08-5030 ISAAC WILDER, v. STATE OF FLORIDA

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State: Florida

Court: Florida First District Court

Docket No: 08-5030

Case Date: 07/07/2010

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ISAAC WILDER, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________/ Opinion filed July 7, 2010.

CASE NO. 1D08-5030

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Linda F. McCallum, Judge. Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and M. J. Lord, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Natalie D. Kirk, Assistant Attorney General, and Giselle Denise Lylen, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

BENTON, J. Isaac Wilder appeals his convictions for first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, and petit theft, on grounds that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence of inculpatory statements he

made, after he had invoked his right to counsel, when the police reinitiated custodial interrogation. Because this point is well taken, we do not address the other points on appeal. We reverse for a new trial, with directions to grant the motion to suppress. As Justice Scalia explained in his opinion for the Court earlier this year, the decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), laid down rules governing custodial interrogation that require reversal in a case like the one before us (the refinement effected by Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1219-20 (U.S. 2010) (requiring abstention from further police-initiated interrogation for only 14 days), having no application here). Miranda announced that police officers must warn a suspect prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, and a right to the presence of an attorney. Id., at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. After the warnings are given, if the suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Id., at 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Similarly, if the suspect states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Id., at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. . . . In Edwards, the Court determined that Zerbst's [Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)] traditional standard for waiver was not sufficient to protect a suspect's right to have counsel present at a subsequent interrogation if he had previously requested counsel; "additional safeguards" were necessary. 451 U.S., at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880. The Court therefore superimposed a "second layer of prophylaxis," McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). Edwards held: 2

"[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. . . . [He] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S., at 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880. The rationale of Edwards is that once a suspect indicates that "he is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel," "any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the `inherently compelling pressures' and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect." Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). Under this rule, a voluntary Miranda waiver is sufficient at the time of an initial attempted interrogation to protect a suspect's right to have counsel present, but it is not sufficient at the time of subsequent attempts if the suspect initially requested the presence of counsel. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1219-20. In the present case, after Mr. Wilder asked for a lawyer in the course of custodial interrogation, his interrogator stopped the questioning, just as Miranda required. But, rather than facilitating--or at least awaiting--an opportunity for him to consult with counsel, the police shortly thereafter reinitiated interrogation. This produced the statements introduced over objection at trial, in violation of the requirements of Edwards. 3

While incarcerated in county jail on other charges, the appellant was interviewed by officers on five different occasions on November 4, 5, and 7, 2005. According to the officers, on November 4, the appellant was interviewed at 6:35 p.m. and 8:10 p.m. Later the same day, while he was being fingerprinted, the conversation turned to the events surrounding the murder, and the appellant indicated that he did not want to talk to the police without counsel. 1

The following exchange took place after the police had finished fingerprinting appellant: [Appellant]: Could you--(inaudible)--talk for real? Honest? Detective Coarsey: Yeah. [Appellant]: (Inaudible)--Listen to me, man. I'm being straight up, man, because I'm straight up guy. Detective Coarsey: Okay. (Inaudible). [Appellant]: I've been straight up the whole time. Detective Coarsey: No, you haven't. What you've been doing is kind of fishing around. [Appellant]: Because the thing is, man, situations like this I honestly really, really try to stay as far away from them as possible because- Detective Coarsey: I don't blame you. [Appellant]: --I'm not--I'm not trying to be caught in no bullshit, man. Detective Coarsey: I don't blame you. [Appellant]: And y'all say--and y'all coming to me -- and I know how y'all play these little games and y'all say this type of stuff. First, you say this person said this and this person ain't said this and this person say this and this person ain't said this. Detective Coarsey: I haven't lied to you yet. I haven't lied to you yet. 4

1

[Appellant]: The thing is, man, I'm not trying to be caught up in no shit that I ain't got no damn thing to do with. You know what I'm saying? I told you. My

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