Preview:

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY ALLIED CAPITAL CORPORATION, a Maryland corporation, Plaintiff, v. GC-SUN HOLDINGS, L.P, a Delaware limited partnership, GC-SUN G.P., INC., a Delaware corporation; GC-SUN HOLDINGS II, L.P., a Delaware limited Partnership; GC-SUN G.P. II, INC., a Delaware corporation; GC-SUN FRONTIER INVESTORS, LLC, f/k/a/ BRAFASCO INVESTORS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; BRAFASCO HOLDINGS II, INC., a Delaware corporation; GLENCOE CAPITAL PARTNERS II, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership; GLENCOE CAPITAL, LLC, an Illinois limited liability company; and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

C.A. No. 1954-N

OPINION Date Submitted: September 18, 2006 Date Decided: November 22, 2006 Daniel B. Rath, Esquire, Rebecca L. Butcher, Esquire, James S. Green, Jr., Esquire, LANDIS RATH & COBB LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Daniel M. Litt, Esquire, Jeffrey Rhodes, Esquire, Addy Schmitt, Esquire, DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO MORIN & OSHINSKY LLP, Washington D.C., Attorneys for Plaintiffs. Raymond J. DiCamillo, Esquire, Elizabeth C. Tucker, Esquire, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Janet Malloy Link, Esquire, B. John Casey, Esquire, Meghan H. Sullivan, Esquire, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Defendants. STRINE, Vice Chancellor.

I. Introduction The plaintiff, Allied Capital Corporation ("Allied"), brought this case in an effort to collect on a promissory note. Allied claims that the insolvent debtor, GCSun Holdings, L.P. ("Sun I"), a Delaware limited partnership, would have had the wherewithal to either repay the note in full, or at least the principal amount, had Sun I's general partner -- a controlled affiliate of defendant Glencoe Capital Partners II, L.P. ("Glencoe") -- not embarked on a scheme by which Allied's claim on the note was subordinated to a new equity investment made by an affiliate formed by Glencoe for the purpose of making that investment. Allied has mounted a jurisprudentially-intergalactic campaign to recover on the note. It has sued all of the affiliated entities of Glencoe that were possibly involved in the disputed equity investment as well as the unidentified human beings who served those affiliated entities as officers and directors. Allied's causes of action are numerous, and include counts for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, tortious interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The numerous defendants have moved to dismiss certain discrete aspects of Allied's bounteous pleading for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This opinion resolves that motion. First, the decision addresses the counts in Allied's complaint pleading breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
1

and tortious interference with contract claims. Allied premises those claims on the notion that the note prohibited Glencoe and any of its affiliates from making the disputed equity investment. But there is a fundamental flaw in Allied's theory. By its express terms, the note only prohibited Sun I or its subsidiaries from incurring any "indebtedness for borrowed money" to Glencoe or its affiliates. The new equity investment is plainly not "indebtedness for borrowed money." Despite all of its assertions in the complaint that it had extracted a contractual prohibition on any form of investment by Glencoe and its affiliates that was superior to or equal in priority to the note held by Allied, Allied cannot escape the plain and unambiguous language of the note itself. That language clearly proscribed Glencoe and its affiliates from making a debt investment in Sun I or any of its subsidiaries. Had the sophisticated parties to the note meant to preclude Glencoe from making "equity" investments in those entities, they would have said so. Instead, they chose to restrict only "indebtedness for borrowed money." Although other legal doctrines -- such as equitable principles of fiduciary duty or statutes addressing fraudulent conveyances -- might condemn the equity investment if its terms were unfairly advantageous to Glencoe, the plain terms of the note preclude the notion that the note itself forbade that investment. This is another in a long line of cases in which a plaintiff has tried, unsuccessfully, to argue that the implied covenant grants it a substantive right that it did not extract during negotiation. The promissory note explicitly addressed what types of investment were forbidden, and thus also impliedly addressed the
2

