Preview:

IN  THE  SUPERIOR  COURT  OF  THE  STATE  OF  DELAWARE
IN  AND  FOR  NEW  CASTLE  COUNTY
TRAVELERS  PROPERTY  CASUALTY                                          )
CORP.  a/s/o  DENNIS  LATINA,                                          )
)
Plaintiff,                                                             )
                                                                       )
5.                                                                     ) C.A. No. 01C-01-254(CHT)
                                                                       )
GEORGE KLEDARAS, OD., P.A.,d/b/a                                       )
PENNY HILL EYE CENTER; PAUL C.                                         )
MITCHELL, O.D., EYE CARE OF  )
DELAWARE, LLC, and ST. FRANCIS                                         )
HOSPITAL, INC.,                                                        )
)
Defendants.                                                            )
OPINION AND ORDER
On  the  Defendants’  Motion  to  Dismiss
Submitted:  May  10,  2001
Decided:  September  18,  2001
Louis  J.  Rizzo,  Esquire,  REGER  &  RIZZO,                          1225  North  King
Street, Legal Arts Building, Suite  900, Wilmington, DE  19801,
Attorney   for   the   Plaintiff,   Travelers   Property   Casualty
Corporation.
William  J.  Cattie,  III,  Esquire,                                   1201  Orange  Street,  Suite
502, P.O. Box  588, Wilmington, DE  19899-0588, Attorney for the
Defendant,  George  Kledaras,  O.D.,  P.A.
Christian  J.  Singewald,  Esquire,  WHITE  AND  WILLIAMS  LLP,  824
Market Street, Suite  902, P.O. Box  709, Wilmington, DE  19899,
Attorney  for  the  Defendant,  St.  Francis  Hospital.
TOLIVER,  Judge
STATEMENT  OF  FACTS




On  January                                                                      30,                 1998,  Dennis  Latina  was  employed  and
working  at  the  Port  of  Wilmington  in  Wilmington,  Delaware.1
On  that  date  and  unbeknownst  to  him,  a  foreign  object  was
blown   into   Mr.   Latina’s   eye   during   the   course   of   his
employment  causing  him  injury  and  discomfort.     He  sought
treatment  from  Dr.  George  Kledaras  that  same  day.      His
employer  was  insured  for  purposes  of  the  Delaware  Workers’
Compensation  Act,                                                               19  Del.  C.  Ch.   21,  et  seq.                               (hereinafter
referred  to  by  section  only),  by  Travelers  Property  Casualty
Corporation.
1  The  record  does  not  reflect  the  nature  of  Mr.  Latina’s  employment
nor  his  employer.    However,  these  facts  bear  no  relevance  to  the
disposition  of  the  issues  before  the  Court.
-2-




Based  upon  his  examination,  Dr.  Kledaras  diagnosed  Mr.
Latina  with  acute  bacterial  conjunctivitis2  and  prescribed
some medications.    Two days later, Mr. Latina sought treatment
at  St.  Francis  Hospital  for  a  tearing  sensation  in  the  same
eye.    The medical personnel at St. Francis also diagnosed Mr.
Latina  with  conjunctivitis.    Dr.  Kledaras  continued  to  treat
Mr.  Latina  for  conjunctivitis  over  the  next  two  months.    It
appears  that  neither  Dr.  Kledaras  nor  St.  Francis  Hospital
examined  Mr.  Latina’s  upper  right  lid  for  the  presence  of  a
foreign  object.      On  March                                                23,   1998,  Dr.  Kledaras  referred
Mr.  Latina  to  Dr.  Paul  Mitchell.    Dr.  Mitchell  examined  the
affected area and found a  “stone” imbedded in his upper right
eye  lid.    In  spite  of  the  action  taken  by  Dr.  Mitchell,  Mr.
Latina’s   vision   worsened,   forcing   him   to   seek   further
treatment   at   the   Wills   Eye   Hospital   in   Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.    There he received treatment for a corneal ulcer
and  underwent  an  operation  on  May                                         4,    1998,  to  repair  the
2  Inflamation  of  the  mucous  membrane  investing  the  anterior  surface
-3-




