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CLAUDIA WEISS v. MARTIN T. WEISS (SC 18209)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille, Zarella and McLachlan, Js.* Argued October 20, 2009--officially released July 20, 2010

Gerald S. Sack, with whom was Eamonn S. Wisneski, for the appellant (plaintiff). Anthony R. Minchella, with whom, on the brief, was Elizabeth S. Lachterman, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

McLACHLAN, J. The plaintiff, Claudia Weiss, appeals1 from the trial court's summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Martin T. Weiss, the plaintiff's former husband, on the basis of the court's conclusion that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. At the heart of this dispute is the plaintiff's contention that workers' compensation cases are ``personal injury cases'' for the purposes of a contingency fee splitting provision in the parties' marital dissolution agreement. Although the defendant argues that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the plaintiff's action, the plaintiff claims that no aspect of the prior dissolution proceeding, including the hearing on the defendant's subsequent motion for clarification regarding ``personal injury cases,'' prevents her from litigating the definition of that term in this separate action. Because we conclude that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following relevant undisputed facts and procedural history. The parties were married in 1987 and were partners in a law firm, the Law Offices of Weiss and Weiss (law firm), from December, 1988, until December, 1999. In December, 1999, the plaintiff commenced an action for the dissolution of the marriage. The parties executed a separation agreement (agreement), drafted by the plaintiff, which contained terms regarding the dissolution of both the marriage and the law firm. Specifically, it contained the following provision: ``The [plaintiff] shall receive [one third] of all contingency fees generated from personal injury cases at . . . [the law firm] active as of November 1, 1999 . . . . The parties have also agreed that the [plaintiff] shall receive a [20 percent] interest in the fee generated from a recent stipulated settlement in the [s]econd [d]istrict [w]orkers' [c]ompensation [d]ivision entitled [Cote v. Tomasso Construction].'' On July 12, 2000, and before the court heard evidence about the agreement, the defendant provided the plaintiff with copies of the law firm's account statements from August through December, 1999, as well a list of ``[a]ctive [p]ersonal [i]njury [f]iles [t]hrough November, 1999.'' The list included the name, date of loss and status of sixty-nine cases. On June 10, 2002, the defendant moved for summary enforcement of the agreement. During the dissolution trial that followed, the plaintiff claimed that various provisions in the agreement were ambiguous, including the phrase ``of counsel,'' the lack of a schedule of personal property, the paragraph stating that the parties had sufficient knowledge of each other's finances, and provisions regarding fee splitting, which did not specify whether the plaintiff was to receive her share from the

net or gross fees. The plaintiff conceded at that time that the remaining terms of the agreement were not ambiguous. After a nine day trial, which included twenty-two witnesses and seventy-three exhibits, the court, Scholl, J., by way of a memorandum of decision dated January 3, 2003, found that, pursuant to General Statutes

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Connecticut Law