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STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. NANCY BURTON (SC 18602)
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, McLachlan and Eveleigh, Js. Argued October 28, 2010--officially released January 4, 2011

Nancy Burton, pro se, the appellant (defendant). Mark A. Dubois, chief disciplinary counsel, with whom was Beth L. Baldwin, disciplinary counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, Nancy Burton, a disbarred attorney, appeals1 pro se from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, the statewide grievance committee, in the plaintiff's presentment complaint against her. In its judgment, the trial court disbarred the defendant from the practice of law in this state and prohibited her from applying for reinstatement for a period of five years after she has satisfied all of the conditions for reinstatement to the bar imposed on her as a result of a prior disbarment.2 The defendant's disbarment at issue in the present case arose from a letter she wrote in 1995 to the then chief justice of this court accusing three Superior Court judges of judicial misconduct.3 On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) determined that the defendant had violated rules 8.2 (a)4 and 8.4 (4)5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct because she asserts that the statements in her letter were true, that she submitted the letter in good faith, and that the contents of the letter were protected speech because the defendant has a duty as an attorney to submit grievances concerning judicial misconduct to the proper authorities; (2) determined that the defendant had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct because the court improperly disregarded and distorted the language of the defendant's letter, impermissibly narrowed the scope of inquiry and failed to articulate accepted standards of judicial conduct; (3) granted the attorney general's motion to quash certain of the defendant's subpoenas; (4) displayed prejudice and bias against the defendant; (5) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's presentment after the plaintiff had rested its case; and (6) determined that the presentment had not subjected the defendant to duplicative discipline in that the pendency of the presentment herein was cited as an aggravating factor supporting the defendant's prior disbarment for unrelated conduct occurring in 2000. We reject all of these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. In December, 1995, the defendant, a member of the Connecticut bar, wrote a letter to the then chief justice of this court accusing three Superior Court judges of participating in civil actions ``in a manner presenting the stark appearance of judicial corruption'' and requesting that this court investigate their conduct. Although the defendant claimed that she had ``witnesses, documentation and transcripts'' to support her allegations, the only evidence she produced was her own affidavit. The chief justice subsequently informed the defendant by letter that the court had reviewed the letter and had decided not to conduct a formal investigation.

In December, 2003, the plaintiff filed a presentment complaint against the defendant, alleging that the accusations contained in the letter were false and that her conduct violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 8.2 (a) provides in relevant part that ``[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . .'' Rule 8.4 (4) provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to ``[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .'' The presentment further alleged that in November, 2001, the defendant had been disbarred for unrelated professional misconduct that had occurred in 2000.6 In addition to the defendant's prior disbarment, the presentment also referred to four other incidents for which the defendant had been reprimanded by the plaintiff, and it asserted that the defendant ``has been guilty of misconduct, involving her character, integrity, and professional standing . . . .'' Prior to the hearing in the present matter, the trial court ordered, sua sponte, that the presentment be dismissed on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it because the defendant had already been disbarred from the practice of law in this state as a result of misconduct that had occurred in 2000. See Sullivan v. Monroe, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 00-0370545 (November 2, 2001) (disbarring same defendant on grounds that she had violated several rules of professional conduct by, inter alia, engaging in unauthorized legal representation of several individuals and making misrepresentations to court), writ dismissed, Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004). The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its presentment to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the matter for further proceedings. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 88 Conn. App. 523, 533, 871 A.2d 380 (2005), aff'd, 282 Conn. 1, 917 A.2d 1 (2007). The matter then proceeded to trial. After the plaintiff presented its case, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the presentment on the basis of her claim that the plaintiff had failed to establish its case by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court found that the plaintiff had sustained its burden and denied the motion. As part of her defense, the defendant then attempted to subpoena as witnesses two of the judges whom she had accused of impropriety. The attorney general's office filed an appearance on behalf of the judges and moved to quash the defendant's subpoenas on the ground of judicial immunity. The trial court granted the motion to quash, finding that the judges'

anticipated testimony would not be sufficient to abrogate the principles of judicial immunity, as the defendant had failed to show that there was a compelling need for them to testify. In its decision, the trial court determined that there was a transcript of the judges' testimony from prior proceedings and that its review of the transcript revealed that, in those prior proceedings, the defendant had fully explored the areas of inquiry that she claimed were relevant to the present proceeding. As a result, the court determined that the defendant's ability to defend herself against the claims alleged in the presentment was protected. After a trial to the court, the trial court found that the plaintiff had carried its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that the defendant had failed to produce any credible evidence to support her contention that the allegations in the letter were based on an objective, reasonable belief that the allegations were true. The court noted that the defendant's claim of wrongdoing on the part of the judges had consisted of references to prior rulings by the judges, or of outcomes of prior cases or proceedings over which they presided, which were adverse to the defendant or her clients. As a result, the court disbarred the defendant from the practice of law in this state. As part of the judgment, the defendant was prohibited from applying for reinstatement for five years after she had satisfied all of the conditions for reinstatement to the bar imposed on her as a consequence of her prior disbarment. This appeal followed. I The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly found that the defendant had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We first address the appropriate standard of review. In Brunswick v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 103 Conn. App. 601, 613, 931 A.2d 319, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 929, 934 A.2d 244 (2007), the Appellate Court, after a thorough analysis, determined that ``the clearly erroneous standard . . . is the preferable standard of review in attorney grievance appeals.'' ``A court reviewing an attorney disciplinary proceeding, therefore, retains its inherent authority over the discipline of its officers in those instances when, despite the evidence in the record, it nevertheless is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'' Id., 614. An attorney asserting allegations of corruption against a judge must have a reasonable, objective belief in the truth of the statements. In the absence of such a belief, the court will infer that the allegations were either false or made in reckless disregard to truth or falseness. Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 227

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