11-4178 KATINA WILLIAMS, v. CITY OF ORLANDO CITY OF ORLANDO RISK MANAGEMENT

State: Florida

Court: Florida First District Court

Docket No: 11-4178

Case Date: 06/13/2012

Preview:IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA KATINA WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. CITY OF ORLANDO / CITY OF ORLANDO RISK MANAGEMENT, Appellees. _____________________________/ Opinion filed June 13, 2012. An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims. W. James Condry, II, Judge. Date of Accident: October 30, 2010. Kelli Biferie Hastings of Bichler, Clelland, Oliver, Kelley, Hastings, Longo, Spears & Parrish, PLLC, Maitland, and Adam Littman, Winter Park, for Appellant. Nicole D. Ruocco and Larry D. Spencer of Rissman, Barrett, Hurt, Donahue & McLain, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED CASE NO. 1D11-4178

PER CURIAM. In this workers' compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying compensability of her hypertension on the ground she failed to establish eligibility to rely on the statutory presumption of

occupational causation available via section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2010). We reverse. The E/C conceded Claimant met three of the four requirements of section 112.18 by being a police officer whose condition resulted in disability and who "successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into" service. The fourth statutory requirement is that the condition itself be one of those listed in section 112.18: "tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension." This court has held such hypertension must be "arterial or cardiovascular." See Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing City of Miami v. Thomas, 657 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)). The JCC found Claimant failed to prove this final requirement. Even though Claimant, diagnosed with "essential" hypertension, introduced unrefuted medical opinion testimony that "essential" hypertension is "the same thing" and "the same condition" as "arterial" hypertension, the JCC rejected that testimony. A JCC is permitted to reject even unrefuted medical testimony if he gives a reason, so as to permit appellate review. See Vadala v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 822 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Here, the reason the JCC gave is that the medical opinion contravenes his understanding of Bivens and Thomas. Because the JCC's

understanding of that case law is inaccurate, the JCC's rejection of the unrefuted medical opinion testimony was unfounded. 2

Bivens does not hold that, as a matter of law, "essential" hypertension is not covered by section 112.18. To the contrary, Bivens, which also involved a

claimant diagnosed with "essential" hypertension, was decided on the ground there was simply "no record evidence that the JCC could rely on"

Download 11-4178 KATINA WILLIAMS, v. CITY OF ORLANDO / CITY OF ORLANDO RISK MANAGEMENT.pd