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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** LAVERY, C. J., dissenting. The majority's opinion is clearly contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), when the majority upholds the trial court's charge that the jury could not consider the effect of marijuana use on the state's key witness, the only witness who identified the defendant as being at the scene with a gun. By so doing, the majority denies the jury, as the sole trier of fact and credibility, the right to consider facts from which they could draw inferences about the reliability and credibility of the witness. Thus, while I agree with the majority's conclusions as to the other issues raised in this appeal, I respectfully dissent from its conclusion that the trial court's instruction1 that the jury could not consider the effect on the state's key witness of the witness' smoking of five marijuana joints shortly before the shooting constituted harmless error. As an initial matter, the majority addresses the claim here as a ``nonconstitutional evidentiary'' claim. I disagree with this characterization of the defendant's claim since the jury instruction at issue violated his right to confront and to impeach a witness against him, a right guaranteed both by the sixth amendment to the United

States constitution and by article first,

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Connecticut Law