area at issue here. Vinco claims, nevertheless, that the exhibits were relevant because they demonstrated how Hilton could have complained more effectively about the unsafe conditions on the platform.

Our standard of review regarding challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings is that ``[t]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. The determination of the relevancy and remoteness of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . The trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court's discretion.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 56 Conn. App. 182, 188, 742 A.2d 387 (1999), cert. denied. 252 Conn. 927, 746 A.2d 791 (2000). ``Sound discretion . . . means a discretion that is not exercised arbitrarily or wilfully . . . . And [it] requires a knowledge and understanding of the material circumstances surrounding the matter . . . . In our review of these discretionary determinations, we make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wright v. Hutt, 50 Conn. App. 439, 445, 718 A.2d 969, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 939, 723 A.2d 320 (1998). ``In considering the relevancy of evidence, we ask whether it tends to establish the existence of a material fact or to corroborate other direct evidence in a case.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Denley v. Denley, 38 Conn. App. 349, 352, 661 A.2d 628 (1995). ``[T]he admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law and unless there is a resultant denial of fundamental fairness or the denial of a specific constitutional right, no constitutional issue is involved.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dwyer, 59 Conn. App. 207, 212

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