types of investment were not subject to contractual restriction. Accordingly, Allied's implied covenant claim, like the claims of plaintiffs before it that have implored this court to award new contract rights, fails. Allied's theory -- that the note's explicit prohibition of "indebtedness for borrowed money" constituted an implicit ban on any equity investment in Sun I or its subsidiaries that would have the same "practical effect" as a debt investment -- is contrary to Delaware's law of contracts. Restrictive covenants in contracts, like promissory notes, that limit the commercial freedom otherwise available to the parties cannot reasonably be read in the squishy and uncertain manner Allied suggests. When an issuer negotiates an agreement that only precludes it -- as a matter of contract -- from making a discrete form of investment, it is entitled to rely upon the words of the contract. To rule otherwise would turn the contractual relationship on its head, forcing the issuer to prove that its apparently unrestricted right to make equity investments was not implicitly precluded by the note's limited explicit prohibition on "indebtedness for borrowed money." Restrictive covenants are carefully negotiated and our law requires that their unambiguous terms be given effect. When a noteholder is only able to obtain a contractual restriction on "indebtedness for borrowed money," it is stuck with that, and cannot, as an "oh by the way," claim that it never occurred to it to argue for a broader restriction on equity investments in subsidiaries -- especially when any reasonable negotiator would have recognized that the words "indebtedness for borrowed money" entirely fail to address equity investments. To permit the noteholder to claim that the issuer
3

breached an implied covenant, and to grant it a right that it clearly did not obtain at the bargaining table, would involve a judicial rewriting of the contract and would disrupt the value that flows from interpreting clear contracts as written. Because Allied's tortious interference claim depends on the viability of its breach of contract claim, that claim also fails. The second major issue on appeal is whether a claim can be pled against Glencoe and its affiliated entities for civil conspiracy. The defendants contend, with little explanation, that, as a result of their corporate relatedness, they cannot, as a matter of law, conspire with one another. The issue presented implicates a muddy area of Anglo-American jurisprudence and the parties have done little to help clear the murk. Because of the lack of clarity, I have approached the question presented with caution. At this stage, I hold only that a conspiracy claim can be pled on the unique facts of this case, where Allied (in simple terms) has alleged that a parent entity (Glencoe) concocted, in bad faith, a scheme whereby one of its controlled, first-tier subsidiaries was rendered unable to pay its debts because Glencoe, the first-tier subsidiary, and a second-tier subsidiary permitted Glencoe's newly formed affiliate to obtain an equity interest in a third-tier subsidiary for an unfair value. Before the new equity infusion, the third-tier subsidiary's equity was entirely owned by the second-tier subsidiary, whose equity was entirely owned by the first-tier subsidiary. The contention is therefore that, through concerted action, the parent and its affiliated entities consciously caused a dilutive injury to the first4

tier subsidiary, knowing that the impoverishment of the first-tier subsidiary would enable the diversion of value from the creditors of the first-tier subsidiary to a newly-formed affiliate of the parent. This scenario is far removed from situations where a parent and subsidiary are privileged to consult, such as when a parent expects that a solvent subsidiary will itself be better off if it commits an "efficient breach of a contract" and pays the injured party contractual damages. Here, the parent and the newly formed affiliate allegedly schemed with the first-tier subsidiary to implement a transaction that would render the first-tier subsidiary insolvent and unable to pay its bills by enabling the newly formed affiliate to dilute the first-tier subsidiary's indirect equity ownership of the third-tier subsidiary. To preclude a conspiracy claim on the argument that the parent and the subsidiaries were one and the same person with identical objectives, and could not, as a matter of law, conspire, is not immediately convincing -- especially when the parent is not offering to make the injured creditor whole using any of its assets or those held by the affiliates involved in the challenged transaction. The state of the briefing is such that I cannot confidently say that Delaware law should embrace a black-letter rule that wholly-owned affiliates of a parent entity cannot conspire with a parent. In other circumstances involving similar considerations -- i.e., the questions of whether a parent can tortiously interfere with the contracts of its subsidiary or can aid and abet breaches of fiduciary duty by a subsidiary -- our courts have refused to hold that the mere fact of common ownership requires
5

