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ANTHONY RAFTOPOL ET AL. v. KARMA A. RAMEY ET AL. (SC 18482)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille, Zarella and McLachlan, Js.*

Argued March 16, 2010--officially released January 5, 2011**

Patrick B. Kwanashie, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, for the appellant (defendant department of health). Victoria T. Ferrara, with whom was Jeremy F. Hayden, for the appellees (plaintiffs). Kenneth J. Bartschi, Karen L. Dowd, Thomas W. Ude, Bennett H. Klein, pro hac vice, Karen L. Loewy, pro hac vice, John Weltman, pro hac vice, and Scott Buckley, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the American Society for Reproductive Medicine et al. as amici curiae.

Opinion

McLACHLAN, J. This appeal raises the question of whether Connecticut law permits an intended parent1 who is neither the biological2 nor the adoptive parent of a child to become a legal parent of that child by means of a valid gestational agreement. The use of technology to accomplish reproduction by means other than sexual intercourse no longer may be considered ``new'' science, and, indeed, the legislature has recognized the validity of such agreements.3 Moreover, no one can deny that assisted reproductive technology implicates an essential matter of public policy--it is a basic expectation that our legal system should enable each of us to identify our legal parents with reasonable promptness and certainty. Despite the facts that assisted reproductive technology has been available for some time, and that the technology implicates the important issue of the determination of legal parentage, our laws, and the laws of most other states, have struggled unsuccessfully to keep pace with the complex legal issues that continue to arise as a result of the technology.4 It is our view that our laws should provide an answer to the following two basic questions: (1) who are the legal parents of children born as a result of such technology; and (2) what steps must such persons take to clarify their status as legal parents of such children? Our answers to these questions are limited by the scope of the question presented on appeal, and, even more importantly, by the fact that the broad public policy issues raised by modern reproductive technology and implicated by this appeal more appropriately would be addressed by the legislature. When, as in the present case, however, a statutory scheme is susceptible to an interpretation whereby a child born as a result of a gestational agreement could be deemed to have no legal parent, which rationally could not have been the legislature's intent, the court is bound to interpret the scheme in a manner that confers legal parentage on the intended parents pursuant to the legally valid gestational agreement. The defendant department of public health (department) appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff Shawn Hargon, an intended parent under the gestational agreement.5 On appeal, the department argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction both to terminate the putative parental rights of the gestational carrier, the defendant Karma A. Ramey,6 and to declare Hargon a legal parent of the children to whom Ramey gave birth, and, consequently, to order the department to issue a replacement birth certificate pursuant to General Statutes

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Connecticut Law