damage  to  his  eye.     Despite  this  operation,  Mr.  Latina’s
vision in his right eye remained at  20/200, requiring that he
wear  a  contact  lens  in  that  eye.     He  received  workers’
compensation  benefits  as  a  result  of  this  injury.
On   January                                                           28,            2000,   Mr.   Latina   filed   a   medical
malpractice  action  against  Dr.  Kledaras  and  St.  Francis
Hospital. See Latina v. Kledaras, Del. Super., C. A. No.  00C-
01-230  (CHT).    Approximately  one  year  later,  on  January  29,
2001,  Travelers,  having  paid  the  aforementioned  workers’
compensation  benefits  of  behalf  of  Mr.  Latina’s  employer,
asserted  its  rights  to  subrogation  pursuant  to                   19  Del.  C.
§2363, and commenced this action against Dr. Kledaras and St.
Francis  Hospital  Inc.     The  essence  of  Travelers’  cause  of
action  is  the  claim  that  the  Defendants  were  negligent  in
failing to locate, diagnose and treat the foreign object that
was in Mr. Latina’s eye.    Travelers asked that the Defendants
be required to reimburse it for monies that it had to pay, and
of  the  eyeball  and  the  posterior  surface  of  the  eye  lids.
-4-




will  have  to  pay  in  the  future,  to  Mr.  Latina  in  the  form  of
workers’  compensation  benefits.
Dr.  Kledaras  and  St.  Francis  have  filed  motions  to
dismiss  pursuant  to  Superior  Court  Civil  Rule                         12(b)(1)  for
lack  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  and  Rule                         12(b)(6)  for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.    It
is   the   Defendants’   contention   that   the   commencement   of
Travelers’ law suit in this matter is barred by the statute of
limitations  as  provided  for  by                                          18  Del.  C.    §6856.      The
Defendants  also  argue  that  19  Del.  C.  §2363  does  not  provide
a  right  of  action  by  the  employer’s  workers’  compensation
carrier  against  a  treating  physician  for  that  physician’s
negligence  in  his  or  her  treatment  of  a  work-related  injury
suffered  by  an  employee.
Travelers  has  responded  by  arguing  that  the  Defendants’
reliance  on                                                                18  Del.  C.    §6856  is  misplaced.     That  section,
Travelers  argues,  applies  to  personal  injuries  arising  from
medical negligence.    Its claims are by way of subrogation for
-5-




workers’  compensation  benefits  and  are  subject  to  the  three-
year  statute  of  limitations  set  forth  in  18  Del.  C.  §8106.
Travelers  also  asserts  that  the  language  of  19  Del.  C.  §2363
does  not  bar  an  insurer’s  subrogation  action  against  a
physician  who  treats  the  employee  negligently.    Nor  is  there
is  any  case  law  which  would  support  such  a  proposition.
DISCUSSION
When  reviewing  a  motion  to  dismiss,  the  Court  must  view
the  record  in  a  light  most  favorable  to  the  nonmoving  party.
All  reasonable  inferences  must  be  construed  most  strongly  in
favor of the plaintiff. Greenly v. Davis, Del. Supr.,  486 A.2d
669,  670  (1984);  Harmon  v.  Eudaily,  Del  Super.,  407  A.2d  232
(1979),  aff’d, Del. Supr.,  420 A.2d  1175  (1980); and Double Z
Enter., Inc. v. Gen. Mktg. Corp., Del. Super., C. A. No.  97C-
-6-




