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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** SAVINGS BANK OF ROCKVILLE v. DAVID J. VICKERS, JR., ET AL. (AC 19852)
Foti, Spear and Zarella, Js. Argued April 27--officially released August 22, 2000 Counsel

Bruce S. Beck, for the appellant (named defendant). Kerry A. Tarpey, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

FOTI, J. The defendant, David J. Vickers, Jr.,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion by the plaintiff, Savings Bank of Rockville, for a deficiency judgment. The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) refused to permit him to make a motion at the deficiency judgment hearing, (2) placed the burden of proof on him as to whether the plaintiff had complied with the terms of a stipulation into which the parties had entered, (3) allowed the plaintiff to pursue the deficiency judgment when it had failed to comply with the stipulation and (4) found that the plaintiff sustained its burden of proof that it complied with the terms of the stipulation. The defendant also raises the

equitable doctrine of unclean hands and claims that the plaintiff is estopped from pursuing its motion for a deficiency judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts are relevant to this appeal. In October, 1995, the plaintiff initiated an action to foreclose a mortgage of certain real property owned by the defendant and on November 22, 1995, filed a motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. On December 4, 1995, the defendant filed a motion for foreclosure by sale, which was granted on December 11, 1995. The sale occurred in March, 1996, and, following a contested hearing, was approved by the court in April, 1996. Thereafter, the defendant filed a request for production and a motion to open the judgment approving the sale. The defendant's motion included a claim that the plaintiff was in possession of other appraisals that had not been disclosed to the court.2 On November 14, 1996, the court held a hearing and denied the defendant's motion to open the judgment. As to the defendant's request for production, the court granted the motion conditioned on the plaintiff's filing a motion for a deficiency judgment against the defendant. On November 25, 1996, the defendant appealed from the judgment.3 That appeal was resolved by a settlement stipulation dated June 13, 1998. On June 22, 1998, the plaintiff filed a motion for a deficiency judgment. A hearing on that motion was held on April 26, 1999. On May 27, 1999, the court granted the motion and, in a memorandum of decision, found the deficiency to be $40,000. The defendant now appeals from that judgment. I The defendant claims first that the court improperly refused to allow him to make a motion at the deficiency judgment hearing. We disagree. This claim is based on a colloquy that occurred between the court and the defendant's counsel at the commencement of the April 26, 1999 hearing. Before any witnesses were called, the court requested that each party give a brief overview of the arguments they intended to make at trial. The plaintiff's counsel complied with the court's request. The defendant's counsel, claiming that he did not believe he was obligated to give an overview of his case, refused to comply with the court's request. Thereafter, a brief dialogue ensued in which the court made further attempts to discern a general overview of the defendant's position, and the defendant's counsel steadfastly refused to provide the court with an offer of proof.4 As the plaintiff's counsel called the first witness to testify, the defendant's counsel asked the court, ``Is this going to be a problem, having you hear the case

Now, enough of this. I've asked you a question [and] you refuse to answer. I didn't pursue it with you, and I think I should pursue it with you, but I'm going to jump over that and we're going to proceed. Now, please sit down.'' The defendant's counsel attempted to continue the discussion5 and eventually stated, ``I think I'd like to have something on the record reflect that I would like to make a motion, and I'm apparently not being permitted to do so.'' Immediately thereafter, the court stated, ``Swear this witness in.'' In support of his argument that the court improperly refused to allow him to make a motion, the defendant cites Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 484, 706 A.2d 960 (1998), for the proposition that the court has a duty to determine every question which may arise in a cause of action. In Ahneman, the trial court refused to consider certain postjudgment financial motions that were before it. Our Supreme Court noted that except in rare instances, a trial court may not decline to exercise its jurisdiction by refusing to consider certain motions. Id. We conclude that Ahneman is inapposite to the defendant's claim because the defendant here did not make a proper motion. Because no motion was properly before the court, it cannot be claimed that the court refused to consider a motion. Practice Book

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