treating the commonly-owned entities as a single legal person. Rather, to ensure that such entities may engage in the expected legitimate collaboration, without subjecting each other to joint and several responsibility for any action taken after collaboration, our law has set a high bar that permits such claims to proceed only when facts are pled that suggest that the parent acted with scienter, in the sense that it knowingly assisted the affiliate in committing a wrongful act against another. Facts of that type have been pled here. II. Factual Background1 A. The Parties Sun I is a holding company that owns only one asset: a 100% equity interest in a single wholly-owned subsidiary, defendant GC-Sun Holdings II, L.P. ("Sun II"). Before the events described herein, Sun II, through various subsidiaries, operated a Canadian industrial supply business under the trade name Brafasco. Sun II was highly leveraged and owed a debt of approximately $37.5 million to Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and its affiliated entities (the "Mass Mutual Debt"). By 2002, Sun II was in default on the Mass Mutual Debt. Both Sun I and Sun II were insolvent at all times relevant to this case. In May 2002, Allied's predecessor in interest, SunSub Holdings, LLC ("SunSub"), a former limited partner in Sun I, transferred its equity interest back to Sun I in exchange for a $10 million promissory note (the "$10 Million Note"),

The following facts, as required by Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), are taken from Allied's complaint. 6

1

which was subordinated to the Mass Mutual Debt. As a result of this transaction, Sun I became a wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant Glencoe, an entity that is allegedly controlled by defendant Glencoe Capital, LLC.2 Glencoe exerted effective control over both Sun I and Sun II via its ownership of 100% of the limited partnership units of Sun I, and its ownership, directly or indirectly, of 100% of the stock of the general partners of Sun I and Sun II, defendants GC-Sun G.P., Inc. ("Sun I GP") and GC-Sun G.P. II, Inc. ("Sun II GP"). The $10 Million Note, which, by its terms, became due and payable immediately upon the payoff of the Mass Mutual Debt, was later transferred to Allied. The $10 Million Note contained a restrictive covenant, under which Sun I and its subsidiaries were prohibited from "incur[ring] any indebtedness for borrowed money [other than permitted indebtedness] to [Glencoe or its affiliates] . . . unless such indebtedness is subordinated to [the $10 Million Note]" (the "Insider Debt Restriction"). The $10 Million Note also contained a provision -- a "Permitted Indebtedness Carve-Out" -- that entitled Glencoe to make a $2 million debt investment in the Brafasco enterprise (the "Glencoe Permitted Debt") that would have a higher priority than the $10 Million Note. Glencoe exercised this right by loaning $2 million to Sun II at an interest rate of 30% -- a rate that is very

The pleadings are imprecise in describing the relationship between Glencoe Capital, LLC and Glencoe Capital Partners II, L.P., which I have defined as "Glencoe." The precise relationship between the two entities is not relevant for purposes of this motion. Therefore, to avoid adding to the confusion of the corporate structure described in this opinion, I refer to the two entities collectively as "Glencoe." 7

2

high, but explicitly permissible under the $10 Million Note. That high interest rate highlights Brafasco's undisputed financial distress. Close attention to the complexity of the corporate structure behind the Brafasco enterprise is necessary to resolve this motion. To recap: Glencoe (the ultimate parent entity) owned 100% of Sun I's equity. Sun I owed a $10 million debt to Allied and owned 100% of Sun II's equity. Sun II owed $37.5 million in senior debt to Mass Mutual, as well as the $2 million Glencoe Permitted Debt, and owned, via various subsidiaries, the Brafasco assets. Because Sun I's claim on the Brafasco assets was through its equity interest in Sun II, the debt at the Sun I level (Allied's $10 Million Note) was structurally subordinated to both the Mass Mutual Debt and the Glencoe Permitted Debt. Because Sun I owned 100% of the equity of Sun II, the entity that owned the Brafasco assets, Allied, as a creditor of Sun I, held an indirect claim on the full value of those assets. Its claim was third in line behind the Mass Mutual Debt and the Glencoe Permitted Debt. Thus, Allied alleges that to the extent the Brafasco assets were worth more than $39.5 million, it expected to recover that residual value up to the full amount of the $10 Million Note. Under the terms of the $10 Million Note, Allied expected this position to be protected by the Insider Debt Restriction such that any new money injected into the entities owning Brafasco would either be subordinate to Allied's claim, or would be provided by thirdparties, and not affiliates of Glencoe, after arms-length negotiation, and would

