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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY BARBARA SPRY and, ROY REYNOLDS,
Plaintiffs,

v. ESTATE OF CHARLES J. CONNOR and PHYLLIS HAYES, EXECUTRIX and ) SOLE BENEFICIARY
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) C.A. No. 01C-03-023 ) ) ) )

Date Submitted: January 4, 2002 Date Decided: February 22, 2002 ORDER U PON D EFENDANT'S M OTION FOR S UMMARY J UDGMENT DENIED
Gregory J. Weinig, Esq. of Cooch and Taylor. 824 Market Street, Suite 1000, P.O. Box 1680, Wilmington, Delaware 19899-1680. Attorney for Defendants. Perry F. Gold lust, Esq. of H eiman, A ber, Goldlu st & Bak er, First Fede ral Plaza, Su ite 600, 702 King Street, P.O. Box 1675, Wilmington, Delaware 19899. Attorney for Plaintiffs.

Spry, et al. v. Connor, et al. C.A. No. 01C-03-023 HLA February 22, 2002 Page 2 On this 14th day of February 2002, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the response filed by Plaintiffs, and oral argument, it appears to the Court that: (1) Plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory judgment on March 2, 2001

against D efendan ts. The action was instituted to determin e the own ership of th e property at 3709 Lafayette Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19808. On March 15, 1957, Charles J. Connor and Rose E. Connor purchased this property. The habendum clause described the tenancy as "tenants by the entireties." A question of fact exists as to whether Charles and Rose w ere eve r marrie d. On April 12, 1974, Rose died intestate. Plaintiffs, the children of Rose, contend that at her death, half of the property became theirs. Plaintiffs contend that Rose and Charles never m arried and thus a tenancy by the entirety could no t be created. In support of their contention that no marriage between Rose and Charles existed, Plaintiffs cite the lack of a finding of a marriage certificate, that Rose never wore a wedding ring, that Rose told her children they were not married, and that at Rose's death the children received Rose' s Socia l Secur ity disability be nefits. From R ose's death until Charle s' death on February 26 , 2000, Ch arles continu ed to occupy the property in question. Plaintiff Spry contends that during the four days after

Spry, et al. v. Connor, et al. C.A. No. 01C-03-023 HLA February 22, 2002 Page 3

her mother's death she had a conversation with Charles allowing him to live in the house as long as he did not marry. No further dealings with the property occurred until Charles death. Charle s left a w ill leaving his entire estate, sa ns a traile r home , to his nie ce Phyllis. Plaintiffs' atto rney contacted Phyllis with Pla intiffs' conte ntion that ha lf of the pro perty in question belonged to them. On September 26, 2000, a "Statement of Claim" was filed against Charles' estate, which represented that the claim arose on the day of Charles' death. Phyllis, as Executrix of Charles' will, rejected this claim. Plaintiffs then filed a Petition for Partition in the Court of Chancery on N ovember 21, 20 00. Upon D efendant's Motion to Dismiss that petition, the Court of Chancery stayed that proceedings so that Plaintiffs co uld file a suit in th e Superio r Court to d etermine w ho held title to th e property in ques tion. Th us, this su it was f iled. (2) Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has shown that

there are no genuine iss ues of m aterial fact and that the mo ving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 In considering such a motion, the Court must evaluate the

fact s in th e ligh t most favora ble to the n on-m ovin g party. 2 Summary judgment will not be

1

Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679 (Del. 1979). Id.

2

Spry, et al. v. Connor, et al. C.A. No. 01C-03-023 HLA February 22, 2002 Page 4

granted un der circum stances w here the rec ord reason ably indicates tha t a material fa ct is in dispute or if it seems de sirable to inqu ire more tho roughly into the facts in orde r to clarify the application of law to the circumstances.3 (3) Defendants raise f our arguments in su pport of their Mo tion for Summ ary

Judgme nt: (1) Plaintiff s' claim is barr ed by the statute o f limitations; (2) Plaintiffs' cla im is barred by the doctrine of laches; (3) Plaintiffs' claim is barred by adverse possession; and (4) Pla intiffs' claim is barred bec ause the de ed conve yed a joint tenan cy and not a tenancy by the en tirety. Plaintiffs' ma in argume nt to each o f these con tentions is that a materia l questio n of fa ct exists a s to each one to b ar a find ing of s umm ary judgm ent. Indeed, as Defendants raised this motion, the facts must be looked at in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. (4) The Court denies summary judgment on Defendants first ground that

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs filed a claim on the Estate within the statute of limitations, on S eptember 26, 200 0. The claim arose be fore Charles' death. Thus, an eight-month statute of limitations applies and the claim was properly filed within that time frame, as stated in 12 Del. C .

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