06-5798 STATE OF FLORIDA v. ERIC M. YOUNG

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State: Florida

Court: Florida First District Court

Docket No: 06-5798

Case Date: 02/25/2008

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, CASE NO. 1D06-5798 v. ERIC M. YOUNG, Appellee. _____________________________/

Opinion filed February 25, 2008.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Henry E. Davis, Judge. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Christine Ann Guard, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Curtis S. Fallgatter of Fallgatter Farmand & Catlin, P. A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND CERTIFICATION LEWIS, J. We deny the State's motion for rehearing and certification. On our own motion, however, we withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following. The State of Florida seeks review of an order granting Eric Young's motion to

suppress evidence gathered during a warrantless search of his office and workplace computer, as well as statements obtained from him in a subsequent interrogation. Although Young did not personally consent to the search, the State contends that the search was reasonable under one or all of the following theories: (1) Young had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the office or computer, (2) church officials who consented to the search had authority to do so, and (3) the officers who conducted the search reasonably relied on the church officials' apparent authority to consent. The State also contends that Young's statements were not a product of the search and, therefore, should not have been suppressed in any event. We reject all of these contentions and affirm the order. At the time of the search, Young was the pastor of Ft. Caroline United Methodist Church ("the church"), a local church under the supervision of the larger United Methodist Church ("the Church"). In the proceedings below, Richard Neal, a district superintendent of the Church, testified regarding the Church's structure, as it related to Young's employment. According to Neal's testimony, the Church is divided into geographical sections known as conferences, and a bishop presides over each conference. Neal explained that bishops appoint pastors after consulting with district superintendents, who supervise the pastors and local churches within their districts. Neal further testified that the Church is governed in accordance with its Book of 2

Discipline and that all pastors agree to be bound by this book when they are ordained.

Young's church was relatively small, with only three full-time staff members: the pastor, a custodian, and a person who served as both the church administrator and the pastor's secretary. Additionally, there was a body within the church known as the staff parish. The church administrator described the staff parish as "the human resources of the church," or the personnel. Although the record is unclear as to the role or authority of the staff parish, the chairperson of staff parish relations testified via deposition that he was not Young's boss or supervisor. The church provided Young with a desktop computer and a private office. Although the computer was provided to Young for use in connection with his duties at the church, there was no official policy regarding the use of the computer or others' access to it. Young's computer was not networked to any other computer, and it was kept in his private office. This office had a special lock that could not be opened with the Church's master key. Three keys to Young's office existed. Young kept two of the keys, and the church administrator kept the third key, which she stored in a locked credenza drawer in her office. According to Young's testimony, a previous pastor had requested the special lock for the office door due to concerns about after-hours intruders. The church 3

administrator testified that she regularly opened the door to Young's office for the custodian and visiting pastors, who occasionally used the office to prepare sermons. However, the church administrator acknowledged that no one was permitted to enter the office without Young's permission. Young testified to this fact himself and added that when he was absent from the office, even the church administrator's access was limited to reasonable business purposes, such as "deliver[ing] paperwork for [him] to sign." Young further testified that the church administrator was not permitted to log on to his computer when he was not physically present. The events leading to the search of Young's office and computer began when the church administrator received a call from the church's Internet service provider. A representative from that company informed the church administrator that spam had been linked to the church's Internet protocol address. In response to this call, the church administrator ran a "spybot" program on the church's computers. She testified that when she ran the program on Young's computer, she saw "some very questionable [w]eb site addresses." The church administrator then contacted a member of the staff parish and an information technology (IT) person to set up a time to have the computer examined. Later, the chairperson of staff parish relations, Kenneth Moreland, contacted Neal to inform him of the situation. After discussing the matter with the bishop and 4

getting approval for the decision, Neal instructed Moreland to contact law enforcement officials and allow them to see the computer. The next morning Neal instructed Young not to return to the church until the two could meet and discuss the situation. When officers arrived at the church, Moreland unlocked Young's office and signed "consent to search" forms for the office and computer. Young arrived at the church during the morning when the officers were there. Moreland and an officer instructed Young to leave the property immediately, and he complied. The two officers who were involved in obtaining consent to search the office and computer testified at the suppression hearing. Both testified that at the time of the search, they understood Moreland to be a "representative of the church" whose authority to consent was based on instructions from a supervisor at the church. Neither of these officers spoke with Moreland's supervisor or asked Moreland further questions about his authority before the search began. One officer testified that she had spoken directly with Neal after she was already inside Young's office. At the time, she knew Neal had never used Young's computer, did not work in Young's office, and did not keep property there. Neal's testimony at the hearing revealed the same information. Similarly, Moreland testified that he did not work in Young's office and did not keep belongings there. However, Neal testified that he had authority to consent to the search and to instruct Young to stay away from the church under the 5

Book of Discipline, by which Young had agreed to be bound when he was ordained. After searching the office and computer, officers went to another location where Young was meeting with Neal. At that time, an officer advised Young of his Miranda rights,1 and Young indicated he was willing to talk. During the interview, the officer showed Young a printout from his computer, which contained a list of Web sites Young had bookmarked. The transcript of the interview indicates that the officer was looking at the printout while questioning Young. During the course of the interview, Young made statements relevant to whether he had a subjective expectation of privacy in his office computer. In particular, when the officer asked, "You have no right to privacy on that computer?," Young responded, "I suppose not . . . I hadn't really thought about it." The officer then stated, "It's like me, . . . my laptop in my truck, if my boss says hand it over, he can look at anything that's on there because it's not mine." Young replied, "I suppose technically you're right." He also made incriminating statements related to child pornography and signed a form giving the officers consent to search a "memory stick" found in his office. Young testified that during the interview, he understood that the officers had been in his office. Statements made by the officer during the interview are consistent with this testimony. After two hearings, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding that,
1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 6

although Neal had authority to consent to the search under the Book of Discipline, he did not have authority to consent under the constitutions of the United States and Florida. The court concluded that the search and seizure was unlawful and that Young's statements were a product of the unlawful search and seizure. Thus, the trial court held that the items seized in the search and the statements taken in the interview could not be used as evidence at trial. We consider the Fourth Amendment issues presented in this case under the requirements of the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See Art. I,

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