8

thus be fair to Allied and not jeopardize its ability to collect on the $10 Million Note. B. The Restructuring Transaction By November 2004, Glencoe, Sun I, and Sun II had to restructure the Mass Mutual Debt. The resulting transaction (the "Restructuring") is the impetus for this lawsuit. Mass Mutual was demanding immediate payment of at least some of the accrued interest on the Mass Mutual Debt, and because Sun II had little cash, Sun I could not meet that demand without a new capital infusion. In other words, in order to prevent Mass Mutual from exercising its remedies as a creditor, the Brafasco enterprise needed to raise new capital. Allied does not dispute that this need was genuine. What it disputes is the method used to satisfy that exigency. Glencoe looked to an affiliate to make the needed investment. In the Restructuring, Glencoe and its affiliates were necessarily confronted with the $10 Million Note's Insider Debt Restriction, and they took care not to offend its literal language. Sun II contributed the Brafasco operating assets to a newly-formed entity, defendant Brafasco Holdings II, Inc. ("BH II") in exchange for 25% of the equity in that entity. Simultaneously, Glencoe and its affiliates formed another new entity, defendant GC-Sun Frontier Investors, LLC ("Investors"), to contribute $5 million to BH II in return for the other 75% of BH II's equity (the "Equity Investment").3 As part of the Restructuring, BH II assumed the Mass Mutual Debt

The pleadings are not entirely clear on the precise nature of the relationship between Investors and Glencoe. Without the benefit of discovery, Allied has been unable to 9

3

owed by Sun II. The $5 million cash contribution and some other cash was paid directly to Mass Mutual, and Mass Mutual also took a preferred stock interest in BH II. The end result was that Mass Mutual now had a claim of approximately $25 million against BH II's assets, and Investors and Sun II shared whatever was left 75% - 25%. Sun II's 25% share would go first to pay the Glencoe Permitted Debt and various administrative and management fees. Whatever was then left, if anything, would go to Sun I to pay Allied on the $10 Million Note. In structuring this transaction, Glencoe and its affiliates did with equity what they were explicitly not permitted to do with "indebtedness for borrowed money" -- they made an investment in the Brafasco enterprise that was not subordinated to the $10 Million Note. Although Investors bought equity, which is generally thought of as having a lower liquidation priority than debt, the Equity Investment was made at Sun I's third-tier subsidiary, BH II. As a result, Investors, who now owned 75% of BH II's equity, was on the same level as Sun I, to which Allied had to look for payment on the $10 Million Note. But Sun I now had only an indirect 25% equity interest in BH II.4 In Allied's simplified terms, Allied went from having a $10 million claim on 100% of the residual value of the Brafasco

determine the precise identity of Investors' shareholders. The defendants do not dispute that Investors is an "affiliate" of Glencoe or that the Insider Debt Restriction would prohibit Sun I or its subsidiaries from incurring any indebtedness for borrowed money to Investors. 4 The Equity Investment would have shared equal priority with the $10 Million Note even if Investors had contributed the $5 million to Sun II in return for an equity interest in Sun II. It appears that Sun II dropped the Brafasco assets down to the lower level BH II subsidiary so that the new investment would take priority over the Glencoe Permitted Debt, which was at the Sun II level. 10

assets to having a claim on only 25% of that value. Investors -- an affiliate of Glencoe -- acquired the other 75% for $5 million. What Allied finds most problematic about the Equity Investment is that it was not the product of arms-length bargaining. Glencoe, by virtue of its control over Sun I and Sun II was bargaining with itself, and could have given its affiliate, Investors, as big or as little a share of BH II's equity as it wanted. Allied, who, before the Restructuring, held the residual claim on the Brafasco assets, had no voice during the negotiations and no representation in Sun I or Sun II's management. Allied claims that this conflict of interest resulted in Investors not giving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 75% equity interest in BH II that it acquired. In other words, Allied contends that 75% of BH II's equity was worth far more than $5 million at the time of the Restructuring. Allied claims that, as a result, the Restructuring was an unfair self-dealing transaction that was specifically designed to harm Sun II, and its parent Sun I, so that Glencoe and its affiliates could usurp the residual value of the Brafasco business without paying anything to Allied, who could only look to Sun I, now stripped of all valuable assets, to collect on the $10 Million Note. C. The Home Depot Transaction As it turns out, Investors, in fact, made themselves a mighty fine investment. On June 30, 2005, only six months after the Restructuring, the Brafasco business was sold to Home Depot (the "Home Depot Transaction") for a

