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PAMELA TAYLOR ET AL. v. WILLIAM T. MUCCI (SC 18062)
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Schaller, Js. Argued March 17--officially released August 12, 2008

Ralph J. Monaco, with whom were Thomas J. Londregan and, on the brief, Thomas J. Monaco, for the appellant (named plaintiff). Paul M. Cramer, with whom were Robert J. Williams, Jr., and, on the brief, Louis J. Dagostine, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J. The named plaintiff, Pamela Taylor,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, William T. Mucci. The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that the defendant's motor vehicle liability insurance policy (policy) issued by Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan), does not provide any coverage for the plaintiff's bystander emotional distress claim. The plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly rejected her claim that the policy provided her with an additional $100,000 in bodily injury coverage for her injuries despite Metropolitan's payment of $100,000 for injuries sustained by the plaintiff's minor son. We disagree with the plaintiff, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following stipulated facts and procedural history. On December 24, 2004, the plaintiff's minor son, Andrew Taylor (Andrew), was struck by a car operated by the defendant and suffered bodily injuries as a result. The plaintiff alleges that she suffered emotional distress as a result of having witnessed the bodily injuries to her son.2 At the time of the accident, the policy provided bodily injury coverage with liability limits of $100,000 for ``each person'' and $300,000 for ``each accident.'' The policy defines the liability limit for the per person provision of the policy as ``the most [that Metropolitan] will pay for all damages, including . . . emotional distress . . . arising out of bodily injury sustained by any one person as a result of any one accident.'' The policy's per accident limit is ``the most [that Metropolitan] will pay for all damages, including . . . emotional distress . . . arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons resulting from any one accident.'' The plaintiff filed a four count complaint against the defendant alleging negligence and recklessness with regard to Andrew's injuries, and negligent and reckless infliction of bystander emotional distress to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and settled the claims with respect to Andrew by payment of $100,000, the maximum limit of per person coverage under the policy. The parties subsequently submitted the following question for determination by the trial court: ``whether the [Metropolitan] policy . . . provides for an additional $100,000 in coverage for [the plaintiff's] bystander emotional distress claim.'' The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, concluding that the policy does not provide an additional $100,000 coverage for the plaintiff. This appeal followed.3 The plaintiff claims4 on appeal that the trial court improperly concluded that, as a matter of law, the policy

does not provide an additional $100,000 in coverage to satisfy her bystander emotional distress claim. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the exhaustion of the $100,000 per person policy limit for Andrew's injuries does not preclude her from recovering on her claim because the emotional distress she suffered constitutes a separate and distinct ``bodily injury'' under the language of the policy, thus allowing her to recover under a separate per person provision limit in the policy. The defendant responds that the plaintiff cannot recover under a separate per person limit because her claim of bystander emotional distress does not constitute a ``bodily injury'' under the terms of the policy. Consequently, the defendant asserts, the plaintiff could recover only under the per person limit applicable to Andrew's injuries, which had been exhausted due to the $100,000 payment made for his injuries. We agree with the defendant. We first set forth the applicable standard of review. ``[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court which this court reviews de novo.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Galgano v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 519, 838 A.2d 993 (2004). Certain well settled principles of law govern the resolution of this claim. ``An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Enviro Express, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 194, 199, 901 A.2d 666 (2006). In accordance with those principles, ``[t]he determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy. . . . If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 267, 819 A.2d 773 (2003). Under those circumstances, the policy ``is to be given effect according to its terms.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kitmirides v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 65 Conn. App. 729, 733, 783 A.2d 1079 (2001), aff'd, 260 Conn. 336, 796 A.2d 1185 (2002). ``When interpreting [an insurance policy], we must look at the contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions together and, if possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Medical Ins. Co. v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 6, A.2d (2008). In the present case, both parties assert that the policy language at issue unambiguously supports their respective interpretations. We agree with the defendant's interpretation. Applying the appropriate standard of review to the allegations of the complaint and the lan-

guage of the policy, we conclude that the plaintiff's allegation of bystander emotional distress resulting from witnessing her son's injuries does not constitute a bodily injury as that term is defined in the policy. The plaintiff therefore cannot recover under a separate per person coverage limitation. In addition, she cannot recover under the limit of coverage pertaining to Andrew because the $100,000 payment made with regard to his claim exhausted his per person coverage limit under the policy. We begin with the language of the policy. As we noted previously, the policy limits recovery for bodily injury to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. The ``limit of liability'' provision of the policy provides that recovery under the per occurrence provision requires ``bodily injury sustained by two or more persons resulting from any one accident.'' There is no dispute that Andrew sustained bodily injuries within the meaning of the policy, and he was compensated by payment of the maximum $100,000 per person limit of coverage in the policy. We now must determine whether the plaintiff's claim for bystander emotional distress constitutes a separate and distinct bodily injury under the policy. The policy defines ``bodily injury'' as ``any bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by any person.'' Several recent decisions of this court have established that emotional distress, without accompanying physical harm, does not constitute a ``bodily injury.'' In Moore v. Continental Casualty Co., 252 Conn. 405, 746 A.2d 1252 (2000), we considered the issue of whether allegations of emotional distress arising out of economic loss sufficed to trigger a duty to defend under a homeowner's insurance policy. The relevant policy provided coverage for ``bodily injury,'' which was defined as ``bodily harm, sickness or disease . . . .'' Id., 407. We concluded that emotional distress did not constitute ``bodily injury'' within the meaning of the policy, and that such allegations did not trigger the insurer's duty to defend. We reasoned, citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary, that the word ``bodily,'' as typically used in the English language, ``strongly suggests something physical and corporeal,'' as opposed to emotional or psychological. Moore v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, 410

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