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ROBERT SIMMS v. PENNY Q. SEAMAN ET AL. (AC 31809)
Bishop, Bear and Stoughton, Js.* Argued October 29, 2010--officially released June 28, 2011

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Blue, J. [motions to strike]; Silbert, J. [motions for judgment, judgment].) John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Patrick M. Noonan, with whom, on the brief, was Matthew H. Geelan, for the appellee (named defendant). Raymond J. Plouffe, Jr., for the appellee (defendant Susan A. Moch). Nadine M. Pare, for the appellees (defendant Kenneth J. Bartschi et al.).

Opinion

BEAR, J. The plaintiff, Robert Simms, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants Penny Q. Seaman, Susan A. Moch, Kenneth J. Bartschi, Brendon P. Levesque and Karen L. Dowd.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly struck the claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress filed against the defendants on the ground of absolute immunity and, thereafter, improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts as alleged in the plaintiff's amended complaint are relevant to our resolution of the appeal.2 The plaintiff and Donna Simms were married from 1961 until 1979, when they divorced and the plaintiff was ordered to pay periodic alimony. The plaintiff filed a motion to modify the alimony payments on November 29, 2004, which was granted by the court. Donna Simms appealed from that judgment, and, on August 14, 2007, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 510, 927 A.2d 894 (2007). From late 2005 until approximately August 14, 2007, Bartschi, Levesque and Dowd represented Donna Simms in her appeal to the Supreme Court. Moch represented Donna Simms during the years 2006 and 2007. During that time, Moch filed at least one motion for pendente lite counsel fees in the Superior Court on behalf of Donna Simms. Seaman represented Donna Simms in the Superior Court from approximately March, 2007, until October 17, 2008. All defendants failed to disclose the true financial circumstances of Donna Simms. Throughout the periods that the defendants represented Donna Simms, they affirmatively represented to the Superior Court and to the Supreme Court that Donna Simms ``was in highly disadvantaged economic circumstances'' and that the plaintiff should ``be compelled to pay substantial sums of money to Donna Simms for her necessary support and maintenance.''3 The defendants made such representations despite knowing that Donna Simms had become the beneficiary of a substantial bequest from her uncle, Albert Whittington Hogeland.4 In June, 2006, Donna Simms received approximately $310,000 from Hogeland's estate, and, in February, 2008, she received another $49,000. Despite the defendants' affirmative obligation to disclose these assets to the courts, they intentionally concealed this information, until, under orders from the trial court, Seaman, on May 27, 2008, finally disclosed the information. On October 17, 2008, the trial court ruled that such

Simms improperly had been concealed from the court and from the plaintiff. The wrongful concealment of this financial information caused the plaintiff to incur more than $400,000 in legal expenses and other costs and expenses, including travel, medical expenses, loss of income and loss of investment value. Additionally, the plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress because of these events. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the Superior Court on June 19, 2009. Counts one and four were brought against Seaman for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. Counts two and five were brought against Moch for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. Counts three and six were brought against Bartschi, Levesque and Dowd for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively.5 The defendants filed motions to strike these counts of the complaint on the ground of absolute immunity or privilege and on the alternate ground of failure to state a claim. The court, concluding that such claims against attorneys for conduct that occurred during judicial proceedings were barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of absolute immunity, granted the motions. The court upon motion, thereafter, rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. This appeal followed. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly struck the claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress filed against the defendants on the ground of absolute immunity and, thereafter, improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court ``erred in holding as a matter of law that attorneys are absolutely immune to suits for money damages for frauds and extreme and outrageous acts causing severe emotional distress perpetrated in their roles as adversary attorneys.'' The defendants argue that the court properly concluded that the claims, which stemmed from alleged misrepresentations and omissions that occurred in connection with judicial proceedings, are barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity. In the alternative, the defendants have presented alternate grounds for affirming the court's judgment; see Practice Book

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