08-076,  Del  Pesco,  J.,  (June  1,  2000)(ORDER).    A  motion  to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
sustained will not be granted unless the plaintiff will not be
able  to  recover  under  any  circumstances  susceptible  of  proof
given  the  allegations  raised  in  that  document.  Browne  v.
Saunders,  Del.  Supr.,  768  A.2d  467  (2001);  Spence  v.  Funk,
Del.  Supr.,  396  A.2d  967  (1978);  and  Bissel  v.  Papastavros’
Assocs. Med. Imaging, Del. Super.,  626 A.2d  856  (1995), appeal
denied,  Del.  Supr.,  623  A.2d  1142  (1993).    For  purposes  of
reviewing  the  complaint,  those  allegations  are  accepted  as
true  and  the  test  of  sufficiency  is  lenient.  State  ex  rel.
Certain-Teed  Prods.  Corp.  v.  United  Pac.  Ins.  Co.,  Del.
Super.,  389  A.2d  777  (1978);  and  Daisy  Constr.  Co.  v.  W.B.
Venables  &  Sons  Inc.,  Del.  Super.,  C.  A.  No.                   95C-02-011,
Babiarz,  J.  (Jan.  14,  2000)(Mem.  Op.)
Entitlement  to  Subrogation  Pursuant  to  §2363
The  authorities  are  generally  in  accord  -  an  employer’s
-7-




right   of   action   against   a   third   party   tortfeasor   for
compensation benefits paid or that will be paid in the future
is derivative.    Stated differently, this right of subrogation
mirrors  any  rights  the  employee  might  have  against  any
tortfeasor  unrelated  to  the  employee’s  employer.    This  rule
applies  with  equal  force  to  an  insurer  standing  in  place  of
the employer. Southland Corp. v. Self, Conn. Super.,  419 A.2d
907  (1980); see also  82 Am. Jur.  2d Workers’ Compensation  §451
(1992).    The  purpose  of  such  a  provision  is  to  prevent  the
tortfeasor  from  avoiding  responsibility  for  the  consequences
of  its  wrongdoing,  and  at  the  same  time,  eliminating  the
possibility of a double recovery by the employee. Dickinson v.
Eastern R.R. Bldrs., Del. Supr.  378 A.2d  650  (1977); and Moore
v.  Gen.  Foods,  Del.  Super.,  459  A.2d  126  (1983).
In  Delaware,  an  employee  injured  in  the  course  of  his
employment cannot bring suit against his employer even if the
employer  was  negligent.    The  employee  is  instead  limited  to
compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  §2304.    That
-8-




limitation,  however,  does  not  prohibit  suit  against  a  third
party  not  involved  in  that  employment  who  may  be  responsible
for  the  employee’s  injury.     Section                               2363,  in  this  regard,
states:
(a) Where the injury for which compensation
is  payable  under  this  chapter  was  caused
under   circumstances   creating   a   legal
liability   in   some   person   other   than   a
natural  person  in  the  same  employ  or  the
employer to pay damages in respect thereof,
the  acceptance of  compensation benefits or
the   taking   of   proceedings   to   enforce
compensation  payments  shall  not  act  as  an
election  of  remedies,  but  such  injured
employee  .  .  . may also proceed to enforce
the   liability   of   such   third   party   for
damages  in  accordance  with  this  section.
If  the  injured  employee                                              .  does  not
commence such action within  260 days after
the occurrence of the personal injury, then
the employer or its compensation insurance
carrier may, within the period of time for
the  commencement  of  actions  prescribed  by
statute,  enforce  the  liability  of  such
other  person  in  the  name  of  that  person  .
Subsection                                                              (c)  dictates  that  a  settlement  by  either  the
employee or the employer and the tortfeasor does not bar suit
by  the  nonsettling  party.    Lastly,  Subsection  (e)  states:
-9-




(e)  In  an  action  to  enforce  the  liability
of a third party, the plaintiff may recover
any   amount   which   the   employee   or   the
employee’s                                                                dependents   or   personal
representative would be entitled to recover
in an action in tort.    Any recovery against
the third party for damages resulting from
personal  injuries  or  death  only,  after
deducting expenses of recovery, shall first
reimburse  the  employer  or  its  workers’
compensation   insurance   carrier   for   any
amounts  paid  or  payable  .  .  .
It  is  readily  apparent  upon  viewing  the  language  set
forth  above,  that  in  this  state  the  compensation  carrier  has
a   right   of   action   against   any   third-party   tortfeasor.
Dickinson  v.  Eastern  R.R.  Bldrs.,  Del.  Supr.,  403  A.2d  717
(1979).   The   extent   of   that   right   is   derivative   of   the
employee’s rights against the tortfeasor and is limited to the
compensation  benefits  paid  to  an  employee  injured  during  the
course  of  his  or  her  employment.  Henshaw  v.  Mays,  Ariz.  Ct.
App.,  512  P.2d  604  (1973);  see  also  82  Am.  Jur.  §451.    The
case  law  is  in  accord  with  this  conclusion.  Distefano  v.
Lamborn, Del. Super.,  84 A.2d  413  (1951), aff’d sub nom Frank
C. Sparks Co., Del. Supr.,  96 A.2d  456  (1953).    Therefore, if
-10-




