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DONNA FUSCO v. JOSEPH P. FUSCO, JR. (SC 16945)
Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js. Argued September 8--officially released November 25, 2003

Bernadette M. Keyes, for the appellant (defendant). Glenn L. Formica, with whom, on the brief, was Daniel W. Adelman, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SULLIVAN, C. J. The defendant, Joseph P. Fusco, Jr., appeals1 from the ruling of the trial court dismissing his motion for modification of postmajority child support payments to the plaintiff, Donna Fusco. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court improperly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the defen-

dant's motion.2 We reverse the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The plaintiff and the defendant were divorced on January 28, 1986. At the time of the dissolution, the parties had one minor child, Donna Marie Fusco, who suffered from chemical sensitivities. The parties agreed by stipulation that ``[t]he defendant will pay to the plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Fifty ($150.00) Dollars per week alimony and Forty ($40.00) Dollars per week child support. . . . Said alimony payment shall continue until the death or remarriage of the plaintiff. In the event the plaintiff remarries, the defendant's obligation to pay the existing loan on the car, insurance, taxes, registration, and licensing fees on the plaintiff's vehicle, and renters insurance shall also cease. However, the weekly amount of child support shall be increased to at least One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars per week payable on the same basis as set forth above. This amount may not be modified downward, however, this agreement will not preclude the plaintiff from returning to court to seek an increase in the weekly child support order, the parties hereto agreeing that said amount is the minimum sum necessary to support the child. Any amounts payable as child support shall continue until the death or marriage of the child.'' This stipulation was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. On December 2, 1992, the trial court modified the order of child support upward from $40 to $200 per week to bring the amount closer to that recommended by the child support guidelines. On August 1, 1997, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to open the judgment and to modify downward the awards of child support, alimony and educational expenses. The daughter reached the age of majority on December 16, 1997. On October 19, 2001, the defendant filed a motion for modification of child support due to a substantial change in his circumstances. The parties agreed that the motion would be decided on the briefs alone. On February 13, 2002, the court concluded pursuant to Miner v. Miner, 48 Conn. App. 409, 709 A.2d 605 (1998), that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the modification motion in the absence of a written agreement giving it power to modify the original postmajority child support order. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the defendant's motion. The defendant appeals from the ruling of the trial court. The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to modify the postmajority support order. Although the parties have focused exclusively on the question of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that this matter is not truly jurisdictional in nature, but involves the trial court's authority to act. We further

conclude that the trial court had the authority to act on the defendant's motion. ``Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727

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