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KAREN DIPIETRO v. FARMINGTON SPORTS ARENA, LLC, ET AL. KAREN DIPIETRO v. DIMENSIONAL TECHNOLOGY GROUP, LLC, ET AL. (SC 18726)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Harper, Js.* Argued April 19--officially released August 28, 2012

Kenneth J. Bartschi, with whom were Brendon P. Levesque and, on the brief, Karen L. Dowd, Jeffrey G. Schwartz, Christopher M. Vossler and Kevin M. Tighe, for the appellants (defendants in each case). David G. Hill, for the appellee (plaintiff in both cases). Robert C.E. Laney and Peter E. DeMartini filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The dispositive issue presented by this premises liability appeal is whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff, Karen DiPietro, had established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning the defendants' actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. The defendants, Farmington Sports Arena, LLC (Arena), Dimensional Technology Group, LLC (Dimensional Technology), and Paul DiTommaso, Jr.,1 appeal, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court's rendering of summary judgments in their favor. DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 123 Conn. App. 583, 619, 2 A.3d 963 (2010). The plaintiff brought these actions on behalf of her minor daughter, Michelle DiPietro (Michelle), alleging that Michelle had injured her ankle while playing soccer at the defendants' indoor soccer facility because the defendants negligently had installed a playing surface inherently dangerous for indoor soccer. The defendants claim that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial court's summary judgments because the plaintiff produced no evidence that the defendants knew of or should have known of the hazardous condition.2 We agree with the defendants and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. The pleadings and documents submitted in connection with the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and with the plaintiff's objection thereto, reveal the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On March 9, 2002, Michelle, then eleven years old, was injured while playing soccer at the defendants' facility, the Farmington Indoor Sports Arena. Michelle fell to the ground after her foot had stuck to the carpet as she was running. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Michelle's fall resulted from a ``dangerous and defective condition with the playing surface'' and further that, as a result of the fall, Michelle had suffered a serious ankle injury that led to ``difficulty walking . . . an [intermittent] inability to walk . . . severe pain and suffering . . . and accompanying mental distress and emotional anxiety.'' The allegedly dangerous and defective playing surface was a commercial grade carpet selected and purchased by DiTommaso. He had selected the carpet based on his two decades of experience with indoor soccer, his knowledge that similar playing surfaces were used in other facilities in Connecticut and the recommendation of the carpet manufacturer's representative. At that time, there were two choices for indoor soccer surfaces, the carpet at issue and synthetic Astroturf. DiTommaso preferred the carpet to Astroturf because he believed that Astroturf caused rug burn injuries and soccer balls moved more slowly over the

carpet. He did not inquire with the manufacturer's representative about the safety of the carpet, compare other playing surfaces or perform any safety testing. At the time of Michelle's injury, there were no industry or government standards regulating the use of playing surfaces for indoor soccer. The United States Indoor Soccer Association, of which Arena is a member, did not prohibit the use of carpeting for indoor soccer, and carpet commonly was used in indoor soccer facilities in Connecticut. The defendants offered testimony that the major indoor soccer league in the United States used similar carpeting. A contractor installed the carpet over a flat concrete floor in November, 2001, and the facility was inspected and approved shortly thereafter by the Connecticut Junior Soccer Association, which sanctions commercial indoor soccer facilities. A site inspection found the playing surface to be flat and even, firmly secured to the underlying concrete surface and free of visible defects. Mike J. Brown, Michelle's soccer coach, who had prior experience with similar playing surfaces at other indoor soccer facilities, attested in an uncontroverted affidavit that the carpet was `` `normal,' '' ''in good condition,'' and without ``damaged areas, lumps, rolls, cuts, tears, or any other foreign objects'' at the time of Michelle's injury. DiTommaso testified in his deposition that he had not received any complaints about the carpet other than the one from the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not dispute that the carpet was not defective in the sense of improper installation or maintenance. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment in both actions, claiming that they were entitled to judgment because, inter alia, there was no evidence as to the applicable standard of care and of notice to the defendants of any defect in the playing surface. In support of her opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted the deposition and affidavit of Benno M. Nigg, a professor of biomechanics and the director of the human performance laboratory in the faculty of kinesiology at the University of Calgary. Nigg's testimony concerned a report he had prepared after conducting scientific tests on the playing surface. Nigg had conducted a series of experiments using the actual shoe worn by Michelle at the time of her injury and samples of the carpet at the defendants' facility, as well as other synthetic sports surfaces, that were intended to measure the resistance between the shoe sole and the surface in the performance of various common athletic movements. The tests showed higher resistance on the carpeted surface than the synthetic surface. Nigg concluded that ``[t]he flooring surface provided by the defendants was unreasonably dangerous and unfit for use at an indoor soccer arena . . . (a) [because] it produced excessive translational and rotational traction forces, which typically result in high injury frequencies,

(b) because it showed significantly higher loading than synthetic sports surfaces found more frequently in sports arenas, and (c) because it created excessive forces on the foot, which can lead to ankle injuries such as the one sustained by [Michelle]. Based on the mechanism of injury described by the plaintiff, my results indicate that the surface was a substantial factor in causing [Michelle's] injuries.'' When deposed by the defendants' counsel, Nigg conceded that he knew of no industry or government standards governing indoor soccer playing surfaces. He also stated that he never had managed or administered a youth indoor soccer program or indoor soccer facility. Nigg confirmed further that he had not contacted or worked with any groups or organizations that promoted indoor soccer, such as the United States Indoor Soccer Association. Despite the lack of industry standards, Nigg testified that, in his view, ``what one should do when one puts a surface in is do some testing, including material testing, including subjects, and based on that testing decide on the appropriate surface.'' He acknowledged, however, that ``[t]hat is not done typically.'' The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on two principal bases. First, the court held that expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care applicable to an indoor soccer facility, and second, that the plaintiff had not produced evidence that the defendants had notice of the alleged hazardous condition. Noting that ``only the defendants have provided evidence of the standard of care and the lack of notice about the alleged, dangerous defect,'' the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish genuine issues of material fact on essential elements of her premises liability claims. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's summary judgments rendered in favor of the defendants. Reasoning that the plaintiff's claims ``[rest] on the rules of law applicable to premises liability in which the law itself imposes the standard of care, namely, the duty to provide and to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition,'' the Appellate Court concluded that expert testimony was not necessary on that issue. DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, supra, 123 Conn. App. 619. In regard to notice, the Appellate Court reasoned that ``there was no need for the plaintiff to prove notice of the unsafe condition because the defendants were responsible for creating the unsafe condition.'' Id., 621. This appeal followed. The defendants claim on appeal that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial court's summary judgments in their favor. They contend that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was not required to produce evidence that they were on notice of the dangerous condition. We agree that the

plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential element of notice.3 We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. ``The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [

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