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PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION v. MELISSA CAMERON ET AL. (AC 32560)
Bishop, Beach and Robinson, Js. Argued May 17--officially released July 19, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Hon. Robert Satter, judge trial referee.) Norman Cameron, pro se, the appellant (defendant). Andrew P. Barsom, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The pro se defendant Norman Cameron1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting his motion to dismiss a foreclosure action filed by the plaintiff, PHH Mortgage Corporation, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly addressed the merits of his claim that the promissory note was unenforceable.2 We dismiss the appeal. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the appeal. On July 22, 2005, Melissa Cameron executed a promissory note in favor of Members Mortgage Company, Inc. (Members). On that same date, the defendant and Melissa Cameron executed a mortgage in favor of Members as security for the promissory note. In February, 2008, the plaintiff commenced a foreclosure action against the defendant and Melissa Cameron, alleging default in payment of the note and mortgage. On March 5, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's foreclosure action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In his memorandum of law in support of his motion to dismiss, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff did not have standing to file the foreclosure action because it was not the holder of the promissory note at the time the action was commenced. Alternatively, the defendant claimed that the promissory note was not enforceable because the original note had been lost.3 In support of his alternative claim, the defendant relied on the following handwritten language included on the note, as set forth with its original spelling, which allegedly was added at the time it was executed: ``In the event this original note and/or the original mortgage deed becomes distroyed, lost or stolen then together (the mortgage deed and note) they both becomes unenforcible, null and void, releasing the Borrowers of their obligation to repay this debt and borrowed amount on the deed. The lean must be removed from the land records.'' The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss and issued its memorandum of decision on May 18, 2010. The court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure action because it was only the servicer, and not the holder, of the subject promissory note at the time the foreclosure action was commenced. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Following its granting of the motion to dismiss, the court proceeded to consider the merits of the defendant's claim that the promissory note was unenforceable. The court recognized that this claim was ``a defense to the merits of [the] case, and [did] not raise an issue of standing,'' but it decided to consider the claim in the interest of ``judicial economy.'' After

reviewing the evidence, the court found that the handwritten language was not included in the promissory note at the time it was executed but instead had been added by the defendant after he had learned that the plaintiff had lost the original promissory note. On the basis of these findings, the court concluded that the defendant's claim was without merit. This appeal followed. Although the parties did not raise the issue of aggrievement in this appeal, we raise it sua sponte because aggrievement implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, is a threshold matter that must be resolved before addressing the claims raised on appeal. See Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 91, 971 A.2d 1 (2009) (``[i]f a party is found to lack [aggrievement], the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause'' [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. T.D., 286 Conn. 353, 358, 944 A.2d 288 (2008) (addressing issue of aggrievement sua sponte because ``[a]ggrievement implicates . . . court's subject matter jurisdiction''); Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 58, 566 A.2d 670 (1989) (court must dispose of issues concerning subject matter jurisdiction as threshold matter). ``It is settled law that the right to appeal is purely statutory and is allowed only if the conditions fixed by statute are met. . . . In all civil actions a requisite element of appealability is that the party claiming error be aggrieved by the decision of the trial court. . . . The test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest shared by the community as a whole; second, the party claiming aggrievement must establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. . . . [A] party cannot be aggrieved by a decision that grants the very relief sought. . . . Such a party cannot establish that a specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fontana v. Zymol Enterprises, Inc., 95 Conn. App. 606, 614, 897 A.2d 694 (2006), quoting In re Allison G., 276 Conn. 146, 156

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