11

total purchase price of approximately $50 million,5 subject to a holdback of about $12.75 million.6 At closing, the Mass Mutual Debt was paid in full, and assuming Home Depot pays the entire holdback amount, that leaves $25 million to be split 75%25% between Investors and Sun II. Investors doubled its money in six months, and will nearly double it again when the final holdback payment is received. Meanwhile, after Sun II repays the Glencoe Permitted Debt (with accrued interest at 30%), and the management and administrative fees, little, if anything, will be left of the cash that came to it as its 25% share of the Home Depot Transaction proceeds. Thus, Sun II will have trivial funds to pay up to Sun I. As a result, Allied expects to recover only pennies on the dollar of the $10 Million Note. III. The Counts In Allied's Complaint That Are Under Attack As Facially Deficient The motion to dismiss challenges four counts in Allied's complaint. Count II seeks recovery under the express terms of the $10 Million Note. Count III argues that the form of the Restructuring breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the $10 Million Note. Count IV asserts a related tortious

The Home Depot Transaction was done in Canadian dollars. The exact purchase price was CDN $59,450,000 with a CDN $15,000,000 holdback. The conversion ratio from Canadian to American dollars fluctuated from about .81 to .89 during the time periods relevant to the transaction. For purposes of this opinion, I have split the difference and assumed a constant conversion ratio of .85. As a result, the numbers used herein are very rough approximations, but are sufficiently accurate for purposes of this opinion. 6 The holdback amount was to be dispersed in two approximately equal amounts on the first and second anniversaries of the June 30, 2005 closing date. 12

5

interference with contract claim. Count VIII alleges a civil conspiracy among the myriad of Glencoe affiliated entities involved in the Restructuring. The first two challenged counts actually assert an identical argument. Count II alleges that the fact that Glencoe's affiliate, Investors, made the Equity Investment in the Brafasco enterprise that shared equal priority with the $10 Million Note violated the express terms of the $10 Million Note's Insider Debt Restriction. As will be seen, that contention is obviously wrong and therefore Allied buttresses it by arguing that because the Equity Investment in BH II had, in Allied's view, the same subordinating effect as a loan of money to Sun I, the Equity Investment was therefore forbidden by the Insider Debt Restriction. In other words, Allied is premising its argument that the Equity Investment breached the literal terms of the Insider Debt Restriction on the notion that the literal terms implicitly incorporated other terms. Properly conceived, this argument is therefore identical to that made in Count III of the complaint, which argues that the Equity Investment violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the $10 Million Note by offending the goal and spirit of the Insider Debt Restriction, which Allied claims was to prevent Glencoe or its affiliates from making any investment at all in the Brafasco enterprise that was not subordinate to the $10 Million Note. Count IV, which claims tortious interference against all of the entities other than Sun I, is based on the same argument. That count's viability turns in the first instance on whether Allied has pled a breach of contract claim.

13

The other counts in Allied's complaint are not contractual and all have their essence in the contention that Glencoe knew that the Restructuring was not fair to Allied. They involve allegations that Glencoe intentionally enriched itself, through its affiliate, Investors, at Allied's expense by making a fraudulent and unfair transfer of the BH II equity to Investors (1) with the purpose of rendering Sun I unable to pay the $10 Million Note, and (2) in disregard of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty that Allied was owed by virtue of its position as a creditor of an insolvent Delaware entity, Sun I. As one of these non-contractual claims, Allied asserts, as Count VIII, a civil conspiracy cause of action, alleging that Glencoe, its subsidiaries and affiliates, and the officers and directors of Sun I and Sun II (whose identities are allegedly unknown to Allied, and, as a result, are identified as John Does 1-10 in Allied's complaint) all acted in concert and agreed upon a malevolent plan to enrich themselves at Allied's expense. This is the only non-contractual cause of action that the defendants have moved to dismiss. I will address the challenges to the complaint in the following order. Initially, I will analyze whether the complaint states a claim for breach of, or tortious interference with, the Insider Debt Restriction in the $10 Million Note. Then, I will examine whether the civil conspiracy count in the complaint is viable. IV. The Procedural Standard The defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is governed by the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard, which requires me to accept all well-pled
14

