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****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. NITOR EGBARIN (AC 19801)
Lavery, C. J., and Schaller and Hennessy, Js. Argued October 30, 2000--officially released January 23, 2001 Counsel

Kweku J. Hanson, for the appellant (defendant). Christopher L. Slack, assistant bar counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

HENNESSY, J. The defendant, Nitor Egbarin, an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Connecticut, appeals from the judgment rendered on a presentment in which the trial court concluded that the defendant was guilty of professional misconduct in violation of rule 8.4 (3)1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct2 and suspended him from the practice of law for five years.3 On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) improperly found that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct because rule 8.4 (3) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, (2) improperly found that he engaged in actions prohibited by rule 8.4 (3),

(3) violated his due process rights by considering allegations of misconduct not raised in the presentment, (4) abused its discretion in suspending his license to practice law because the court's findings are unsupported by the record and (5) abused its discretion in suspending his license to practice law for a period of five years. The defendant also claims that the composition of the reviewing subcommittee violated his due process rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts are relevant to this appeal. The defendant has been a member of the bar and has practiced law in Connecticut since 1987. For approximately one year, in 1998, the defendant and his wife leased a house owned by Claude Picard and Pauline Picard (Picards) in Bloomfield, with an option to buy. The defendant decided to exercise his option to purchase the Picards' house, and the purchase price was initially set at either $300,000 or $330,000.4 The property was subsequently appraised for $300,000. To purchase the Picards' property, the defendant obtained a mortgage from Sanborn Corporation (Sanborn) in the amount of $270,000. The Picards then lent $30,000 to the defendant for which the defendant also signed a promissory note. The defendant secured both loans with a mortgage on the property. As a condition to receiving the loans, the defendant provided Sanborn and the Picards with copies of his 1992 and 1993 federal income tax returns. The defendant's 1992 federal income tax return listed an adjusted gross income of $93,603 and a tax liability of $26,210. His 1993 federal income tax return stated that the adjusted gross income was $116,950, with a tax owing of $31,389. The defendant also prepared a Uniform Residential Loan Application (URLA) for Sanborn and answered, ``No, see file,'' to the question on the application regarding whether he was delinquent on any federal debt or financial obligation. As to the defendant's answer of ``No, see file,'' the trial court found that the defendant was referring to certain outstanding student loans. The closing on the property was held on May 31, 1994. Scott Lewis, an attorney, represented the Picards at the closing. The defendant signed and submitted a final version of the URLA at the closing. When asked on the application whether he was delinquent on any federal debt or financial obligation, the defendant answered ``No.'' As of the date of the closing, however, the defendant had in fact not paid, nor even filed for, the amounts due and owing on the 1992 and 1993 federal income tax returns. The defendant did not disclose either to Sanborn or to the Picards that he had not paid his 1992 and 1993 federal income tax obligations. Shortly after the closing, the defendant defaulted on the loan payments to both Sanborn and the Picards. Represented by Lewis, the Picards sued the defendant for the amounts owing on the promissory note. On

November 4, 1998, the court found in favor of the Picards regarding the promissory note and awarded damages in favor of the Picards in the amount of $38,544. In 1996, Lewis filed with the plaintiff statewide grievance committee a grievance complaint against the defendant alleging that the defendant violated rules 3.3 (a) and (b); 4.1 (a) and (b); and 8.4 (a), (b) and (c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.5 On April 30, 1997, a grievance panel found probable cause that the defendant violated rules 4.1 (a) and 8.4 (3).6 A reviewing subcommittee of the statewide grievance committee found that the defendant violated rule 8.4 (3) and recommended a Superior Court presentment.7 On December 10, 1998, the plaintiff filed a presentment in the Superior Court.8 In the presentment, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated rule 8.4 (3) ``by providing the tax returns but not disclosing to the lender and sellers that the tax liability represented in the returns had not been paid'' and ``by falsely representing on the [URLA] that he was not delinquent on any federal debt or other financial obligation.'' A hearing ensued. During the presentment hearing, which commenced in March, 1999, Claude Picard testified that in lending the defendant $30,000, he relied, in part, on the federal income tax returns that the defendant provided. At the hearing, the defendant also testified and stated before the trial court that at the time of the property closing in 1994, his taxes were not paid in full because of a personal arrangement with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). When the court asked the defendant about the details of his arrangement with the IRS, the defendant avoided answering the question and failed to provide the court with any information or details. The defendant further revealed to the court that he also failed to pay his 1994 taxes. On June 22, 1999, in a memorandum of decision, the court held that the plaintiff demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of professional misconduct and suspended the defendant from practicing law for five years. Specifically, the court concluded that the defendant violated rule 8.4 (3) in that he ``fraudulently misrepresented relevant facts to his mortgage lender and to the seller of his former home. He has failed to pay his taxes and he has been less than honest and forthright with this court.'' After the expiration of the five years, the court stated that the defendant may be readmitted to the bar pending the successful completion of a bar approved course on legal ethics. This appeal followed. Before addressing the defendant's specific claims, our analysis begins with a review of the legal principles that govern attorney disciplinary proceedings. ``An

attorney is admitted to the practice of law on the implied condition that the continuation of this right depends on remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it.'' Statewide Grievance Committee v. Fountain, 56 Conn. App. 375, 377, 743 A.2d 647 (2000). The Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in accordance with high standards in both their personal and professional lives. See Preamble to Rules of Professional Conduct. As officers and commissioners of the court, attorneys are in a special relationship with the judiciary and are ``subject to the court's discipline.'' Statewide Grievance Committee v. Fountain, supra, 377. It is well established that ``[j]udges of the Superior Court possess the inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar. . . . It is their unique position as officers and commissioners of the court . . . which casts attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary and subjects them to its discipline. . . . [T]he judges have empowered the statewide grievance committee to file presentments in Superior Court seeking judicial sanctions against those claimed to be guilty of misconduct. . . . In carrying out these responsibilities . . . the [statewide grievance committee] is an arm of the court . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Whitney, 227 Conn. 829, 838, 633 A.2d 296 (1993), quoting Sobocinski v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 215 Conn. 517, 525

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