the injury is compensable and proximately caused, at least in
part,  by  a  third-party  tortfeasor,  the  compensation  insurer
may recover any benefits it has paid to the employee pursuant
to  §2363.3
There  is  no  doubt  that  Mr.  Latina’s  initial  injury  was
compensable.    However,  Travelers  seeks  to  exercise  its  right
of  subrogation  against  Dr.  Kledaras  and  St.  Francis  Hospital
for the aggravation of that injury which resulted from what is
alleged  to  have  been  the  negligent  failure  to  properly  treat
the  same.    In  order  to  exercise  that  right,  there  must  be  a
3  Weber  v.  The  Medical  Center  of  Delaware,  Inc.,  Del.  Super.,  C.  A.
No.  90C-MR-88-1  (SCD),  Del  Pesco,  J.  (April  26,  1994)  (Mem.  Op.),
cited  by  the  Defendants,  is  simply  not  on  point.    It  involved  a
medical  negligence  claim  wherein  the  treating  physician  attempted  to
bring  a  third-party  action  against  the  motorist  who  allegedly  caused
the  initial  injury  which  the  physician  was  charged  with  having
negligently  treated.    This  Court  held  that  the  motorist  and  the
hospital  were  not  joint  tortfeasors.    As  a  result,  there  was  no  basis
for  the  physician  to  seek  contribution  or  indemnification.    The  case
has  no  bearing  on  this  controversy  whatsoever.
-11-




determination  that  aggravation  is  compensable  as  well.
Generally  speaking  the authorities seem to be in  accord.
The aggravation of the initial injury as a result of medical
treatment,    even    if    that    treatment    was    negligently
administered, must be deemed as a continuation of that injury
and compensable. Volterano v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., Pa.
Commw.  Ct.,                                                              613  A.2d                                                   61        (1992).     Fault  is  not  relevant  to
causation or compensability. Page v. Hercules, Del. Supr.,  637
A.2d  29  (1994);  Histed  v.  E.I.  DuPont  de  Nemours  &  Co.,  Del.
Supr.,                                                                    621  A.2d                                                   340       (1993);  and  Duvall  v.  Charles  Connell
Roofing, Del. Supr.,  564 A.2d  1132  (1989).      Although there is
no  Delaware  authority  on  this  issue  which  is  dispositive,
given the scope of the definition of  “injury” set forth in  19
Del.   C.                                                                 §2301,4   there   can   be   little   doubt   that   this
4  Section  2301  states  that:
“Injury” and  “personal injury” mean violence to the
physical  structure  of  the  body,  such  disease  or
infection  as  naturally  results  directly  therefrom
when                                                                      reasonably                                                  treated   and                                          compensable
occupational   diseases   and   compensable   ionizing
-12-




interpretation  applies  to  the  Delaware  statute.    But  for  the
initial  injury  here  there  would  have  been  no  opportunity  for
the  aggravation  alleged  to  have  been  caused  by  the  instant
Defendants.    That aggravation must, as a result, be deemed as
a   compensable   continuation   of   the   initial   injury.            If
Travelers   cannot   escape   responsibility   to   pay   workers’
compensation  benefits  in  these  circumstances,  it  is  entitled
to  seek  reimbursement  of  the  cost  of  those  benefits  from  the
alleged third-party tortfeasor based upon  §2363.    However, the
inquiry   does   not   end   here   in   light   of   the   additional
contention  raised  by  the  Defendants  concerning  whether  the
Travelers  filed  its  claim  within  the  time  allotted  by  law.
The  Applicable  Statute  of  Limitations
radiation injuries arising out of and in the course
of  employment.
-13-




