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CELIN G. REIZFELD v. LEONARD C. REIZFELD (AC 31075)
Gruendel, Beach and Borden, Js. Argued November 10, 2010--officially released January 4, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, Hon. James G. Kenefick, Jr., judge trial referee.) Leonard C. Reizfeld, pro se, the appellant-appellee (defendant). Kenneth A. Votre, with whom, on the brief was Michele D. Sensale, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).

Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. The defendant, Leonard C. Reizfeld, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Celin G. Reizfeld, and entering related financial orders. On appeal, he claims that the court improperly (1) awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees, (2) deviated from the statutory child support guidelines, and (3) ordered that the plaintiff be allowed to reside in the defendant's home rent and expense free for approximately six months following the dissolution of the parties' marriage. The plaintiff cross appeals, claiming that the court improperly determined that the parties were bound by a valid and enforceable antenuptial agreement. With respect to the defendant's claims, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. With respect to the plaintiff's cross appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, as found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of these appeals. On July 27, 1998, the parties executed an antenuptial agreement (agreement) ``to fix and determine their respective rights in and to all property that the other may own or enjoy at the time of [their] marriage or thereafter . . . in the event of a dissolution of [their] marriage . . . .'' Both parties were represented by counsel throughout the negotiation and drafting of the agreement, and both parties acknowledged that they were entering into the agreement ``freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of [their respective rights].'' At the time the agreement was executed, the parties had one three year old child, and the plaintiff was approximately eight months pregnant with their second child. Also at that time, the defendant was in possession of nearly $2.4 million in assets, while the plaintiff was in possession of approximately $4500 in assets. On August 13, 1998, the parties married in New Haven. On October 11, 2006, the plaintiff commenced this dissolution action, claiming that the parties' marriage had broken down irretrievably. In addition to awards of periodic alimony and child support, the plaintiff sought an equitable distribution of the parties' assets. The defendant filed a special defense, claiming that the parties' rights upon dissolution of the marriage were governed exclusively by the agreement. The plaintiff filed an amended reply to the defendant's special defense, arguing that the agreement was unenforceable against her because it was unconscionable both when executed and at the time the defendant sought its enforcement. The matter was tried to the court over seven days in January and February, 2009. On May 4, 2009, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. In so doing, the court specifically found that the agreement was enforceable and awarded the plaintiff alimony and child support,1 as well as $7500 in attorney's fees and costs. Additionally, the court

ordered that the plaintiff be allowed to reside in the defendant's home until September 1, 2009. These appeals followed. On August 28, 2009, in a memorandum of decision, the court granted the plaintiff's postjudgment motion seeking additional funds from the defendant for attorney's fees to defend the appeal. In addition to ordering that the defendant pay the plaintiff $6000 to defend the appeal, the court also extended the time that the plaintiff be allowed to remain in the defendant's home until October 15, 2009. Thereafter, the defendant amended his appeal to include a challenge to this postjudgment ruling. The defendant now claims that the court improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees because the agreement precludes either party from seeking the payment of such fees from the other in the event of a dissolution action. The defendant also claims that the court improperly deviated from the statutory child support guidelines to the detriment of the parties' minor children and improperly ordered that the plaintiff be allowed to remain rent and expense free in the defendant's home for a period of six months following the dissolution of the parties' marriage. On cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the agreement was enforceable against her in light of its apparent unconscionability. We address the parties' claims in turn. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I DEFENDANT'S APPEAL A The defendant first claims that the court improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees both in its initial May 4, 2009 financial orders and its subsequent August 28, 2009 postjudgment memorandum of decision. Specifically, the defendant maintains that the award of attorney's fees to either party in the context of a dissolution action is precluded by the language of the agreement, which the court found to be valid and enforceable. We agree. The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim. Nowhere in the parties' agreement is the issue of attorney's fees addressed directly. Rather, the issue is addressed implicitly by two separate provisions of the agreement--namely, paragraphs 5 and 10 (B). Paragraph 5 provides: ``Neither of the parties shall seek, in any action for dissolution of marriage, payment for liabilities from the other.'' (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 10 (B) states: ``The parties agree that in any [dissolution] action, neither [party] will ask for different or greater rights than those specified [in the agreement] and that each will abide with and be bound by the

provisions of [the] [a]greement . . . .'' On June 12, 2009, the court granted in part the defendant's motion for articulation with respect to the ``factual and legal basis for awarding the [p]laintiff attorney['s] fees and costs . . . .'' In clarifying its ruling, the court referenced General Statutes

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