allegations of fact as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Allied's favor.7 I need not, however, accept as true conclusory assertions unsupported by specific factual allegations.8 If, after these principles are applied, I conclude that the facts fail to support a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be granted.9 V. Does The Complaint State A Claim For Breach Of The $10 Million Note? A. The Governing Principles Of Contract Interpretation Under Delaware law, the proper interpretation of language in a contract is a question of law. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss is a proper framework for determining the meaning of contract language.10 When the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, binding effect should be given to its evident meaning.11 Only where the contract's language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation may a court look to parol evidence; otherwise, only the language of the contract itself is considered in determining the intentions of the parties.12 In interpreting contract language, clear and unambiguous terms are interpreted according to their ordinary and usual meaning.13 Absent some ambiguity, Delaware courts will not distort or twist contract language under the

E.g., In re Lukens, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 727 (Del. Ch. 1999). E.g., H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 139 (Del. Ch. 2003). 9 E.g., Kohls v. Kenetech Corp., 791 A.2d 763, 767 (Del. Ch. 2000). 10 E.g., OSI Systems, Inc. v. Instrumentarium Corp., 892 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Del. Ch. 2006). 11 E.g., Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del. 1992). 12 E.g., Citadel Holding Corp., v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 822 (Del. 1992); Eagle Industries, Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A. 2d 1228, 1232 (Del. 1997). 13 E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006).
8

7

15

guise of construing it.14 When the language of a contract is clear and unequivocal, a party will be bound by its plain meaning because creating an ambiguity where none exists could, in effect, create new contract rights, liabilities and duties to which the parties had not assented.15 By such judicial action, the reliability of written contracts is undermined, thus diminishing the wealth-creating potential of voluntary agreements.16 B. Allied's Express Contract Claim Despite the $10 Million Note's failure to restrict any equity investments by Glencoe or its affiliates in Sun I or its subsidiaries, Allied initially contends that the Restructuring violated the express terms of the $10 Million Note because it involved an investment by a Glencoe affiliate that shared equal priority with the $10 Million Note. But, as noted above, the Insider Debt Restriction only prohibited Sun I or its subsidiaries from incurring any "indebtedness for borrowed money" to Glencoe or its affiliates. Allied's argument that the Equity Investment violated the express terms of the $10 Million Note is, therefore, frivolous. Allied does not base its argument on any reasonable interpretation of the contract language. Rather, Allied falls back on what it asserts is a basic principle of capital structuring -- that debt naturally takes liquidation priority over equity. Allied contends that because the $10 Million Note prohibited an unsubordinated
14 15

Id. Id. 16 See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that creating uncertainty with respect to the meaning of ordinary contract provisions decreases the inherent value of similar contracts). 16

debt investment in Sun I or its subsidiaries, it must also have prohibited the unsubordinated Equity Investment because equity by its very nature has a lower priority than debt. Allied argues that if debt provided by Investors could not share priority with the $10 Million Note, the Equity Investment should not be able to either. It claims that to interpret the Insider Debt Restriction otherwise would render it meaningless because such interpretation would too easily allow Glencoe to avoid the restriction but still accomplish the prohibited result by doing just what it did -- making the new Equity Investment in a downstream subsidiary. But by relying on one fundamental difference between debt and equity to bolster its argument, Allied merely highlights that debt and equity are, as a general matter, two distinct concepts. Allied's argument boils down to the assertion that when the parties to the $10 Million Note used the words "indebtedness for borrowed money," they meant to preclude both debt and garden variety equity investments. That argument is, to put it mildly, unconvincing. Admittedly, at the edges, it can be difficult in some cases to distinguish between a loan of money and an equity investment. The ingenuity of the marketplace and the flexibility afforded by the Delaware General Corporation Law have given rise to a variety of investment securities that blur the line between debt and equity. But this does not mean that equity and debt do not remain importantly distinct categories.17 Here,

For example, with respect to voting rights, the General Corporation Law provides that unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, a stockholder is entitled to one vote for each share that he holds, even if that "stock" has substantial debt-like qualities. 8 Del. C.

Download 84570.pdf

Delaware Law