The  Defendants  contend  that  since  Travelers  has  alleged
that they were negligent in administering medical treatment to
Mr. Latina, their complaint should have been filed, as was the
complaint  filed  of  behalf  of  by  Mr.  Latina,  within  the  two-
year  statute  of  limitations  provided  for  18  Del.  C.  Ch.  68.
That  law  governs  the  prosecution  of  medical  negligence
actions  in  this  state.    The  specific  provision  is  set  out  in
18  Del.  C.  §6856  and  requires  that  such  actions  be  brought
within  two  years  of  the  date  of  the  injury  or  death  with  two
exceptions  which  do  not  apply  here.5     As  noted  earlier,
Travelers  did  not  file  the  complaint  in  this  action  until
January  29,  2001; almost  3 years after Mr. Latina suffered his
injury.    The  stated  justification  for  doing  so  was  that  the
5  The  exceptions  as  provided  for  in  §6856  are  as  follows:
(1)  Solely  in  the  event  of  personal  injury  the
occurrence of which, during such period of  2 years,
was  unknown  to  and  could  not  in  the  exercise  of
reasonable  diligence  have  been  discovered  by  the
injured person, such action may be brought prior to
the expiration of  3 years from the date upon which
such  injury  occurred  and  not  thereafter;  and
(2)  A  minor  under  the  age  of  6  years  shall  have
until  the  latter  of  time  for  bringing  such  action
as  provided  for  hereinabove  or  until  the  minor’s
6th  birthday  in  which  to  bring  an  action.
-14-




instant  litigation  sought  to  assert  the  right  of  subrogation
conferred  by                                                           §2363.     Travelers  was  therefore  pursuing  an
action based on a statute which would not bar litigation until
three years had elapsed from the time the cause of action had
arisen  pursuant  to                                                    10  Del.  C.                                         §8106.6     The  Court  does  not
agree.
First, Travelers, as Mr. Latina’s subrogee, stands in his
place  to  the  extent  of  workers’  compensation  benefits  paid.
Dickinson,  403  A.2d  717.  In  that  regard,  its  rights  are  no
greater  than  the  rights  of  the  injured  employee.  Southland,
419 A.2d  907; see also  82 Am. Jur.  §451.    And, no one disputes
that  the  action  filed  by  Mr.  Latina  against  the  Defendants
alleges  medical  negligence  and  must  be  brought  with  the  two-
6                                                                       10  Del.  C.  §8106  holds  in  relevant  part:
No  action  .  .  .  based  on  a  statute  .  .  .  shall  be
brought  after  the  expiration  of  3  years  from  the
accruing  of  the  cause  of  such  action  .  .  .
-15-




year period set forth in  18 Del. C.  §6856.    One must conclude
as  a  result  that  Travelers  is  bound  by  the  same  statute  of
limitations.     It  would  certainly  be  an  oddity  to  say  the
least, if the insurer’s right of subrogation pursuant to  §2363
was greater than that allowed the injured employee upon which
it  is  based.                                                          Second,   Travelers   argument   that   §8106
applies  is  misplaced.     This  is  not  an  action  based  upon  a
statute.    Section  2363 does not confer any substantive rights,
just  the  right  to  bring  suit.     Again,  it  only  allows  the
insurer to stand in place of the injured employee and attempt
to  recover  against  a  third-party  tortfeasor  in  order  to
prevent the tortfeasor from avoiding responsibility or unjust
enrichment  on  the  part  of  the  employee.  Dickinson,  378  A.2d
650; and Moore,  459 A.2d  126.    The distinction, albeit a fine
one,  is  nevertheless  important  and  which  has  been  recognized
by  the  Delaware  Supreme  Court.
In  Harper  v.  State  Farm  Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,  Del.  Supr.,
703  A.2d  136  (1997), the Court ultimately held that an action
-16-




