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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** SCHALLER, J., dissenting. Because I conclude that the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction on an expert's duty of care, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. An examination of the record reveals that the operative complaint, the plaintiff's second amended complaint, is framed in terms of a theory of premises liability on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff, Thomas Monterose, alleges that the defendant, Paul Cross, was the owner of and in possession and control of premises in Watertown, and that the plaintiff was a social invitee on the premises for the purpose of picking up a large wooden spool to be used off the premises. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant had exclusive control over the premises, and that it was his duty to render the premises reasonably safe for the loading and unloading of personal property. The complaint then asserts that while the plaintiff and the defendant were on the premises loading the spool onto the plaintiff's truck, the spool toppled over, falling onto the plaintiff. Among the allegations of negligence committed by the defendant on the basis of premises liability are several concerning the defendant's status as a skilled rigger, and the standard of care and skill to be used by riggers

engaged in moving heavy objects. The defendant filed a special defense that contained various allegations of comparative negligence, including an allegation that ``the plaintiff had exclusive control of the situation at the time the spool toppled over on his leg. . . .'' The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff ``attempted to move the large wooden spool while under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages,'' he knew or should have known that ``his sense of balance'' and ``his strength'' had been impaired by excessive consumption of alcohol, and ``he knew or should have known that he could not safely handle the weight of the spool after consuming a large amount of beer.'' The only legal relationship of the parties alleged in the second amended complaint that could generate a duty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff, therefore, was based on an assertion of ownership and control of premises by the defendant. The sole duty of the defendant to the plaintiff, as alleged, was that of premises owner to social invitee. While it is true that the complaint contains several allegations concerning the defendant's experience and skill as a trained rigger, the plaintiff failed to allege any relationship or transaction between the parties that would invoke the defendant's experience or skill as a rigger. The defendant's status as a rigger would have no bearing on the defendant's duty as an owner of premises. ``In general, there is an ascending degree of duty owed by the possessor of land to persons on the land based on their entrant status, i.e., trespasser, licensee or invitee.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kurti v. Becker, 54 Conn. App. 335, 338, 733 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 909, 739 A.2d 1248 (1999). On the basis of the complaint, therefore, the only applicable standard of care would be ordinary negligence, that is, a duty of reasonable care. See Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 234, 397 A.2d 1335 (1978); Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., 29 Conn. App. 519, 521, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1992); see also General Statutes

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