by  an  injured  party  for  personal  injury  protection                (“PIP”)
benefits  against  his  insurer  was  subject  to  the  three-year
statute  of  limitations  set  forth  in  §8106,  and  not  the  two-
year  period  in  §8119.    The  Superior  Court  had  held  that  the
two-year  period  was  controlling,  relying  on  Nationwide  Ins.
Co.  v.  Rothermel,  Del.  Supr.,                                        385  A.2d   691   (1978).   The
Supreme Court distinguished Rothermel, reasoning that because
of  legislative  amendments  to  the  PIP  provisions  of  this
state’s  No-Fault  Insurance  Statute,  21  Del.  C.  §2118,  suits
for  PIP  benefits  were  causes  of  action  based  upon  a  statute
and  must  be  commenced  within  the  three-year  period  set  forth
in  §8106.
Of particular moment to this case, is the Supreme Court’s
discussion   of   the   rationale   underlying   Rothermel.              The
relevant    language  is  as  follows:
In  Rothermel,  the  majority  opinion  harmonized
the  limitation  period  for  an  insured’s  cause  of
action  against  a  PIP  insurer  with  the  limitation
period  for  the  PIP  insurer’s  right  of  subrogation
against  the  individual  tortfeasor.     The  majority
noted   that   a   PIP   insurer’s   subrogation   rights
-17-




against the tortfeasor were based on or derived from
the   plaintiff’s   cause   of   action   against   the
tortfeasor   for   negligence.                                            Consequently,   the
majority  decided  that  a  cause  of  action  based  upon
the  right  to  subrogation  for  PIP  payments  should  be
subject to the two-year limitation period in  10 Del.
C.  §8119. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Rothermel,  385 A.2d
at  693.  Accordingly,  the  majority  declined  to  apply
the                                                                       10   Del.  C.         §8106  limitation  period  to  the
plaintiff’s  action  against  the  PIP  insurer  because
‘[i]t  would  create  an  unreasonable  anomaly  to  hold
that  a  claim  against  an  insurer  for  no-fault  [PIP]
benefits arising out of a personal injury is subject
to  a  different  and  longer  limitations  period  than
the    insurer’s    subrogation    right    against    the
[tortfeasor]’.
703  A.2d  at  138.
Although  Harper  is  not  directly  on  point,  the  reasoning
employed   by   the   Supreme   Court   in   reviewing   Rothermel
illustrates  and  persuasively  supports  the  distinction  drawn
herein.     Moreover,  there  have  been  no  amendments  to              §2363
amplifying, altering or otherwise modifying an insurer’s right
to  subrogation  since  the  statute’s  enactment.    Consequently,
there  is  nothing  in  the  statute  which  would  lead  to  the
conclusion  that  the  aforementioned  right  is  distinguishable
from  or  has  a  basis  other  than  in  the  rights  of  the  injured
-18-




employee   to   bring   suit   against   someone   other   than   his
employer.7
7  In  Harper,  the  Supreme  Court  also  stated:
Although  a  claim  for  PIP  benefits  still  arises
from  a  personal  injury,  the  current  statute  has
at  least  four  provisions  that  together
demonstrate  an  unambiguous  legislative  intention
to  completely  separate  all  litigation  regarding
the  statutory  right  to  PIP  benefits  from  any
independent  cause  of  action  at  common  law  against
a  tortfeasor  for  personal  injury.
703  A.2d  139.    The  absence  of  any  such  legislative  intent  is
conspicuous  in  §2363.
-19-




Any  way  it  is  viewed,  the  Court  must  reach  the  same
result.     Travelers  had  two  years  within  which  to  file  the
instant  action.    It  did  not  do  so.    Prosecution  of  whatever
cause  of  action  it  may  have  had  in  this  context  against  the
Defendants  is  therefore  barred.8
8 In  reaching  this  result,  the  Court  has  not  ruled  upon  the
obligations  between  Travelers  and  Mr.  Latina  regarding  any  lien
Travelers  may  have  against  the  proceeds  of  the  litigation,  if  any,  Mr.
Latina  instituted  against  Dr.  Kledaras  and  St.  Francis  Hospital.
-20-




CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’  Motion to
Dismiss  must  be,  and  hereby  is,  granted.
IT  IS  SO  ORDERED.
TOLIVER,  JUDGE
-21-

Download 15360.pdf

Delaware Law